Motivation is the only thing that causes actions, it’s the only thing that it makes sense to talk about in reference to prescriptive statements. Why do you define motivation as irrational? At worst, it should be arrational. Even then, I see motivation as its own justification and indeed the ultimate source of all justifications for belief in truth, etc. Until you can solve every paradox ever, you need to either embrace nihilism or embrace subjective value as the foundation of justification.
The majority verdict isn’t moral justification because morality is subjective. But for people within the majority, their decision makes sense. If I were in the community, I would do what they do. I believe that it would be morally right for me to do so. Values are the only source of morality that there is.
Motivation is the only thing that causes actions, it’s the only thing that it makes sense to talk about in reference to prescriptive statements.
That doesn’t follow. If it is the only thing that causes actions, then it is relevant to why, as a matter of fact, people do what they do—but that is description, not prescription. Prescription requires extra ingredients.
Why do you define motivation as irrational?
I said that as a matter fof fact it is not necessarily rational. My grounds are that you cna’t always explain you motivations on a ratioanl basis.
Even then, I see motivation as its own justification and indeed the ultimate source of all justifications for belief in truth, etc.
It may be the source of caring about truth and rationality. That does not mke it the source of truth and rationality.
Until you can solve every paradox ever, you need to either embrace nihilism or embrace subjective value as the foundation of justification.
That doens’t follow. I could embrace non-evaluative intutions, for instance.
The majority verdict isn’t moral justification because morality is subjective.
Subjective morality cannot justify laws tha pply to eveybody.
But for people within the majority, their decision makes sense.
It may make sense as a set of personal preferences, but that doens’t justify it being binding on others.
If I were in the community, I would do what they do.
Then you would have colluded with atrocities in other historical societies.
Values are the only source of morality that there is.
That doesn’t follow. If it is the only thing that causes actions, then it is relevant to why, as a matter of fact, people do what they do—but that is description, not prescription. Prescription requires extra ingredients.
In that case, prescription is impossible. Your system can’t handle the is-ought problem.
I said that as a matter fof fact it is not necessarily rational. My grounds are that you cna’t always explain you motivations on a ratioanl basis.
Values are rationality neutral. If you don’t view motivations and values as identical, explain why?
That doens’t follow. I could embrace non-evaluative intutions, for instance.
These intuitions are violated by paradoxes such as the problem of induction or the fact that logical justification is infinitely regressive (turtles all the way down). Your choice is nihilism or an arbitrary starting point, but logic isn’t a valid option.
Subjective morality cannot justify laws tha pply to eveybody.
Sure. Technically this is false if everyone is the same or very similar but I’ll let that slide. Why does this invalidate subjective morality?
It may make sense as a set of personal preferences, but that doens’t justify it being binding on others.
Why would I be motivated by someone else’s preferences? The only thing relevant to my decision is me and my preferences. The fact that this decision effects other people is irrelevant, literally every decision effects other people.
Then you would have colluded with atrocities in other historical societies.
In that case, prescription is impossible. Your system can’t handle the is-ought problem.
Something is not impossible just because it requires extra ingredients.
Values are rationality neutral. If you don’t view motivations and values as identical, explain why?
I don’t care about the difference between irrational and arational, they’re both non-rational.
These intuitions are violated by paradoxes such as the problem of induction or the fact that logical justification is infinitely regressive (turtles all the way down).
Grounding out in an intuitionthat can’t be justified is no worse than grounding out in a value that can’t
be justified.
Your choice is nihilism or an arbitrary starting point, but logic isn’t a valid option.
You are (trying to) use logic right now, How come it works for you?
Why does this invalidate subjective morality?
Because morality needs to be able to tell people why they should not always
act on their first-oder impulses.
Why would I be motivated by someone else’s preferences?
I didn’t say you should.If you have morality as a higher order prefernce, you can be persuaded
to override some of your first ortder preferences. In favour of morality. Which is not subjectiv,e and
therefore not just someone else;s values.
The only thing relevant to my decision is me and my preferences.
You’ve admitted that prefernces can include empathy. They can include respect for universalisable moral
principles too. “My prefernces” does not have to equate to “selfish preferneces”
The fact that this decision effects other people is irrelevant, literally every decision effects other people.
How does choosing vanilla over chocale chip affect other people?
I value human life, you are wrong.
You need to make up your mind whether you value human life more or less than going along with the majority.
Something is not impossible just because it requires extra ingredients.
How do you generate moral principles that conflict with desire? How do you justify moral principles that don’t spring from desire? Why would anyone adopt these moral principles or care what they have to say? How do you overcome the is-ought gap?
Give me a specific example of an objective system that you think is valid and that overcomes the is-ought gap.
Because morality needs to be able to tell people why they should not always act on their first-oder impulses.
Mine can do that. Some impulses contradict other values. Some values outweigh others. Sometimes you make sacrifices now for later gains.
I don’t know why you believe morality needs to be able to restrict impulses, either. Morality is a guide to action. If that guide to action is identical to your inherent first-order impulses, all the better for you.
I didn’t say you should.If you have morality as a higher order prefernce, you can be persuaded to override some of your first ortder preferences. In favour of morality. Which is not subjectiv,e and therefore not just someone else;s values.
Let me rephrase. How can you generate motivational force from abstract principles? Why does morality matter if it has nothing to do with our values?
You’ve admitted that prefernces can include empathy. They can include respect for universalisable moral principles too. “My prefernces” does not have to equate to “selfish preferneces”
Your preferences might include this, yes. I think that would be a weird thing to have built in your preferences and that you should consider self-modifying it out. Regardless, that would be justifying a belief in a universalisable moral principle through subjective principles. You’re trying to justify that belief through nothing but logic, because that is the only way you can characterize your system as truly objective.
How does choosing vanilla over chocale chip affect other people?
There are less vanilla chips for other people. It effects your diet which effects the way you will behave. It will increase your happiness if you value vanilla chips more than chocolate ones. If someone values your happiness, they will be happy you ate vanilla chips. If someone hates when you’re happy, they will be sad.
You need to make up your mind whether you value human life more or less than going along with the majority.
I don’t value going along with the majority in and of itself. If I’m a member of the majority and I have certain values then I would act on those values, but my status as a member of the majority wouldn’t be relevant to morality.
That claim needs justification.
Sure. Pain and pleasure and value are the roots of morality. They exist only in internal experiences. My pain and your pleasure are not interchangeable because there is no big Calculating utility god in the sky to aggregate the content of our experiences. Experience is always individual and internal and value can’t exist outside of experience and morality can’t exist outside of value. The parts of your brain that make you value certain experiences are not connected to the parts of my brain that make me value certain experiences, which means the fact that your experiences aren’t mine is sufficient to refute the idea that your experiences would or should somehow motivate me in and of themselves.
How do you generate moral principles that conflict with desire?
Did you notice my references to “firist order” and “higher order”?
How do you overcome the is-ought gap?
By using rational-should as an intermediate.
Mine can do that. Some impulses contradict other values. Some values outweigh others. Sometimes you make sacrifices now for later gains.
Sometimes you need to follow impersonal, universaliable,...maybe even objective...moral reasoning?
I don’t know why you believe morality needs to be able to restrict impulses,
i don’t know why you think “do what thou wilt” is morlaity. It would be like having a system of logic
that can prove any claim.
either. Morality is a guide to action. If that guide to action is identical to your inherent first-order impulses, all the better for you.
“All the better for me” does not mean “optimal morality”. The job of logic is not to prove everything I happen to believe, and the job of morality is not to confirm all my impulses.
Let me rephrase. How can you generate motivational force from abstract principles?
Some people value reason, and the rest have value systems tweaked by the threat of punishment.
Why does morality matter if it has nothing to do with our values?
You think no one values morality?
Your preferences might include this, yes. I think that would be a weird thing to have built in your preferences and that you should consider self-modifying it out.
What’s weird? Empathy? Morality? Ratioanlity?
You’re trying to justify that belief through nothing but logic, because that is the only way you can characterize your system as truly objective.
You say that like its a bad thing.
There are less vanilla chips for other people
Not necessarily. There might be a surplus.
But if you want to say that everything effects others, albeit to a ti y extent, then it follows that everything is a tiny
bit moral.
I don’t value going along with the majority in and of itself.
You previouly made some statements that sounded a lot like that.
Sure. Pain and pleasure and value are the roots of morality.
That statement needs some justification. Is it better to do good things voluntarily, or because you are forced to?
Experience is always individual and internal and value can’t exist outside of experience and morality can’t exist outside of value.
OK, I though ti was something like that. The things is that subjects can have values which are inherently
interpersonal and even objective...things like empathy and rationality. So “value held by a subject” does not imply “selfish value”.
The parts of your brain that make you value certain experiences are not connected to the parts of my brain that make me value certain experiences, which means the fact that your experiences aren’t mine is sufficient to refute the idea that your experiences would or should somehow motivate me in and of themselves.
Yet agian, objective morality is not a case of one subject being motivated by another subjects values. Objectivity is not achieved by swapping subjects.
Did you notice my references to “firist order” and “higher order”?
This is a black box. Explain what they mean and how you generate the connection between the two.
By using rational-should as an intermediate.
You claim that a rational-should exists. Prove it.
Sometimes you need to follow impersonal, universaliable,...maybe even objective...moral reasoning?
Using objective principles as a tool to evaluate tradeoffs between subjective values is not the same as using objective principles to produce moral truths.
i don’t know why you think “do what thou wilt” is morlaity. It would be like having a system of logic that can prove any claim.
That’s not my definition of morality, it’s the conclusion I end up with. Your analogy doesn’t seem valid to me because I don’t conclude that all moral claims are equal but that all desires are good. Repressing desires or failing to achieve desires is bad. Additionally, its clear to me why a logical system that proves everything is good is bad, but why would a moral system that did the same be invalid?
“All the better for me” does not mean “optimal morality”. The job of logic is not to prove everything I happen to believe, and the job of morality is not to confirm all my impulses.
I agree. I didn’t claim either of those things. Morality doesn’t have a job outside of distinguishing between right and wrong.
What’s weird? Empathy? Morality? Ratioanlity?
The idea that all principles you act upon must be universalizable. It’s bad because individuals are different and should act differently. The principle I defend is a universalizable one, that individuals should do what they want. The difference between mine and yours is that mine is broad and all people are happy when its applied to their case, but yours is narrow and exclusive and egocentric because it neglects differences in individual values, or holds those differences to be morally irrelevant.
Not necessarily. There might be a surplus.
But if you want to say that everything effects others, albeit to a ti y extent, then it follows that everything is a tiny bit moral.
Subtraction, have you heard of it?
Some things are neutral even though they effect others.
That statement needs some justification. Is it better to do good things voluntarily, or because you are forced to?
Voluntarily, because that means you’re acting on your values.
OK, I though ti was something like that. The things is that subjects can have values which are inherently interpersonal and even objective...things like empathy and rationality. So “value held by a subject” does not imply “selfish value”.
If I valued rationality, why would that result in specific moral decrees? Value held by a subject doesn’t imply selfish value, but it does imply that the values of others are only relevant to my morality insofar as I empathize with those others.
Yet agian, objective morality is not a case of one subject being motivated by another subjects values. Objectivity is not achieved by swapping subjects.
“Objectivity” in ethics is achieved by abandoning individual values and beliefs and trying to produce statements which would be valued and believed by everyone. That’s stupid because we can never escape the locus of the self and because morality emerges from internal processes and neglecting those internal processes means that there is zero foundation for any sort of morality. I’m saying that morality is only accessible internally, and that the things which produce morality are internal subjective beliefs.
If you continue to disagree, I suggest we start over. Let me know and I’ll post an argument that I used last year in debate. I feel like starting over would clarify things a lot because we’re getting muddled down in a line-by-line back-and-forth hyperspecific conversation here.
This is a black box. Explain what [first order and higher order] mean and how you generate the connection between the two.
Usual meaning in this type of disucssion.
You claim that a rational-should exists. Prove it.
If I can prove anything to you, you are already running on rational_should.
Using objective principles as a tool to evaluate tradeoffs between subjective values is not the same as using objective principles to produce moral truths.
Why not?
That’s not my definition of morality, it’s the conclusion I end up with.
That doens’t help. It;s not morality whether it’s assumed or concluded.
The idea that all principles you act upon must be [is weird]
It’s bad because individuals are different and should act differently.
Individuals are different and would act differntly. You are arguing as though people should never
do anythng unless it is morally obligated, as though moral rules are all encompassing. I never
said that. Morality does not need to detemine evey action any more than civil law does.
The principle I defend is a universalizable one, that individuals should do what they want.
That isn’t universalisable because you don;t want to be murdered.
The correct form is “individuals should do what they want unless it harms another”.
The difference between mine and yours is that mine is broad and all people are happy when its applied to their case,
We don’t have it.
if people wanted your principle, they would abolish all laws.
but yours is narrow and exclusive and egocentric
!!!
If I valued rationality, why would that result in specific moral decrees?
Look at examples of people arguing about morality.
ETA: Better restrict that to liberals.
There’s plenty about, even on this site.
Value held by a subject doesn’t imply selfish value, but it does imply that the values of others are only relevant to my morality insofar as I empathize with those others.
Nope. Rationality too.
“Objectivity” in ethics is achieved by abandoning individual values and beliefs
Of course not. It is a perfectly acceptable principle that people should be allowed to realise
their values so long as they do not harm others. Where do you ge these ideas?
and trying to produce statements which would be valued and believed by everyone.
Just everyone rational. The police are there for a reason
That’s stupid because we can never escape the locus of the self and because morality emerges from internal processes
Yet again: we can internally value what is objective and impartial. “In me” doesn’t imply “for me”.
and neglecting those internal processes means that there is zero foundation for any sort of morality.
“Neglect” is your straw man.
I’m saying that morality is only accessible internally, and that the things which produce morality are internal subjective beliefs.
Yet again: “In me” doesn’t imply “for me”.
If you continue to disagree, I suggest we start over. Let me know and I’ll post an argument that I used last year in debate. I feel like starting over would clarify things a lot because we’re getting muddled down in a line-by-line back-and-forth hyperspecific conversation here.
Motivation is the only thing that causes actions, it’s the only thing that it makes sense to talk about in reference to prescriptive statements. Why do you define motivation as irrational? At worst, it should be arrational. Even then, I see motivation as its own justification and indeed the ultimate source of all justifications for belief in truth, etc. Until you can solve every paradox ever, you need to either embrace nihilism or embrace subjective value as the foundation of justification.
The majority verdict isn’t moral justification because morality is subjective. But for people within the majority, their decision makes sense. If I were in the community, I would do what they do. I believe that it would be morally right for me to do so. Values are the only source of morality that there is.
That doesn’t follow. If it is the only thing that causes actions, then it is relevant to why, as a matter of fact, people do what they do—but that is description, not prescription. Prescription requires extra ingredients.
I said that as a matter fof fact it is not necessarily rational. My grounds are that you cna’t always explain you motivations on a ratioanl basis.
It may be the source of caring about truth and rationality. That does not mke it the source of truth and rationality.
That doens’t follow. I could embrace non-evaluative intutions, for instance.
Subjective morality cannot justify laws tha pply to eveybody.
It may make sense as a set of personal preferences, but that doens’t justify it being binding on others.
Then you would have colluded with atrocities in other historical societies.
Individual values do not sum to group morality.
In that case, prescription is impossible. Your system can’t handle the is-ought problem.
Values are rationality neutral. If you don’t view motivations and values as identical, explain why?
These intuitions are violated by paradoxes such as the problem of induction or the fact that logical justification is infinitely regressive (turtles all the way down). Your choice is nihilism or an arbitrary starting point, but logic isn’t a valid option.
Sure. Technically this is false if everyone is the same or very similar but I’ll let that slide. Why does this invalidate subjective morality?
Why would I be motivated by someone else’s preferences? The only thing relevant to my decision is me and my preferences. The fact that this decision effects other people is irrelevant, literally every decision effects other people.
I value human life, you are wrong.
Group morality does not exist.
Something is not impossible just because it requires extra ingredients.
I don’t care about the difference between irrational and arational, they’re both non-rational.
Grounding out in an intuitionthat can’t be justified is no worse than grounding out in a value that can’t be justified.
You are (trying to) use logic right now, How come it works for you?
Because morality needs to be able to tell people why they should not always act on their first-oder impulses.
I didn’t say you should.If you have morality as a higher order prefernce, you can be persuaded to override some of your first ortder preferences. In favour of morality. Which is not subjectiv,e and therefore not just someone else;s values.
You’ve admitted that prefernces can include empathy. They can include respect for universalisable moral principles too. “My prefernces” does not have to equate to “selfish preferneces”
How does choosing vanilla over chocale chip affect other people?
You need to make up your mind whether you value human life more or less than going along with the majority.
That claim needs justification.
How do you generate moral principles that conflict with desire? How do you justify moral principles that don’t spring from desire? Why would anyone adopt these moral principles or care what they have to say? How do you overcome the is-ought gap?
Give me a specific example of an objective system that you think is valid and that overcomes the is-ought gap.
Mine can do that. Some impulses contradict other values. Some values outweigh others. Sometimes you make sacrifices now for later gains.
I don’t know why you believe morality needs to be able to restrict impulses, either. Morality is a guide to action. If that guide to action is identical to your inherent first-order impulses, all the better for you.
Let me rephrase. How can you generate motivational force from abstract principles? Why does morality matter if it has nothing to do with our values?
Your preferences might include this, yes. I think that would be a weird thing to have built in your preferences and that you should consider self-modifying it out. Regardless, that would be justifying a belief in a universalisable moral principle through subjective principles. You’re trying to justify that belief through nothing but logic, because that is the only way you can characterize your system as truly objective.
There are less vanilla chips for other people. It effects your diet which effects the way you will behave. It will increase your happiness if you value vanilla chips more than chocolate ones. If someone values your happiness, they will be happy you ate vanilla chips. If someone hates when you’re happy, they will be sad.
I don’t value going along with the majority in and of itself. If I’m a member of the majority and I have certain values then I would act on those values, but my status as a member of the majority wouldn’t be relevant to morality.
Sure. Pain and pleasure and value are the roots of morality. They exist only in internal experiences. My pain and your pleasure are not interchangeable because there is no big Calculating utility god in the sky to aggregate the content of our experiences. Experience is always individual and internal and value can’t exist outside of experience and morality can’t exist outside of value. The parts of your brain that make you value certain experiences are not connected to the parts of my brain that make me value certain experiences, which means the fact that your experiences aren’t mine is sufficient to refute the idea that your experiences would or should somehow motivate me in and of themselves.
Did you notice my references to “firist order” and “higher order”?
By using rational-should as an intermediate.
Sometimes you need to follow impersonal, universaliable,...maybe even objective...moral reasoning?
i don’t know why you think “do what thou wilt” is morlaity. It would be like having a system of logic that can prove any claim.
“All the better for me” does not mean “optimal morality”. The job of logic is not to prove everything I happen to believe, and the job of morality is not to confirm all my impulses.
Some people value reason, and the rest have value systems tweaked by the threat of punishment.
You think no one values morality?
What’s weird? Empathy? Morality? Ratioanlity?
You say that like its a bad thing.
Not necessarily. There might be a surplus.
But if you want to say that everything effects others, albeit to a ti y extent, then it follows that everything is a tiny bit moral.
You previouly made some statements that sounded a lot like that.
That statement needs some justification. Is it better to do good things voluntarily, or because you are forced to?
OK, I though ti was something like that. The things is that subjects can have values which are inherently interpersonal and even objective...things like empathy and rationality. So “value held by a subject” does not imply “selfish value”.
Yet agian, objective morality is not a case of one subject being motivated by another subjects values. Objectivity is not achieved by swapping subjects.
This is a black box. Explain what they mean and how you generate the connection between the two.
You claim that a rational-should exists. Prove it.
Using objective principles as a tool to evaluate tradeoffs between subjective values is not the same as using objective principles to produce moral truths.
That’s not my definition of morality, it’s the conclusion I end up with. Your analogy doesn’t seem valid to me because I don’t conclude that all moral claims are equal but that all desires are good. Repressing desires or failing to achieve desires is bad. Additionally, its clear to me why a logical system that proves everything is good is bad, but why would a moral system that did the same be invalid?
I agree. I didn’t claim either of those things. Morality doesn’t have a job outside of distinguishing between right and wrong.
The idea that all principles you act upon must be universalizable. It’s bad because individuals are different and should act differently. The principle I defend is a universalizable one, that individuals should do what they want. The difference between mine and yours is that mine is broad and all people are happy when its applied to their case, but yours is narrow and exclusive and egocentric because it neglects differences in individual values, or holds those differences to be morally irrelevant.
Subtraction, have you heard of it?
Some things are neutral even though they effect others.
Voluntarily, because that means you’re acting on your values.
If I valued rationality, why would that result in specific moral decrees? Value held by a subject doesn’t imply selfish value, but it does imply that the values of others are only relevant to my morality insofar as I empathize with those others.
“Objectivity” in ethics is achieved by abandoning individual values and beliefs and trying to produce statements which would be valued and believed by everyone. That’s stupid because we can never escape the locus of the self and because morality emerges from internal processes and neglecting those internal processes means that there is zero foundation for any sort of morality. I’m saying that morality is only accessible internally, and that the things which produce morality are internal subjective beliefs.
If you continue to disagree, I suggest we start over. Let me know and I’ll post an argument that I used last year in debate. I feel like starting over would clarify things a lot because we’re getting muddled down in a line-by-line back-and-forth hyperspecific conversation here.
Usual meaning in this type of disucssion.
If I can prove anything to you, you are already running on rational_should.
Why not?
That doens’t help. It;s not morality whether it’s assumed or concluded.
Individuals are different and would act differntly. You are arguing as though people should never do anythng unless it is morally obligated, as though moral rules are all encompassing. I never said that. Morality does not need to detemine evey action any more than civil law does.
That isn’t universalisable because you don;t want to be murdered. The correct form is “individuals should do what they want unless it harms another”.
We don’t have it. if people wanted your principle, they would abolish all laws.
!!!
Look at examples of people arguing about morality.
ETA: Better restrict that to liberals.
There’s plenty about, even on this site.
Nope. Rationality too.
Of course not. It is a perfectly acceptable principle that people should be allowed to realise their values so long as they do not harm others. Where do you ge these ideas?
Just everyone rational. The police are there for a reason
Yet again: we can internally value what is objective and impartial. “In me” doesn’t imply “for me”.
“Neglect” is your straw man.
Yet again: “In me” doesn’t imply “for me”.
If you like.
I don’t want to spend any more time on this. I’m done.