value” is a verb, and the noun form is just a nominalization of the verb,
I don’t see the force to that argument.
“Believe” is a verb and “belief” is a nominalisation. But beliefs can be objectively
right or wrong—if they belong to the appropriate subject area.
Ayn Rand tried to say there was such a thing as objectively good taste, even of foods, music,
It is possible for aesthetics(and various other things) to be un-objectifiable whilst morality (and various other things) are objectifiable.
But before I would even want to revise my aims and goals, I’d have to anticipate something different than I do now.
Why?
What does “some of your beliefs may be wrong by objective standards” make me anticipate that would motivate me to change my goals?
You should be motivated by a desire to get things right in general. The anticipation
thing is just a part of that. It’s not an ultimate. But morality is an ultimate because
there is no more important value than a moral value.
(This is the same as the question in the other comment: What penalty do I suffer by having the “wrong” moral sentiments?)
If there is no personal gain from morality, that doesn’t mean you shouldn’t be moral. You should be moral by the definition of “moral”and “should”. It’s an analytical truth.
It is for selfishness to justify itself in the face of morality, not vice versa.
First of all, I should disclose that I don’t find ultimately any kind of objectivism coherent, including “objective reality.” It is useful to talk about objective reality and objectively right or wrong beliefs most of the time, but when you really drill down there are only beliefs that predict my experience more reliably or less reliably. In the end, nothing else matters to me (nor, I expect, anyone else—if they understand what I’m getting at here).
You should be motivated by a desire to get things right in general. The anticipation thing is just a part of that. It’s not an ultimate
So you disagree with EY about making beliefs pay rent? Like, maybe some beliefs don’t pay rent but are still important? I just don’t see how that makes sense.
You should be moral by the definition of “moral”and “should”.
This seems circular.
If there is no personal gain from morality, that doesn’t mean you shouldn’t be moral.
First of all, I should disclose that I don’t find ultimately any kind of objectivism coherent, including “objective reality.” It is useful to talk about objective reality and objectively right or wrong beliefs most of the time, but when you really drill down there are only beliefs that predict my experience more reliably or less reliably
How do you know that?
So you disagree with EY about making beliefs pay rent?
If disagreeing mean it is good to entertain useless beliefs, then no. If disagreeing means that instrumental utility is not the ultimate value , then yes.
You should be moral by the definition of “moral”and “should”.
This seems circular.
You say that like that’s a bad thing. I said it was analytical and analytical truths would be expected to sound tautologous or circular.
If there is no personal gain from morality, that doesn’t mean you shouldn’t be moral.
It is useful to talk about objective reality and objectively right or wrong beliefs most of the time, but when you really drill down there are only beliefs that predict my experience more reliably or less reliably
How do you know that?
Why do I think that is a useful phrasing? That would be a long post, but EY got the essential idea in Making Beliefs Pay Rent.
If disagreeing mean it is good to entertain useless beliefs, then no. If disagreeing means that instrumental utility is not the ultimate value , then yes.
Well, what use is your belief in “objective value”?
So it’s still true. Not caring is not refutation.
Ultimately, that is to say at a deep level of analysis, I am non-cognitive to words like “true” and “refute.” I would substitute “useful” and “show people why it is not useful,” respectively.
Why do I think that is a useful phrasing? That would be a long post, but EY got the essential idea in Making Beliefs Pay Rent.
I meant the second part: “but when you really drill down there are only beliefs that predict my experience more reliably or less reliably” How do you know that?
Well, what use is your belief in “objective value”?
What objective value are your instrumental beliefs? You keep assuming
useful-to-me is the ultimate value and it isn’t: Morality is, by definition.
Ultimately, that is to say at a deep level of analysis, I am non-cognitive to words like “true” and “refute.”
Then I have a bridge to sell you.
I would substitute “useful” and “show people why it is not useful,” respectively.
And would it be true that it is non-useful? Since to assert P is to assert “P is true”,
truth is a rather hard thing to eliminate. One would have to adopt the silence
of Diogenes.
Why do I think that is a useful phrasing? That would be a long post, but EY got the essential idea in Making Beliefs Pay Rent.
I meant the second part: “but when you really drill down there are only beliefs that predict my experience more reliably or less reliably” How do you know that?
That’s what I was responding to.
What objective value are your instrumental beliefs? You keep assuming useful-to-me is the ultimate value and it isn’t: Morality is, by definition.
Zorg: And what pan-galactic value are your objective values? Pan-galactic value is the ultimate value, dontcha know.
And would it be true that it is non-useful? Since to assert P is to assert “P is true”, truth is a rather hard thing to eliminate.
You just eliminated it: If to assert P is to assert “P is true,” then to assert “P is true” is to assert P. We could go back and forth like this for hours.
But you still haven’t defined objective value.
Dictionary says, “Not influenced by personal feelings, interpretations, or prejudice; based on facts; unbiased.”
How can a value be objective? ---EDIT: Especially since a value is a personal feeling. If you are defining “value” differently, how?
I meant the second part: “but when you really drill down there are only beliefs that predict my experience more reliably or less reliably” How do you know that?
That’s what I was responding to.
It is not the case that all beliefs can do is predict experience based on existing preferences. Beliefs can also set and modify preferences. I have given that counterargument several times.
Z org: And what pan-galactic value are your objective values? Pan-galactic value is the ultimate value, dontcha know.
I think moral values are ultimate because I can;t think of a valid argument
of the form “I should do because ”. Please
give an example of a pangalactic value that can be substituted for ,
You just eliminated it: If to assert P is to assert “P is true,” then to assert “P is true” is to assert P. We could go back and forth like this for hours.
Yeah,. but it sitll comes back to truth. If I tell you it will increase your happiness
to hit yourself on the head with a hammer, your response is going to have to
amount to “no, that’s not true”.
Dictionary says, [objective[ “Not influenced by personal feelings, interpretations, or prejudice; based on facts; unbiased.”
How can a value be objective?
By being (relatively) uninfluenced by personal feelings, interpretations, or prejudice; based on facts; unbiased.
Especially since a value is a personal feeling.
You haven’t remotely established that as an identity. It is true that some people
some of the time arrive at values through feelings. Others arrive at them (or revise
them) through facts and thinking.
you are defining “value” differently, how?
“Values can be defined as broad preferences concerning appropriate courses of action or outcomes”
If I tell you it will increase your happiness to hit yourself on the head with a hammer, your response is going to have to amount to “no, that’s not true”.
I’ll just decide not to follow the advice, or I’ll try it out and then after experiencing pain I will decide not to follow the advice again. I might tell you that, too, but I don’t need to use the word “true” or any equivalent to do that. I can just say it didn’t work.
People have been known to follow really bad advice, sometimes to their detriment and suffering a lot of pain along the way.
Some people have followed excessively stringent diets to the point of malnutrition or death. (This isn’t intended as a swipe at CR—people have been known to go a lot farther than that.)
People have attempted (for years or decades) to shut down their sexual feelings because they think their God wants it.
I’ll just decide not to follow the advice, or I’ll try it out and then after experiencing pain I will decide not to follow the advice again. I might tell you that, too, but I don’t need to use the word “true” or any equivalent to do that. I can just say it didn’t work.
Any word can be eliminated in favour of a definitions or paraphrase. Not coming out with an equivalent—showing that you have dispensed with the concept—is harder. Why didn’t it work? You’re going to have to paraphrase “Because it wasn’t true” or refuse to answer.
The concept of truth is for utility, not utility for truth. To get them backwards is to merely be confused by the words themselves. It’s impossible to show you’ve dispensed with any concept, except to show that it isn’t useful for what you’re doing. That is what I’ve done. I’m non-cognitive to God, truth, and objective value (except as recently defined). Usually they all sound like religion, though they all are or were at one time useful approximate means of expressing things in English.
The concept of truth is for utility, not utility for truth.
Truth is useful for whatever you want to do with it. If people can collect stamps for the sake of collecting stamps, they can collect truths for the sake of collecting truths.
I’m non-cognitive to God, truth, and objective value (except as recently defined). Usually they all sound like religion
Sounding like religion would not render something incomprehensible...but it could
easilly provoke an “I don’t like it” reaction, which is then dignified with the label “incoherent” or whatever.
It is not the case that all beliefs can do is predict experience based on existing preferences. Beliefs can also set and modify preferences.
I agree, if you mean things like, “If I now believe that she is really a he, I don’t want to take ‘her’ home anymore.”
I think moral values are ultimate because I can;t think of a valid argument of the form “I should do because ”.
Neither can I. I just don’t draw the same conclusion. There’s a difference between disagreeing with something and not knowing what it means, and I do seriously not know what you mean. I’m not sure why you would think it is veiled disagreement, seeing as lukeprog’s whole post was making this very same point about incoherence. (But incoherence also only has meaning in the sense of “incoherent to me” or someone else, so it’s not some kind of damning word. It simply means the message is not getting through to me. That could be your fault, my fault, or English’s fault, and I don’t really care which it is, but it would be preferable for something to actually make it across the inferential gap.)
EDIT: Oops, posted too soon.
“Values can be defined as broad preferences concerning appropriate courses of action or outcomes”
So basically you are saying that preferences can change because of facts/beliefs, right? And I agree with that. To give a more mundane example, if I learn Safeway doesn’t carry egg nog and I want egg nog, I may no longer want to go to Safeway. If I learn that egg nog is bad for my health, I may no longer want egg nog. If I believe health doesn’t matter because the Singularity is near, I may want egg nog again. If I believe that egg nog is actually made of human brains, I may not want it anymore.
At bottom, I act to get enjoyment and/or avoid pain, that is, to win. What actions I believe will bring me enjoyment will indeed vary depending on my beliefs. But it is always ultimately that winning/happiness/enjoyment/fun//deliciousness/pleasure that I am after, and no change in belief can change that. I could take short-term pain for long-term gain, but that would be because I feel better doing that than not.
But it seems to me that just because what I want can be influenced by what could be called objective or factual beliefs doesn’t make my want for deliciousness “uninfluenced by personal feelings.”
In summary, value/preferences can either be defined to include (1) only personal feelings (though they may be universal or semi-universal), or to also include (2) beliefs about what would or wouldn’t lead to such personal feelings. I can see how you mean that 2 could be objective, and then would want to call them thus “objective values.” But not for 1, because personal feelings are, well, personal.
If so, then it seems I am back to my initial response to lukeprog and ensuing brief discussion. In short, if it is only the belief in objective facts that is wrong, then I wouldn’t want to call that morality, but more just self-help, or just what the whole rest of LW is. It is not that someone could be wrong about their preferences/values 1, but preferences/values 2.
There’s a difference between disagreeing with something and not knowing what it means, and I do seriously not know what you mean. I’m not sure why you would think it is veiled disagreement, seeing as lukeprog’s whole post was making this very same point about incoherence. (But incoherence also only has meaning in the sense of “incoherent to me” or someone else,
“incoherence” means several things. Some of them, such a self-contradiction are
as objective as anything. You seem to find morality meaningless in some personal
sense. Looking at dictionaries doesn’t seem to work for you. Dictionaries tend
to define the moral as the good.It is hard to believe that anyone can grow up
not hearing the word “good” used a lot, unless they were raised by wolves. So
that’s why I see complaints of incoherence as being disguised disagreement.
At bottom, I act to get enjoyment and/or avoid pain, that is, to win.
If you say so. That doesn’t make morality false, meaningless or subjective. It makes
you an amoral hedonist.
But it seems to me that just because what I want can be influenced by what could be called objective or factual beliefs doesn’t make my want for deliciousness “uninfluenced by personal feelings.”
Perhaps not completley, but that sill leaves some things as relatively more
objective than others.
In summary, value/preferences can either be defined to include (1) only personal feelings (though they may be universal or semi-universal), or to also include (2) beliefs about what would or wouldn’t lead to such personal feelings. I can see how you mean that 2 could be objective, and then would want to call them thus “objective values.” But not for 1, because personal feelings are, well, personal.
Then your categories aren’t exhaustive, because preferences can also
be defined to include universalisable values alongside personal whims.
You may be making the classic of error of taking “subjective” to mean
“believed by a subject”
Dictionaries tend to define the moral as the good.It is hard to believe that anyone can grow up not hearing the word “good” used a lot, unless they were raised by wolves
The problem isn’t that I don’t know what it means. The problem is that it means many different things and I don’t know which of those you mean by it.
an amoral hedonist
I have moral sentiments (empathy, sense of justice, indignation, etc.), so I’m not amoral. And I am not particularly high time-preference, so I’m not a hedonist.
preferences can also be defined to include universalisable values alongside personal whims
If you mean preferences that everyone else shares, sure, but there’s no stipulation in my definitions that other people can’t share the preferences. In fact, I said, “(though they may be universal or semi-universal).”
You may be making the classic of error of taking “subjective” to mean “believed by a subject”
It’d be a “classic error” to assume you meant one definition of subjective rather than another, when you haven’t supplied one yourself? This is about the eight time in this discussion that I’ve thought that I can’t imagine what you think language even is.
I doubt we have any disagreement, to be honest. I think we only view language very, radically differently. (You could say we have a disagreement about language.)
Dictionaries tend to define the moral as the good.It is hard to believe that anyone can grow up not hearing the word “good” used a lot, unless they were raised by wolves
The problem isn’t that I don’t know what it means.
What “moral” means or what “good” means/?
The problem is that it means many different things and I don’t know which of those you mean by it.
No, that isn’t the problem. It has one basic meaning, but there are a lot of different theories about it. Elsewhere you say that utilitarianism renders objective morality meaningful. A theory of X cannot render X meaningful, but it can render X plausible.
I have moral sentiments (empathy, sense of justice, indignation, etc.), so I’m not amoral. And I am not particularly high time-preference, so I’m not a hedonist.
But you theorise that you only act on them(and that nobody ever acts but) toincrea se your pleasure.
If you mean preferences that everyone else shares, sure, but there’s no stipulation in my definitions that other people can’t share the preferences.
I don’t see the point in stipulating that preferences can’t be shared. People who
believe they can be just have to find another word. Nothing is proven.
You may be making the classic of error of taking “subjective” to mean “believed by a subject”
It’d be a “classic error” to assume you meant one definition of subjective rather than another, when you haven’t supplied one yourself?
I’ve quoted the dictionary derfinition, and that’s what I mean.
“existing in the mind; belonging to the thinking subject rather than to the object of thought ( opposed to objective).
2.
pertaining to or characteristic of an individual; personal; individual: a subjective evaluation.
3.
placing excessive emphasis on one’s own moods, attitudes, opinions, etc.; unduly egocentric”
This is about the eight time in this discussion that I’ve thought that I can’t imagine what you think language even is.
I think language is public, I think (genuine) disagreements about meaning can
be resolved with dictionaries, and I think you shouldn’t assume someone is using
idiosyncratic definitions unless they give you good reason.
I don’t see the force to that argument. “Believe” is a verb and “belief” is a nominalisation. But beliefs can be objectively right or wrong—if they belong to the appropriate subject area.
It is possible for aesthetics(and various other things) to be un-objectifiable whilst morality (and various other things) are objectifiable.
Why?
You should be motivated by a desire to get things right in general. The anticipation thing is just a part of that. It’s not an ultimate. But morality is an ultimate because there is no more important value than a moral value.
If there is no personal gain from morality, that doesn’t mean you shouldn’t be moral. You should be moral by the definition of “moral”and “should”. It’s an analytical truth. It is for selfishness to justify itself in the face of morality, not vice versa.
First of all, I should disclose that I don’t find ultimately any kind of objectivism coherent, including “objective reality.” It is useful to talk about objective reality and objectively right or wrong beliefs most of the time, but when you really drill down there are only beliefs that predict my experience more reliably or less reliably. In the end, nothing else matters to me (nor, I expect, anyone else—if they understand what I’m getting at here).
So you disagree with EY about making beliefs pay rent? Like, maybe some beliefs don’t pay rent but are still important? I just don’t see how that makes sense.
This seems circular.
What if I say, “So what?”
How do you know that?
If disagreeing mean it is good to entertain useless beliefs, then no. If disagreeing means that instrumental utility is not the ultimate value , then yes.
You say that like that’s a bad thing. I said it was analytical and analytical truths would be expected to sound tautologous or circular.
So it’s still true. Not caring is not refutation.
Why do I think that is a useful phrasing? That would be a long post, but EY got the essential idea in Making Beliefs Pay Rent.
Well, what use is your belief in “objective value”?
Ultimately, that is to say at a deep level of analysis, I am non-cognitive to words like “true” and “refute.” I would substitute “useful” and “show people why it is not useful,” respectively.
I meant the second part: “but when you really drill down there are only beliefs that predict my experience more reliably or less reliably” How do you know that?
What objective value are your instrumental beliefs? You keep assuming useful-to-me is the ultimate value and it isn’t: Morality is, by definition.
Then I have a bridge to sell you.
And would it be true that it is non-useful? Since to assert P is to assert “P is true”, truth is a rather hard thing to eliminate. One would have to adopt the silence of Diogenes.
That’s what I was responding to.
Zorg: And what pan-galactic value are your objective values? Pan-galactic value is the ultimate value, dontcha know.
You just eliminated it: If to assert P is to assert “P is true,” then to assert “P is true” is to assert P. We could go back and forth like this for hours.
But you still haven’t defined objective value.
Dictionary says, “Not influenced by personal feelings, interpretations, or prejudice; based on facts; unbiased.”
How can a value be objective? ---EDIT: Especially since a value is a personal feeling. If you are defining “value” differently, how?
It is not the case that all beliefs can do is predict experience based on existing preferences. Beliefs can also set and modify preferences. I have given that counterargument several times.
I think moral values are ultimate because I can;t think of a valid argument of the form “I should do because ”. Please give an example of a pangalactic value that can be substituted for ,
Yeah,. but it sitll comes back to truth. If I tell you it will increase your happiness to hit yourself on the head with a hammer, your response is going to have to amount to “no, that’s not true”.
By being (relatively) uninfluenced by personal feelings, interpretations, or prejudice; based on facts; unbiased.
You haven’t remotely established that as an identity. It is true that some people some of the time arrive at values through feelings. Others arrive at them (or revise them) through facts and thinking.
“Values can be defined as broad preferences concerning appropriate courses of action or outcomes”
I missed this:
I’ll just decide not to follow the advice, or I’ll try it out and then after experiencing pain I will decide not to follow the advice again. I might tell you that, too, but I don’t need to use the word “true” or any equivalent to do that. I can just say it didn’t work.
People have been known to follow really bad advice, sometimes to their detriment and suffering a lot of pain along the way.
Some people have followed excessively stringent diets to the point of malnutrition or death. (This isn’t intended as a swipe at CR—people have been known to go a lot farther than that.)
People have attempted (for years or decades) to shut down their sexual feelings because they think their God wants it.
Any word can be eliminated in favour of a definitions or paraphrase. Not coming out with an equivalent—showing that you have dispensed with the concept—is harder. Why didn’t it work? You’re going to have to paraphrase “Because it wasn’t true” or refuse to answer.
The concept of truth is for utility, not utility for truth. To get them backwards is to merely be confused by the words themselves. It’s impossible to show you’ve dispensed with any concept, except to show that it isn’t useful for what you’re doing. That is what I’ve done. I’m non-cognitive to God, truth, and objective value (except as recently defined). Usually they all sound like religion, though they all are or were at one time useful approximate means of expressing things in English.
Truth is useful for whatever you want to do with it. If people can collect stamps for the sake of collecting stamps, they can collect truths for the sake of collecting truths.
Sounding like religion would not render something incomprehensible...but it could easilly provoke an “I don’t like it” reaction, which is then dignified with the label “incoherent” or whatever.
I agree, if you mean things like, “If I now believe that she is really a he, I don’t want to take ‘her’ home anymore.”
Neither can I. I just don’t draw the same conclusion. There’s a difference between disagreeing with something and not knowing what it means, and I do seriously not know what you mean. I’m not sure why you would think it is veiled disagreement, seeing as lukeprog’s whole post was making this very same point about incoherence. (But incoherence also only has meaning in the sense of “incoherent to me” or someone else, so it’s not some kind of damning word. It simply means the message is not getting through to me. That could be your fault, my fault, or English’s fault, and I don’t really care which it is, but it would be preferable for something to actually make it across the inferential gap.)
EDIT: Oops, posted too soon.
So basically you are saying that preferences can change because of facts/beliefs, right? And I agree with that. To give a more mundane example, if I learn Safeway doesn’t carry egg nog and I want egg nog, I may no longer want to go to Safeway. If I learn that egg nog is bad for my health, I may no longer want egg nog. If I believe health doesn’t matter because the Singularity is near, I may want egg nog again. If I believe that egg nog is actually made of human brains, I may not want it anymore.
At bottom, I act to get enjoyment and/or avoid pain, that is, to win. What actions I believe will bring me enjoyment will indeed vary depending on my beliefs. But it is always ultimately that winning/happiness/enjoyment/fun//deliciousness/pleasure that I am after, and no change in belief can change that. I could take short-term pain for long-term gain, but that would be because I feel better doing that than not.
But it seems to me that just because what I want can be influenced by what could be called objective or factual beliefs doesn’t make my want for deliciousness “uninfluenced by personal feelings.”
In summary, value/preferences can either be defined to include (1) only personal feelings (though they may be universal or semi-universal), or to also include (2) beliefs about what would or wouldn’t lead to such personal feelings. I can see how you mean that 2 could be objective, and then would want to call them thus “objective values.” But not for 1, because personal feelings are, well, personal.
If so, then it seems I am back to my initial response to lukeprog and ensuing brief discussion. In short, if it is only the belief in objective facts that is wrong, then I wouldn’t want to call that morality, but more just self-help, or just what the whole rest of LW is. It is not that someone could be wrong about their preferences/values 1, but preferences/values 2.
“incoherence” means several things. Some of them, such a self-contradiction are as objective as anything. You seem to find morality meaningless in some personal sense. Looking at dictionaries doesn’t seem to work for you. Dictionaries tend to define the moral as the good.It is hard to believe that anyone can grow up not hearing the word “good” used a lot, unless they were raised by wolves. So that’s why I see complaints of incoherence as being disguised disagreement.
If you say so. That doesn’t make morality false, meaningless or subjective. It makes you an amoral hedonist.
Perhaps not completley, but that sill leaves some things as relatively more objective than others.
Then your categories aren’t exhaustive, because preferences can also be defined to include universalisable values alongside personal whims. You may be making the classic of error of taking “subjective” to mean “believed by a subject”
The problem isn’t that I don’t know what it means. The problem is that it means many different things and I don’t know which of those you mean by it.
I have moral sentiments (empathy, sense of justice, indignation, etc.), so I’m not amoral. And I am not particularly high time-preference, so I’m not a hedonist.
If you mean preferences that everyone else shares, sure, but there’s no stipulation in my definitions that other people can’t share the preferences. In fact, I said, “(though they may be universal or semi-universal).”
It’d be a “classic error” to assume you meant one definition of subjective rather than another, when you haven’t supplied one yourself? This is about the eight time in this discussion that I’ve thought that I can’t imagine what you think language even is.
I doubt we have any disagreement, to be honest. I think we only view language very, radically differently. (You could say we have a disagreement about language.)
What “moral” means or what “good” means/?
No, that isn’t the problem. It has one basic meaning, but there are a lot of different theories about it. Elsewhere you say that utilitarianism renders objective morality meaningful. A theory of X cannot render X meaningful, but it can render X plausible.
But you theorise that you only act on them(and that nobody ever acts but) toincrea se your pleasure.
I don’t see the point in stipulating that preferences can’t be shared. People who believe they can be just have to find another word. Nothing is proven.
I’ve quoted the dictionary derfinition, and that’s what I mean.
“existing in the mind; belonging to the thinking subject rather than to the object of thought ( opposed to objective). 2. pertaining to or characteristic of an individual; personal; individual: a subjective evaluation. 3. placing excessive emphasis on one’s own moods, attitudes, opinions, etc.; unduly egocentric”
I think language is public, I think (genuine) disagreements about meaning can be resolved with dictionaries, and I think you shouldn’t assume someone is using idiosyncratic definitions unless they give you good reason.