It can also be worth it to give to multiple organizations because of what it indicates to other people.
Here it is. Signalling has effects on the real world, and if I make other people contribute to charities, the total effect can be much higher than my personal contribution could do. Optimizing for the total effect is better than merely optimizing the effect of my money.
Let’s assume there are two important charities, X and Y. I have two friends, A and B. The friend A would be willing to donate to charity X, assuming that someone else in his social sphere does too. But he would never donate to Y. On the other hand, the friend B would be willing to donate to charity Y, assuming that someone else in her social sphere does too; but she would never donate to X.
If I donate to both charities and give the relevant part of information to each of my friends, I can make A donate to X, and B donate to Y, which could be more useful than if both me and A donate all our money to X, but B does not donate anything.
Mathematically speaking, assume that me, A and B are willing to donate $100 each; charity X creates 2 utilons per dollar, charity Y creates 1 utilon per dollar. If I donate all $100 to X, my personal contribution to the world is 200 utilons, and together with A we create 200+200= 400 utilons. If I donate $50 to X and $50 to Y, my personal contribution to the world is 150 utilons, and together with A and B we create 150+200+100= 450 utilons. With these specific numbers, the second option is better.
But even if the difference among the charities is greater, I can improve the result by donating more to X and less to Y. Ideally, I should donate to Y only as much as B needs to be socially convinced to donate too.
Ideally, I should donate to Y only as much as B needs to be socially convinced to donate too.
Within the constraints of the model, B may have donation threshold, above which they’ll be convinced to donate, but the size of the donation will always be constant, but in reality, the size of people’s donations may be heavily influenced by how much they see their peers donating.
Needs experimenting on real humans. Imagine the following situations:
a) I donate $100 to charities, all of them B considers useful; b) I donate $50 to charities, all of them B considers useful; c) I donate $100 to charities, but only $50 to charities that B considers useful.
How much of a “social pressure” does situation c) make on a typical person B? As much as a), as much as b), or somewhere in between?
How much does the response depend on how exactly I present them the data? For example: “I donated $100 to charities, for example this one.”
Here it is. Signalling has effects on the real world, and if I make other people contribute to charities, the total effect can be much higher than my personal contribution could do. Optimizing for the total effect is better than merely optimizing the effect of my money.
Let’s assume there are two important charities, X and Y. I have two friends, A and B. The friend A would be willing to donate to charity X, assuming that someone else in his social sphere does too. But he would never donate to Y. On the other hand, the friend B would be willing to donate to charity Y, assuming that someone else in her social sphere does too; but she would never donate to X.
If I donate to both charities and give the relevant part of information to each of my friends, I can make A donate to X, and B donate to Y, which could be more useful than if both me and A donate all our money to X, but B does not donate anything.
Mathematically speaking, assume that me, A and B are willing to donate $100 each; charity X creates 2 utilons per dollar, charity Y creates 1 utilon per dollar. If I donate all $100 to X, my personal contribution to the world is 200 utilons, and together with A we create 200+200= 400 utilons. If I donate $50 to X and $50 to Y, my personal contribution to the world is 150 utilons, and together with A and B we create 150+200+100= 450 utilons. With these specific numbers, the second option is better.
But even if the difference among the charities is greater, I can improve the result by donating more to X and less to Y. Ideally, I should donate to Y only as much as B needs to be socially convinced to donate too.
Or you could donate in secret and lie to your friends, for 200+200+100 = 500 utilons, assuming you have no negative effects from lying.
Within the constraints of the model, B may have donation threshold, above which they’ll be convinced to donate, but the size of the donation will always be constant, but in reality, the size of people’s donations may be heavily influenced by how much they see their peers donating.
Needs experimenting on real humans. Imagine the following situations:
a) I donate $100 to charities, all of them B considers useful;
b) I donate $50 to charities, all of them B considers useful;
c) I donate $100 to charities, but only $50 to charities that B considers useful.
How much of a “social pressure” does situation c) make on a typical person B? As much as a), as much as b), or somewhere in between?
How much does the response depend on how exactly I present them the data? For example: “I donated $100 to charities, for example this one.”