I think my response to lukeprog above answers this in a way, but it’s more just a question of what we mean by “help me decide.” I’m not against people helping me be less wrong about the actual content of the territory. I’m just against people helping me decide how to emotionally respond to it, provided we are both already not wrong about the territory itself.
If I am happy because I have plenty of food (in the map), but I actually don’t (in the territory), I’d certainly like to be informed of that. It’s just that I can handle the transition from happy to “oh shit!” all by myself, thank you very much.
In other words, my suspicion of anyone calling themselves an Empathetic Metaethicist is that they’re going to try to slide in their own approved brand of ethics through the back door. This is also a worry I have about CEV. Hopefully future posts will alleviate this concern.
If you mean that in service of my goal of satisfying my actual desires, there is more of a danger of being misled when getting input from others as to whether my emotions are a good match for reality than when getting input as to whether reality matches my perception of it, I tentatively agree.
If you mean that getting input from others as to whether my emotions are a good match for reality has a greater cost than benefit, I disagree assuming basic advice filters similar to those used when getting input as to whether reality matches my perception of it. As per above, there will all else equal be a lower expected payoff for me getting advice in this area, even though the advantages are similar.
If you mean that there is a fundamental difference in kind between matching perception to reality and emotions to perceptions that makes getting input an act that is beneficial in the former case and corrosive in the latter, I disagree.
I have low confidence regarding what emotions are most appropriate for various crises and non-crises, and suspect what I think of as ideal are at best local peaks with little chance of being optimal. In addition, what I think of as optimal emotional responses are likely to be too resistant to exceptions. E.g., if one is trapped in a mine shaft the emotional response suitable for typical cases of being trapped is likely to consume too much oxygen.
I’m generally open to ideas regarding what my emotions should be in different situations, and how I can act to change my emotions.
I think my response to lukeprog above answers this in a way, but it’s more just a question of what we mean by “help me decide.” I’m not against people helping me be less wrong about the actual content of the territory. I’m just against people helping me decide how to emotionally respond to it, provided we are both already not wrong about the territory itself.
If I am happy because I have plenty of food (in the map), but I actually don’t (in the territory), I’d certainly like to be informed of that. It’s just that I can handle the transition from happy to “oh shit!” all by myself, thank you very much.
In other words, my suspicion of anyone calling themselves an Empathetic Metaethicist is that they’re going to try to slide in their own approved brand of ethics through the back door. This is also a worry I have about CEV. Hopefully future posts will alleviate this concern.
If you mean that in service of my goal of satisfying my actual desires, there is more of a danger of being misled when getting input from others as to whether my emotions are a good match for reality than when getting input as to whether reality matches my perception of it, I tentatively agree.
If you mean that getting input from others as to whether my emotions are a good match for reality has a greater cost than benefit, I disagree assuming basic advice filters similar to those used when getting input as to whether reality matches my perception of it. As per above, there will all else equal be a lower expected payoff for me getting advice in this area, even though the advantages are similar.
If you mean that there is a fundamental difference in kind between matching perception to reality and emotions to perceptions that makes getting input an act that is beneficial in the former case and corrosive in the latter, I disagree.
I have low confidence regarding what emotions are most appropriate for various crises and non-crises, and suspect what I think of as ideal are at best local peaks with little chance of being optimal. In addition, what I think of as optimal emotional responses are likely to be too resistant to exceptions. E.g., if one is trapped in a mine shaft the emotional response suitable for typical cases of being trapped is likely to consume too much oxygen.
I’m generally open to ideas regarding what my emotions should be in different situations, and how I can act to change my emotions.