I thought moral realism proposes that there do exist agent-independent moral laws.
I’m pretty sure you are wrong. You have realism confused with ‘universality’. Moral realism applies to the situation when you say “It is forbidden that Mary hit John” and I say “It is permissible that Mary hit John”. If realism holds, then one of us is in error—one of those two statements is false.
Compare to you thinking Mary is pretty and my disagreeing. Here, neither of us may be in error, because there may be no “fact of the matter” regarding Mary’s prettiness. It is just a difference of opinion.
Moral realism states that moral judgments are not just matters of opinion—they are matters of fact.
If you had said ‘observer-independent’ rather than ‘agent-independent’, then you would have been closer to the concept of moral realism.
More like “Moral realism is the doctrine stating that moral questions should be addressed using a two-valued logic. As opposed, say, to aesthetic questions.”
So moral realism proposes that there are sorts of moral formalisms whose truth values are observer independent, because their logic is consistent, but not agent-independent because moral formalisms are weighted subjectively based on the preferences of agents. Therefore we have a set of moral formalisms that are true facts about the world as they are endorsed by some agents but weighted differently by different agents.
If you could account for all moral formalisms and how they are weighted by how many agents, would this constitute some sort of universal utility function and its equilibrium equal a world-state that could be called right?
I’m afraid that I am still not being understood. Firstly, the concepts of universalism and moral realism still make sense even if agent preferences have absolutely no impact on morality. Secondly, the notion that ‘moral formalisms’ can be true or false makes me squirm with incomprehension. Third, the notion that true formalisms get weighted in some way by agents leads me to think that you fail to understand the terms “true” and “false”.
Let me try a different example. Someone who claims that correct moral precepts derive their justification from the Koran is probably a moral realist. He is not a universalist though, if he says that Allah assigns different duties and obligations to men and women—to believers and non-believers.
I’m pretty sure you are wrong. You have realism confused with ‘universality’. Moral realism applies to the situation when you say “It is forbidden that Mary hit John” and I say “It is permissible that Mary hit John”. If realism holds, then one of us is in error—one of those two statements is false.
Compare to you thinking Mary is pretty and my disagreeing. Here, neither of us may be in error, because there may be no “fact of the matter” regarding Mary’s prettiness. It is just a difference of opinion.
Moral realism states that moral judgments are not just matters of opinion—they are matters of fact.
If you had said ‘observer-independent’ rather than ‘agent-independent’, then you would have been closer to the concept of moral realism.
So moral realism is a two-valued logic?
I didn’t know there was a difference.
More like “Moral realism is the doctrine stating that moral questions should be addressed using a two-valued logic. As opposed, say, to aesthetic questions.”
So moral realism proposes that there are sorts of moral formalisms whose truth values are observer independent, because their logic is consistent, but not agent-independent because moral formalisms are weighted subjectively based on the preferences of agents. Therefore we have a set of moral formalisms that are true facts about the world as they are endorsed by some agents but weighted differently by different agents.
If you could account for all moral formalisms and how they are weighted by how many agents, would this constitute some sort of universal utility function and its equilibrium equal a world-state that could be called right?
I’m afraid that I am still not being understood. Firstly, the concepts of universalism and moral realism still make sense even if agent preferences have absolutely no impact on morality. Secondly, the notion that ‘moral formalisms’ can be true or false makes me squirm with incomprehension. Third, the notion that true formalisms get weighted in some way by agents leads me to think that you fail to understand the terms “true” and “false”.
Let me try a different example. Someone who claims that correct moral precepts derive their justification from the Koran is probably a moral realist. He is not a universalist though, if he says that Allah assigns different duties and obligations to men and women—to believers and non-believers.