omnizoid

• omnizoidSep 17, 2023, 8:43 PM

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  in reply to: metachirality’s comment on: Con­tra Heighn Con­tra Me Con­tra Heighn Con­tra Me Con­tra Func­tional De­ci­sion The­ory

  I mean like, I can give you some names. My friend Ethan who’s getting a Ph.D was one person. Schwarz knows a lot about decision theory and finds the view crazy—MacAskill doesn’t like it either.

Eu­gen­ics Performed By A Blind, Idiot God

• omnizoidSep 17, 2023, 6:59 PM

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  in reply to: metachirality’s comment on: Con­tra Heighn Con­tra Me Con­tra Heighn Con­tra Me Con­tra Func­tional De­ci­sion The­ory

  I wouldn’t call a view crazy for just being disbelieved by many people. But if a view is both rejected by all relevant experts and extremely implausible, then I think it’s worth being called crazy!

  I didn’t call people crazy, instead I called the view crazy. I think it’s crazy for the reasons I’ve explained, at length, both in my original article and over the course of the debate. It’s not about my particular decision theory friends—it’s that the fact that virtually no relevant experts agree with an idea is relevant to an assessment of it.

  I’m sure Soares is a smart guy! As are a lot of defenders of FDT. Lesswrong selects disproportionately for smart, curious, interesting people. But smart people can believe crazy things—I’m sure I have some crazy beliefs; crazy in the sense of being unreasonable such that pretty much all rational people would give them up upon sufficient ideal reflection and discussion with people who know what they’re talking about.

• omnizoidSep 17, 2023, 6:55 PM

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  in reply to: Richard_Kennaway’s comment on: The Lop­sided Lives Ar­gu­ment For He­donism About Well-being

  Good one!

  Though is there a reason?

• omnizoidSep 17, 2023, 3:29 PM

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  in reply to: Richard_Kennaway’s comment on: The Lop­sided Lives Ar­gu­ment For He­donism About Well-being

  Yep

• omnizoidSep 17, 2023, 3:26 PM

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  in reply to: Oskar Mathiasen’s comment on: Con­tra Heighn Con­tra Me Con­tra Heighn Con­tra Me Con­tra Func­tional De­ci­sion The­ory

  You can make it with Parfit’s hitchiker, but in that case there’s an action before hand and so a time when you have the ability to try to be rational.

  There is a path from the decision theory to the predictor, because the predictor looks at your brain—with the decision theory it will make—and bases the decision on the outputs of that cognitive algorithm.

• omnizoidSep 17, 2023, 3:24 PM

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  in reply to: ProgramCrafter’s comment on: Con­tra Heighn Con­tra Me Con­tra Heighn Con­tra Me Con­tra Func­tional De­ci­sion The­ory

  The Demon is omniscient.

  FDTists can’t self-modify to be CDTists, by stipulation. This actually is, I think, pretty plausible—I couldn’t choose to start believing FDT.

• omnizoidSep 17, 2023, 3:21 PM

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  in reply to: metachirality’s comment on: Con­tra Heighn Con­tra Me Con­tra Heighn Con­tra Me Con­tra Func­tional De­ci­sion The­ory

  Well here’s one indication—I don’t know if there’s a single published academic philosophy paper defending FDT. Maybe there’s one—certainly not many. Virtually no decision theorists defend it. I don’t know much about Soares, but I know he’s not an academic philosopher, and I think there are pretty unique skills involved in being an academic philosopher.

Con­tra Heighn Con­tra Me Con­tra Heighn Con­tra Me Con­tra Func­tional De­ci­sion The­ory

• omnizoidSep 16, 2023, 6:40 PM

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  in reply to: johnswentworth’s comment on: The com­ment­ing re­stric­tions on LessWrong seem bad

  Yeah, I agree I have lots of views that LessWrongers find dumb. My claim is just that it’s bad when those views are hard to communicate on account of the way LW is set up.

The com­ment­ing re­stric­tions on LessWrong seem bad

Ethics Needs A Marginal Revolution

• omnizoidSep 15, 2023, 7:04 PM

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  in reply to: Heighn’s comment on: Con­tra Heighn Con­tra Me Con­tra Func­tional De­ci­sion The­ory

  The description is exactly as you describe in your article. I think my original was clear enough, but you describe your interpretation, and your interpretation is right. You proceed to bite the bullet.

Con­tra Heighn Con­tra Me Con­tra Func­tional De­ci­sion The­ory

• omnizoidAug 31, 2023, 7:37 PM

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  in reply to: Heighn’s comment on: Any­one want to de­bate pub­li­cly about FDT?

  How’d you feel about a verbal debate?

• omnizoidAug 29, 2023, 4:03 AM

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  in reply to: Jackson Wagner’s comment on: Eliezer Yud­kowsky Is Fre­quently, Con­fi­dently, Egre­giously Wrong

  Philosophy is pretty much the only subject that I’m very informed about. So as a consequence, I can confidently say Eliezer is eggregiously wrong about most of the controversial views I can fact check him on. That’s . . . worrying.

Any­one want to de­bate pub­li­cly about FDT?

• omnizoid 28 Aug 2023 14:32 UTC

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  in reply to: Steven Byrnes’s comment on: Eliezer Yud­kowsky Is Fre­quently, Con­fi­dently, Egre­giously Wrong

  I felt like I was following the entire comment, until you asserted that it rules out zombies.

• omnizoid 28 Aug 2023 3:15 UTC

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  in reply to: Steven Byrnes’s comment on: Eliezer Yud­kowsky Is Fre­quently, Con­fi­dently, Egre­giously Wrong

  If you only got rid of consciousness behavior would change.

  You might be able to explain Chalmers’ behavior, but that doesn’t capture the subjective experience.

• omnizoid 27 Aug 2023 22:23 UTC

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  in reply to: Steven Byrnes’s comment on: Eliezer Yud­kowsky Is Fre­quently, Con­fi­dently, Egre­giously Wrong

  It’s not epiphenomenalism because the law invokes consciousness. On the interactionalist account, consciousness causes things rather than just the physical stuff causing things. If you just got rid of consciousness, you’d get a physically different world.

  I don’t think that induction on the basis of “science has explained a lot of things therefore it will explain consciousness” is convincing. For one, up until this point, science has only explained physical behavior, not subjective experience. This was the whole point (see Goff’s book Galileo’s error). For another, this seems to prove too much—it would seem to suggest that we could discover the corect modal beliefs in a test tube.