Not to suggest that you’ve done this, but I think it’s a fairly common mistake to look for conceptual engineering’s merits as a metaphilosophy by only looking at papers that include the words ‘conceptual engineering’, many of which are quite bad. There’s a section of Fixing Language (by Cappelen) that provides examples of actual philosophical contributions, some of which predate the term.
Two papers that I think are important—and count as conceptual engineering, by my lights—are The Extended Mind and Grace and Alienation.
Hi Brendan!
I agree with much of RobertM’s comment; I read the same essay, and came away confused.
One thing I think might be valuable: if you were to explain your object-level criticisms of particular arguments for AI safety advanced by researchers in the field—for instance, this one or this one.
Given that there are (what I think are) strong arguments for catastrophic risks from AI, it seems important to engage with them and explain where you disagree—especially because the Cosmos Institute’s approach seems partially shaped by rejecting AI risk narratives.