Gatsby believed in the green light, the orgastic future that year by year recedes before us. It eluded us then, but that’s no matter — tomorrow we will run faster, stretch out our arms farther… And one fine morning —
The Great Gatsby
I always liked Fitzgerald’s portrayal of what Something to Protect feels like.
Happy New Year’s resolutions, all.
I’m having difficulty replacing your quotation with its referent. Could you describe an activity I could do that would demonstrate that I was judging how much evidence I have on a given issue?
Hey, that’s me! I also didn’t think we had other LWers down here. PM sent, let’s meet up after the holidays.
I thought of the idea that maybe the human decision maker has multiple utility functions that when you try to combine them into one function some parts of the original functions don’t necessarily translate well… sounds like the “shards of desire” are actually a bunch of different utility functions.
I hereby request a research-filled thread of what to do when you feel like you’re in this situation, which I believe has been called “welfare economics” in the literature.
It sounds like you’re measuring your success by the impact you have on the person you are directly communicating with.
What happens if you measure success by your impact on the rest of your audience?
Interesting position! I can’t speak for James, but I want to engage with this. Let’s pretend, for the scope of this thread, that I made the statement about the proper role of skepticism.
I’m happy to endorse your wording. I agree it’s more precise to talk about “claims” than “things” in this context.
Quick communication check. When you say “increased” you’re implying at least two distinct levels of skepticism. From your assertion, I gather that difficult-to-measure claims like “there exist good leaders, people who can improve the performance of the rest of their team” will face your higher level of skepticism.
Could you give me an example of a claim that faces your lower level of skepticism?
[S]kepticism should be directed at things that are actually untrue rather than things that are difficult to measure.
Thank you. Heuristics like these are, I think, the meta-skill I’m trying to learn at the same time.
Thanks for sharing your experience!
In case you or any other LWers would find these interesting, here are some resources I’ve enjoyed:
Dan Carlin’s Hardcore History podcast This is what got me hooked on history in the first place. [Edit: I see you mentioned this in the comments! Well … seconded!]
Philip Tetlock’s Expert Political Judgment book Really anything that Tetlock has done (I think some LWers are involved in his Good Judgment Project). For my money, this is the steelman against using geopolitical insight for forecasting purposes.
I personally worry about moving from “reading history for insight” to “reading history for insight porn”. What actions do you take to push back against that tendency?
Finally, FWIW, this sentence jumped off the page when I read it:
I don’t read much fiction any more, because most fiction can’t compete with the sheer weight, drama, and insightfulness of history.
There was a time in my life when I would have emphatically agreed. These days I have to disagree, though. I’ve taken to reading history for the experience of viewing the same events from multiple conflicting perspectives. I feel like it widens my set of available reference classes for common issues. Since shifting to view history as a “reference class generator” I’ve picked up literature as a “way of being in the world generator”.
Note: Here’s what I’m not saying. I’m not saying you or anybody else should have the same experience I do. I am saying to watch out for mind-projection at “most fiction can’t compete with … history”. It’s more accurate to say that your experience of most fiction can’t compete with your experience of history … which isn’t really the same thing at all. Especially since you can probably change both experiences, either with some effort or just by waiting a while.
Done! Wish I had had a scanner handy going in, I’m curious about the digit ratio.
I’m curious about this “liquid water is wet” statement. Obviously I agree, but for the sake of argument, could you taboo “is” and tell me the statement again? I’m trying to understand how your algorithm feels from the inside.
If you’re curious how to quantify fractions of statements, you might enjoy this puzzle I heard once. Suppose you’re an ecological researcher and you need to know the number of fish in a large lake. How would you get a handle on that number?
After describing
blind certainty, a close-mindedness that amounts to an imprisonment so total that the prisoner doesn’t even know he’s locked up.
David Foster Wallace continues
The point here is that I think this is one part of what teaching me how to think is really supposed to mean. To be just a little less arrogant. To have just a little critical awareness about myself and my certainties. Because a huge percentage of the stuff that I tend to be automatically certain of is, it turns out, totally wrong and deluded. I have learned this the hard way, as I predict you will, too.
There is a real joy in doing mathematics, in learning ways of thinking that explain and organize and simplify. One can feel this joy discovering new mathematics, rediscovering old mathematics, learning a way of thinking from a person or text, or finding a new way to explain or to view an old mathematical structure.
This inner motivation might lead us to think that we do mathematics solely for its own sake. That’s not true: the social setting is extremely important. We are inspired by other people, we seek appreciation by other people, and we like to help other people solve their mathematical problems.
The entire essay is a beautiful discussion of success and failure in practicing the art of mathematics. Changing the things that need to be changed, much of it applies to practicing the art of rationality.
Could you give this some more context? My reaction was to downvote.
The word “only” gives me vibes like “language exerts a trivial or insignificant influence on our consciousness”. I don’t know any of Kroetz’s plays, but given that he is a playwright I feel like I’m getting the wrong vibe.
I’m only familiar with open source tools, but git will do this with “git diff—word-diff FILE1 FILE2” and Emacs diff has the “ediff-toggle-autorefine” command. IMO you still need to insert line breaks before they become useful.
GNU has wdiff though I’ve never used it: https://www.gnu.org/software/wdiff/ (update: the git command above seems to do the same thing)
I’m still looking for an online diff tool that makes the word-level differences obvious. That would be ideal here (my web skills are too weak to make it happen this month).
Is there a convenient place to see just what changed from the old to the new?
Online diff tools aren’t usefully handling the paragraphs when I copy-paste, and my solution of download → insert line breaks → run through my favorite diff program is probably inconvenient for most.
This is the most forceful version I’ve seen (assumed it had been posted before, discovered it probably hasn’t, won’t start a new thread since it’s too similar):
But by definition, there can’t be any particular feeling associated with simply being wrong. Indeed, the whole reason it’s possible to be wrong is that, while it is happening, you are oblivious to it. When you are simply going about your business in a state you will later decide was delusional, you have no idea of it whatsoever. You are like the coyote in the Road Runner cartoons, after he has gone off the cliff but before he has looked down. Literally in his case and figuratively in yours, you are already in trouble when you feel like you’re still on solid ground. So I should revise myself: it does feel like something to be wrong. It feels like being right.
But I’m not comfortable endorsing either of these quotes without a comment.
chipaca’s quote (and friends) suggest to me that
my “being wrong” and “being right” are complementary hypotheses, and
my subjective feelings are not evidence either way.
Schulz’s quote (and book) suggest to me that
my “being wrong” is broadly and overwhelmingly true (my map is not the territory), and
my subjective feeling of being right is in fact evidence that I am very wrong.
I’d prefer to emphasize that “You are already in trouble when you feel like you’re still on solid ground,” or said another way:
Becoming less wrong feels different from the experience of going about my business in a state that I will later decide was delusional.
Ah! That sounds like a great one!
So, folks like Chris Ferguson are presumably doing both activities (judging how much evidence as well as accurately translating brain estimates to numerical estimates).
But if I go find a consistently successful poker player who does not translate brain estimates to numerical estimates, then I could see how that person does on calibration exercises. That sounds like a fun experiment. Now I just need to get the grant money …
Sidenote, but how would I narrow down to the successful poker players who don’t translate brain estimates to numerical estimates? I mean, I could always ask them up front, but how would I interpret an answer like “I don’t really use numbers all that much. I just go by feel.” Is that a brain that’s translating brain-based estimates to numerical estimates, then throwing away the numbers because of childhood mathematical scarring? Or is that a brain that’s doing something totally outside translating brain-based estimates to numerical estimates?