My kingdom for a truly universal footnote format
ymeskhout
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Yet Another Critique of “Luxury Beliefs”
I wanted to include very basic examples first:
For example, observing that most birds can fly, assuming that flight is a necessary trait for being classified as a bird (composition), and subsequently excluding penguins from being birds because they don’t fly (division). Or observing that mammals tend to have fur, assuming fur is a necessary trait for being a mammal, and therefore excluding dolphins as not mammals. Or observing that weapons tend to cause bleeding and therefore excluding blunt instruments like clubs and batons. The list goes on.
I am planning yet another follow-up to outline more contentious examples. Basically, almost any dispute that is based on a disguised query and hinges on specific categorization matches the fallacy. Some of the prominent examples that come to mind, with the sticker shortcut label italicized:
Was January 6th an insurrection?
Is Israel committing a genocide?
Are IQ tests a form of eugenics?
All of these questions appear to be a disguised query into asking whether X is a “really bad thing”. But instead of asking this directly, they try to sneak in the connotation through the label. Similarly, the whole debate over whether transwomen are women is a hodgepodge of disguised queries that try to sneak in a preferred answer through the acceptance of labels. In each of these examples, we’re better served by discussing the thing directly rather than debating over labels. Does this help clarify?
No really, the Sticker Shortcut fallacy is indeed a fallacy
he is not only willing to have an affair, but he’s willing to break the law to hide it.
This too is another example of the fallacy I’m describing. The fact that OJ Simpson was acquitted of a double homicide doesn’t change my mind that he did in fact kill two people, all it tells me is that the legal system did not find him guilty of the allegations. If someone started every conversation about OJ with “exonerated celebrity football player OJ Simpson”, it’s obvious what connotations they’re trying to convey without having to communicate them directly.
I’m sorry, but this is exactly the fallacy I’m describing in my post. Sometimes the innocent is convicted, and sometimes the guilty is acquitted, which means the only thing that makes “convicted” true in all circumstances is “the legal system has deemed an individual guilty of the allegations”. Nothing more. Now, you may certainly make very plausible Bayesian predictions about the fact that someone has been convicted, but they will always be probabilistic rather than determinative.
Consider the hypothetical where Trump’s conviction gets overturned or vacated, maybe because of some procedural defect, what would change? For me, it wouldn’t change the fact that Trump constructed a convoluted scheme to pay hush money to a porn star he had an affair with in an attempt to hide this fact from the voting public. The only thing that would change from the conviction getting overturned is whether “the legal system has deemed an individual guilty of the allegations”.
I don’t believe that anyone actually holds the syllogism you describe, because a consistent application would mean that even folks like Nelson Mandela (convicted of sabotage and sentenced to life) would be unfit to serve as president. Instead, what I gather people are doing is some combination of the composition/division fallacies:
A (being convicted of a felony) implies B (being a bad person).
B (being a bad person) implies C (being unfit to be president).
Therefore, A (being convicted of a felony) implies C (being unfit to be president).
I disagree that there is such a thing as objective “centrality”, just as I disagree there is such a thing as objective definitions. All language is made-up, and it’s only useful to the extent others share your (arbitrarily designated) meaning or boundaries. There are scores of real-life examples that clearly illustrate this, such as the fact that the word for ‘sake’ refers to all alcoholic drinks in Japanese, or how some languages make a distinction between maternal/paternal aunt/uncle, or how Russian treats light blue and dark blue as separate colors, etc.
Even setting that aside, the only insight you glean from determining whether a member is central to a category or not is...whether a member is central to a category or not. If you use category membership itself to glean any other information about a member, this is exactly the sticker shortcut fallacy I’m describing.
Statutory and other legal interpretation is exempt from my critique here, because the meaning of a word is very often explicitly spelled out in legislation (hence why legalese is so tedious to read). When the meaning is ambiguous, judges resort to specific canons of interpretations (such as legislative intent, ordinary meaning, historical meaning, rule of lenity, etc.) that are based in legal precedent.
I think this post might be a good illustration of the sticker shortcut fallacy I’m describing. Instead of directly describing the information you want to impart, you’re instead relying upon the label dredging up enough ‘good enough’ connotations attached to it.
I think it’s non-fallacious to use language as a shorthand, the same way we say “do you want to play baseball?” rather than “do you want to play a bat-and-ball sport played between two teams of nine players each, taking turns batting and fielding?”
What information, specifically, do you believe “Trump: convicted felon” conveys except that “a jury reviewed evidence and were convinced that Trump committed a particular offense categorized under New York state law as a felony”? I mean this question very narrowly.
On this point, I concede your argument. To the extent anyone is operating at the “sticker” level (e.g. we don’t support law-breakers) then pointing out that their preferred candidate is a law-breaker is indeed a valid rebuttal. But if it’s deployed outside that narrow purpose, then it becomes fallacious.
If the problem is ad hoc application, then it doesn’t matter if the archetype is “central” or not, no?
My objection to “MLK is a criminal” is that it has to make too many unannounced jumps to get to its conclusion. The principle I can glean from this type of denouncement is something along the lines of “[Criminals] should not be honored by statutes” but whether or not this is a good argument depends entirely on what definition of [criminal] we’re using. If we adopt a barebones definition of the word, we’d end up with something like “[anyone who has ever broken any law] should not be honored by statues” which immediately is exposed as unconvincing, which is why they have to hide behind the connotation. That’s why I argue the problem isn’t whether it’s “central” but rather using labels as reasoning shortcuts.
Indeed, it’s the same fallacy.
Edit: for those who disagree, can you explain why? I don’t believe that “Trump is a convicted felon” tells us anything new except that a court found him guilty of a felony. I’m not trying to be pedantic here, but so what? If people are actually interested in the connotation avalanche that is attached to that label (such as ‘bad person’, ‘dishonorable’, ‘malicious’, etc) then why not just use those direct descriptions instead?
Sticker Shortcut Fallacy — The Real Worst Argument in the World
There Are No Primordial Definitions of Man/Woman
It’s interesting hearing about your background. One of my approaches when I negotiate cases with prosecutors is that I openly admit the strengths of the government’s case. I’ve recently had a factually innocent client who was charged as an accessory to burglary, but it seemed obvious to me she had no idea what the other people were up to. When I talked to the prosecutor, I fully acknowledged “This aspect does indeed look bad for my client, but...” and I’ve always wondered whether this approach has any effect. In this particular instance I did get the case dismissed (and many others like it), but I’m curious if it’s a lesson I can continue extrapolating.
I think I recognize the power I wield in these circumstances. However, it only exists because I work to ensure my credibility doesn’t get diluted too often.
I think they fully know they’re lying about the facts. Where I’m more inclined to believe they’ve achieved self-deception is within the realm of positive thinking and unshakeable confidence about their anticipated results. Many of my clients seem to earnestly believe that their antics will get their case dismissed or somehow overturned on appeal, but that seems to be a coping strategy necessary to cope with the unimaginable torture of the upcoming years in prison.
The American Bar Association writes the Model Rules of Professional Conduct which are not governing but intended to serve as a template for attorney bars to adopt. Right off the bat that’s at least 50 different jurisdictions (plus DC, plus Puerto Rico, plus federal judicial districts, plus many more) that may or may not adopt the RPCs with or without any modifications. Sometimes the modifications are done to comport with state constitution, a judicial committee, a piece of legislation, new case law, or whatever else. So very often, I don’t even know that I don’t know of a caveat. But even if I did, adding a disclaimer would render anything I write about the law nigh-incomprehensible. Just consider how many libraries have been filled with exceptions and caveats from this one sentence: A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.
You would think that the revolving door would help repeat offenders wisen up through experience, but the overriding effect is that they’re repeat offenders precisely because they lack the capacity to wisen up.
What happened with 11 magic words is too arcane and unpredictable to “game”. It mystified even me, and I’ve had the experience of going through criminal proceedings magnitudes more times than even my most decorated clients. I’ve commented here to a similar question but gaining my sympathy through lying is 1) not likely to be consequential and 2) very likely to backfire.
Correct, there are indeed potential advantages to lying to your attorney under very specific and narrow circumstances. You also have to consider the risky gamble this presents because you can’t predict every aspect of the machinery. Maybe the jury never would’ve paid attention to the alibi aspect of the case, but if the alibi witnesses get exposed as liars by the prosecution, that alone could swing jurors from acquittal and towards conviction.
If a client tells me they know for sure that their alibi witness will be lying in their favor, then I’m not allowed to elicit the false testimony from that witness. If they admit to me to robbing the store but (truthfully and without omissions) say they were wearing a mask and functional gloves, then that lets me know what facets to focus on and what to avoid. If they’re sure enough they left no fingerprints, then I can comfortably ask the investigating detectives if any fingerprints were found. If the circumstances allow it, then I may even get my own expert to dust the entire scene for fingerprints with the aim of presenting their absence as exculpatory evidence to the jury. Keep in mind that my job is not to help the government prosecute my client.
And yes, there are plenty of cases where the perpetrator might be obvious from a common-sense perspective, but it would be legally difficult to prove in court.
This is a really good reformulation of the underlying idea behind “luxury beliefs” that improves upon it and makes it much more useful.