You may be interested in The Great American Gamble: Deterrence Theory and Practice from the Cold War to the Present by Keith Payne. It details the development of the deterrent paradigm with which we are familiar, and describes the differing thoughts of Schelling (who is otherwise popular here) and Herman Kahn. I have started but not finished the book, and it is very interesting.
It relates to your questions because nuclear arms development was driven by the European military situation. Summarizing from the book, the process went like this:
1. The Soviet Union has an overwhelming numbers advantage within easy reach of Western Europe.
2. For the US and Western Europe to counter this advantage was deemed too expensive, as the US was far away and Europe was rebuilding.
3. Nuclear weapons were stockpiled by the United States in order to retaliate against a conventional Soviet invasion. This was cheap enough to accomplish.
4. The Soviets developed and stockpiled nuclear weapons to deter any such retaliation.
5. The ICBM program enables first-strike capability, which would pre-empt a successful ground invasion.
6. The Soviet missile program also enables first-strike capability, to deter such pre-emption.
7. Both sides develop second-strike capabilities to ensure first-strike capabilities are not used.
None of these calculations applied to China, which focused its military development on defending China proper from invasion. Further, all technical aid and support for China was withdrawn by the Soviet Union in the Sino-Soviet Split of 1959.
In short, China was not a part of strategic situations which strongly motivated developing nuclear weapons, and both nuclear powers were motivated not to provide nuclear capability to them. They had a nuclear detonation in 1964, and a hydrogen detonation in 1967, ~20 years behind the US.
You may be interested in The Great American Gamble: Deterrence Theory and Practice from the Cold War to the Present by Keith Payne. It details the development of the deterrent paradigm with which we are familiar, and describes the differing thoughts of Schelling (who is otherwise popular here) and Herman Kahn. I have started but not finished the book, and it is very interesting.
It relates to your questions because nuclear arms development was driven by the European military situation. Summarizing from the book, the process went like this:
1. The Soviet Union has an overwhelming numbers advantage within easy reach of Western Europe.
2. For the US and Western Europe to counter this advantage was deemed too expensive, as the US was far away and Europe was rebuilding.
3. Nuclear weapons were stockpiled by the United States in order to retaliate against a conventional Soviet invasion. This was cheap enough to accomplish.
4. The Soviets developed and stockpiled nuclear weapons to deter any such retaliation.
5. The ICBM program enables first-strike capability, which would pre-empt a successful ground invasion.
6. The Soviet missile program also enables first-strike capability, to deter such pre-emption.
7. Both sides develop second-strike capabilities to ensure first-strike capabilities are not used.
None of these calculations applied to China, which focused its military development on defending China proper from invasion. Further, all technical aid and support for China was withdrawn by the Soviet Union in the Sino-Soviet Split of 1959.
In short, China was not a part of strategic situations which strongly motivated developing nuclear weapons, and both nuclear powers were motivated not to provide nuclear capability to them. They had a nuclear detonation in 1964, and a hydrogen detonation in 1967, ~20 years behind the US.