Right, so if we’re using a uniform distribution over 2^30000, there should be exactly zero ants sharing observer-moments, so in order to argue that ants’ overlap in observer-moments should discount their total weight, we’re going to need to squeeze that space a lot harder than that.
I’ve also spent some time recently staring at ~randomly generated grids of color for an unrelated project, and I think there’s basically no way that the human visual system is getting so much as 5000 bits of entropy (i.e., 50x50 grid of four-color choices) out of the observer-experience of the visual field. So I think using 2^#receptors is just the wrong starting point. Similarly, assuming that neurons operate independently is going to give you a number in entirely the wrong realm of numbers entirely. (Wikipedia says an ant has ~250,000 neurons.)
I think that if you want to get to the belief that two ants might ever actually share an experience, you’re going to need to work in a significantly smaller domain, like your suggestion of output actions, though applying the domain of “typical reactions of a human to new objects” is going to grossly undercount the number of human possible observer-experiences, so now I’m back to being stuck wondering how to do that at all.
If we take multiverse view, there will be copies, but what we need is not actual copies, but a measure of uniqueness of each observer-moments, which could be calculated as a proportion of frequencies of copies—for humans and for ants.
The problem may be done more practical by asking how much computational resources we (future FAI) need to resurrect all possible humans and all possible ants.
Right, so if we’re using a uniform distribution over 2^30000, there should be exactly zero ants sharing observer-moments, so in order to argue that ants’ overlap in observer-moments should discount their total weight, we’re going to need to squeeze that space a lot harder than that.
I’ve also spent some time recently staring at ~randomly generated grids of color for an unrelated project, and I think there’s basically no way that the human visual system is getting so much as 5000 bits of entropy (i.e., 50x50 grid of four-color choices) out of the observer-experience of the visual field. So I think using 2^#receptors is just the wrong starting point. Similarly, assuming that neurons operate independently is going to give you a number in entirely the wrong realm of numbers entirely. (Wikipedia says an ant has ~250,000 neurons.)
I think that if you want to get to the belief that two ants might ever actually share an experience, you’re going to need to work in a significantly smaller domain, like your suggestion of output actions, though applying the domain of “typical reactions of a human to new objects” is going to grossly undercount the number of human possible observer-experiences, so now I’m back to being stuck wondering how to do that at all.
If we take multiverse view, there will be copies, but what we need is not actual copies, but a measure of uniqueness of each observer-moments, which could be calculated as a proportion of frequencies of copies—for humans and for ants.
The problem may be done more practical by asking how much computational resources we (future FAI) need to resurrect all possible humans and all possible ants.