Point C is a particular combination of utilities. The particular combination of utilities is not attainable via re-distribution while the economy is in state a. If a change took place so that the economy was now in state c, then point C would be attainable by re-distribution.
(And there is a point common to both the curves a and c, but just from knowing that the utilities of Citizens 1 and 2 were at that particular point wouldn’t allow you to know whether the economy is in state a or c, that would be extra information, and this extra information would be necessary in order to know which other points you could get to via re-distribution from your current situation.)
I made the following observation to Chris on Facebook which he encouraged me to post here.
My point was basically just that, in reply to the statement “If we don’t have such a model to reject, the statement will be tautological”, it is in fact true relative to the standard semantics for first-order languages with equality that there is indeed no model-combined-with-an-interpretation-of-the-free-variables for which “x=x” comes out false. That is to say, relative to the standard semantics the formula is indeed a “logical truth” in that sense, although we usually only say “tautology” for formulas that are tautologies in propositional logic (that is, true under every Boolean valuation, a truth-valuation of all subformulas starting with a quantifier and all subformulas which are atomic formulas which then gets extended to a truth-valuation of all subformulas using the standard rules for the propositional connectives). So most certainly “x=x” is universally valid, relative to the standard semantics, and in the sense just described, there is no counter-model.
I take it that Chris’ project here is in some way to articulate in what sense the Law of Identity could be taken as a statement that “has content” to it. It sounds as though the best approach to this might be to try to take a look at how you would explain the semantics of statements that involve the equality relation. It looks as though it should be in some way possible to defend the idea that the Law of Identity is in some way “true in virtue of its meaning”.