Cognitivism: Yes, moral propositions have truth-value, but not all people are talking about the same facts when they use words like “should”, thus creating the illusion of disagreement.
… and now from this post:
Some people might dispute whether unicorns must be attracted to virgins, but since unicorns aren’t real—since we aren’t locating them within our universe using a causal reference—they’d just be talking about different models, rather than arguing about the properties of a known, fixed mathematical model.
(This little realization also holds a key to resolving the last meditation, I suppose.)
I’ve heard people say the meta-ethics sequence was more or less a failure since not that many people really understood it, but if these last posts were taken as a perequisite reading, it would be at least a bit easier to understand where Eliezer’s coming from.
I’ve heard people say the meta-ethics sequence was more or less a failure since not that many people really understood it, but if these last posts were taken as a perequisite reading, it would be at least a bit easier to understand where Eliezer’s coming from.
Agreed, and disappointed that this comment was downvoted.
So this is where (one of the inspirations for) Eliezer’s meta-ethics comes from! :)
A quick refresher from a former comment:
… and now from this post:
(This little realization also holds a key to resolving the last meditation, I suppose.)
I’ve heard people say the meta-ethics sequence was more or less a failure since not that many people really understood it, but if these last posts were taken as a perequisite reading, it would be at least a bit easier to understand where Eliezer’s coming from.
Agreed, and disappointed that this comment was downvoted.