non-expert

Karma: −30

non-expert 10 Feb 2013 18:52 UTC
0 points
in reply to: drethelin’s comment on: Politics Discussion Thread January 2013
interesting, so you are dividing morality into impact on immigrants and the idea that they should be allowed to join us a a moral right, with the former included in your analysis and the latter not.

putting aside positions, from a practical perspective it seems that drawing that line will remain difficult because “impact to immigrants” likely informs the very moral arguments I think you’re trying to avoid. Or in other words, putting that issue (effect on immigrants) within the costs/benefits analysis requires some of the same subjective considerations that plague the moral argument (both in terms of difficulty in resolving with certainty and the idea of avoiding morality).

Regardless, seems like the horse has been dead for hours (my fault!). Thanks for engaging with me.

non-expert 10 Feb 2013 17:01 UTC
1 point
in reply to: drethelin’s comment on: Politics Discussion Thread January 2013
nope, i’m just asking why you think that the moral argument should be ignored, and why that position is obvious. we’re talking about a group of humans and what laws and regulations will apply to their lives, likely radically changing them. these decisions will affect their relatives, who may or may not be in similar positions themselves. when legislating about persons, it seems there is always some relevance as to how the laws will affect those people’s lives, even if broader considerations (value to us/cost to us as a country) are also relevant.

to be clear, i’m NOT saying you’re wrong. I’m asking you why you think you’re right, particularly since its so obvious.

EDIT: i totally appreciate i jumped in mid-conversation and asked a question which is now a chain and that might come off as odd to you, so sorry -- you asked about my point -- fair question, I’m not sure I really have one other than understanding your point of view. perhaps silly, but thought you made an interesting point and wanted to see how you thought through the issue before you made it. a “non-expert” can’t tell anyone they’re wrong, can only try to learn why others think they are right :).

non-expert 10 Feb 2013 3:37 UTC
2 points
on: By Which It May Be Judged

if we confess that ‘right’ lives in a world of physics and logic—because everything lives in a world of physics and logic—then we have to translate ‘right’ into those terms somehow.

A different perspective i’d like people’s thoughts on: is it more accurate to say that everything WE KNOW lives in a world of physics and logic, and thus translating ‘right’ into those terms is correct assuming right and wrong (fairness, etc.) are defined within the bounds of what we know.

I’m wondering if you would agree that you’re making an implicit philosophical argument in your quoted language—namely that necessary knowledge (for right/wrong, or anything else) is within human comprehension, or to say it differently, by ignoring philosophical questions (e.g. who am i and what is the world, among others) you are effectively saying those questions and potential answers are irrelevant to the idea of right/wrong.

If you agree, that position, though most definitely reasonable, cannot be proven within the standards set by rational thought. Doesn’t the presence of that uncertainty necessitate consideration of it as a possibility, and how do you weigh that uncertainty against the assumption that there is none?

To be clear, this is not a criticism. This is an observation that I think is reasonable, but interested to see how you would respond to it.

non-expert 9 Feb 2013 20:15 UTC
0 points
in reply to: drethelin’s comment on: Politics Discussion Thread January 2013
Look, there is no doubt an equivalency in your method in that “they should join us” is put on the backburner along with “we should penalize them.” I’m simply highlighting this point.

Or to put it another way, the moral statement I’m trying to make is that the moral value of absolutist moral considerations is less than utilitarian concerns in regards to costs/benefits. I don’t actually care about moral arguments for or against immigration that aren’t consequentalist.

In limiting the “consequentialist” argument to the “home country’s” benefits and costs, you’ve by default given credence to the idea that “they should be penalized” in that you’re willing to avoid penalizing them if they add value to your country—another way of looking at it is to say those that want the immigrants to “join us” aren’t benefited in any way by saying that the opposite moral argument was ignored. You’ve softened your statement now by using “moral value....is less,” but you’re actually going further than that—you’re saying that the utilitarian concerns on cost/benefits are SO GREAT relative to the moral issues that the moral issues should be ignored completely (or that’s how your solution plays out). This is a bold statement, irrespective of its merits. How else would you interpret your statement?:

Immigration would be much better if we approached the issue of “How much do immigrants cost us vs how much do we benefit from them” and made laws in light of this, instead of approaching it from the moral difference between “This is our home and we shouldn’t let strangers in” or “Freedom means allowing anyone to join us”.

Your point only works if you completely ignore the moral argument. Once it matters even a little, the luxuries offered by cost/benefit analysis are thrown out the window because you now have a subjective consideration to incorporate that makes choices difficult. Again, just highlighting the consequences of your argument, don’t really have an opinion on your particular argument.

Part of the problem with politics is we just say things and don’t think about what they mean, since our focus is more on being right and presuming the potential certainty rather than understanding the sources and consequences of various political arguments and appreciating the inherent uncertainty that is unavoidable with any governance regime (or so I would argue).

non-expert 9 Feb 2013 2:55 UTC
2 points
in reply to: drethelin’s comment on: Politics Discussion Thread January 2013
I think you’re implicitly making an moral statement (putting aside whether its “correct”). Your focus on “costs to us and how much do we benefit” means we downplay or eliminate any consideration of the moral question. However, ignoring the moral question has the same effect as losing the moral argument to “this is our home and we shouldn’t let strangers in”—in both cases the moral argument for “joining us” is treated as irrelevant. I’m not making an argument, just an observation i think is relevant if considering the issue.

non-expert 7 Feb 2013 17:07 UTC
3 points
in reply to: DaFranker’s comment on: Avoiding Your Belief’s Real Weak Points
DeFranker—many thanks for taking the time, very helpful.

I spent last night thinking about this, and now I understand your (LW’s) points better and my own. To start, I think the ideas of epistemic rationality and instrumental rationality are unassailable as ideas—there are few things that make as much sense as the ideas of what rationality is trying to do, in the abstract.

But, when we say “rationality” is a good idea, I want to understand two fundamental things: In what context does rationality apply, and where it applies, what methodologies, if any, apply to actually practice it. I don’t presuppose any answers to the above—at the same time I don’t want to “practice rationality” unless or before i understand how those two questions are answered or dealt with (I appreciate its not your responsibility to answer them, I’m just expressing them as things I’m considering).

“Weaknesses” of rationality is not an appropriate question—I now understand the visceral reaction—However, by putting rationality in context, one can better understand its usefulness from a practical perspective. Any lack of usefulness, or lack of applicability would be the “weakness/criticism” I was asking about, but upon reflection, I get to the same place by talking about context.

Let me step back a bit to explain why I think these questions are relevant. We all know the phrase “context matters” in the abstract—I would argue that epistemic rationality, in the abstract, is relevant for instrumental rationality because if our model of the world is incorrect, the manner in which we choose to reach our goals in that world will be affected. All I’m really saying here is that “context matters.” Now while most agree that context matters with respect to decision making, there’s an open question as to “what context actually matters. So, there is always a potential debate regarding whether the the world is understood well enough and to the extent necessary in order to successfully practice instrumental rationality—this is clearly a relative/subjective determination.

With that in mind, any attempt to apply instrumental rationality would require some thought about epistemic rationality, and whether my map is sufficient to make a decision. Does rationality, as it is currently practice, offer any guidance on this? Lets pretend the answer is no—that’s fine, but then that’s a potential “flaw” in rationality or hole where rationality alone does not help with an open issue/question that is relevant.

I’m not trying to knock rationality, but I’m not willing to coddle it and pretend its all there is to know if it comes at the cost of minimizing knowledge.

non-expert 7 Feb 2013 16:36 UTC
0 points
in reply to: TheOtherDave’s comment on: Avoiding Your Belief’s Real Weak Points
Great, thanks, this is helpful. Is the answer to the above questions, as far as you practice rationality, the same for instrumental rationality? it is an idea—but no real methodology? in my mind it would seem decision theory could be a methodology by which someone could practice instrumental rationality. To the extent it is, the above questions remain relevant (only in the sense they should be considered,

I now have an appreciation of your point—I can definitely see how the question “what are the flaws with epistemic rationality” could be viewed as an meaningless question—I was thinking about epistemic rationality as more than just an idea—an idea WITH a methodology. Clearly the idea is unassailable (in my mind anyway), but methodologies (whether for rationality or some other purpose) could at least in concept have flaws, or perhaps flaws in that they cannot be applied universally—it was this that I was asking about.

Interestingly, your response raises a different question. If epistemic rationality is an idea, and not a methodology, rationality (as it is discussed here) leaves open the possibility that there could be a methodology that may apply/help with practicing epistemic rationality (i.e. consistent with the IDEA of rationality, but a methodology by which you can practice it).

As I think most appreciate, ideas ( not necessarily with respect to rationality, but generally) suffer from the fact that they are general, and don’t give a user a sense of “what to do”—obviously, getting your map to match reality is not an easy task, so methodologies for epistemic rationality in the abstract could be helpful so as to put the idea to practice.

This is particularly important if you’re practicing instrumental rationality—This type of rationality is practiced “in the world,” so having an accurate (or accurate enough) model is seemingly important to ensure that the manner in which you practice instrumental rationality makes sense.

Thus, a possible shortcoming of instrumental rationality could be that it depends on epistemic rationality, but because there isn’t a clear answer to the question of “what is real,” instrumental rationality is limited to the extent our beliefs regarding “what is real” are actually correct. You could say that instrumental rationality, depending on the circumstances, does not require a COMPLETE understanding of the world, and so my observation, even if fair, must be applied on a sliding scale.

non-expert 7 Feb 2013 4:42 UTC
0 points
in reply to: TheOtherDave’s comment on: Avoiding Your Belief’s Real Weak Points
no—im not saying your goals ought to be anything, and i’m not trying to win an argument, but appreciate you will interpret my motives as you see appropriate.

let me try this differently—there is an idea on LW that rationality is a “good” way to go about thinking [NOTE: correct me if i’m wrong]. By rationality, I mean exactly what is listed here:

Epistemic rationality: believing, and updating on evidence, so as to systematically improve the correspondence between your map and the territory. The art of obtaining beliefs that correspond to reality as closely as possible. This correspondence is commonly termed “truth” or “accuracy”, and we’re happy to call it that. Instrumental rationality: achieving your values. Not necessarily “your values” in the sense of being selfish values or unshared values: “your values” means anything you care about. The art of choosing actions that steer the future toward outcomes ranked higher in your preferences. On LW we sometimes refer to this as “winning”.

My question relates to putting these two ideas/points into context, but with more of a focus on epistemic rationality (because it seems you need to know the world (i.e. context) in which you’re making decisions before you apply instrumental rationality) -- is epistemic rationality practiced through a methodology? (probability theory/decision theory/something else?) or is the description above just an idea that is to be applied generically, e.g. just taking into account cognitive biases? If its just a description of an idea, then does that mean you cannot really “apply” it, you more just try to keep the general tenets in mind when thinking about things?

if theres a methodology (or multiple) to be used to practice epistemic rationality, does that methodology(ies) apply to help understand all aspects of “reality” (again, keying off EY’s definition)? [NOTE: It seems reality, if it could be understood, would mean the broadest understanding of who we are, why we are here, and how our world works day-to-day. Is LW using a different definition of reality?] If more than one methodology could apply depending on the situation, how do you distinguish between those methodologies?

If the “chosen” methodology(ies) for epistemic rationality is NOT appropriate for certain decisions, what alternatives are to be used? Also, how do you describe the distinction between the decisions for which the chosen methodology(ies) works and those decisions for which it does not?

To be clear, I’m asking to get context for how rationality fits within the larger picture of the universe, including all of its uncertainty. I realize you may not have answers to all these questions and that there may not be consensus about any of it—thats more than fine since all i’m looking for is responses, i don’t care what they actually are. for example, you or others may make certain assumptions for certain of the questions to make necessary simplifications/etc. - all of that is fine, I just think the questions need to be considered before you can credibly apply (or seek to apply) rationality, and want to see if you’ve thought about them and if so, how you’ve handled them. If I’m being unreasonable or missing something with my questions, so be it, but i’d be interested in your thoughts.

non-expert 6 Feb 2013 20:52 UTC
4 points
in reply to: DaFranker’s comment on: Avoiding Your Belief’s Real Weak Points
DeFranker, thanks for the detailed note—I take your points, they are reasonable and fair, but want to share a different perspective.

The problem I’m having is that I’m not actually making any arguments as “correct” or saying any of you people are wrong. The observation/statement for the sake of discussion does not mean that there is a conclusory judgment attached to it. Now, to the extent that you say i need to have a better understanding to make dissenting points, fair, but all I want to know is what the weakest arguments against rationality are, and question what relevance those weaknesses, if any, on the determination about the amount of time and energy to be spent on rational choice theory, as opposed to another theory or no theory. This seems particularly appropriate with respect to THIS article—which asks that believers of a theory question the weakest positions of that theory—whether in application or whatever. This is an analysis for believers to perform. Again, I’m not saying you don’t have any strong arguments to weaker positions or that you even have weak positions—I’m asking how those that follow rationality have approached this question/issue and how they’ve disposed of it.

It would seem those that follow a theory have the greatest responsibility to consider the strongest arguments against that very theory (which is exactly why EY posted the article re: Judaism). Why is it so inappropriate to hold rationality to the same standard? I’m not presupposing an answer, I just want to know YOUR answer is so i better understand your point of view. Perhaps your answer is “its obvious this theory is correct,” without more. I would be fine with that simply because you’ve answered the question—you’ve given me your perspective. Sure, I may ask additional questions, but the goal is not to be right or win some online war, the goal is to learn (my effing name is “non-expert”—you dont’ have to worry about me telling you that you’re wrong, but i may question your logic/reason/etc.) I cannot learn unless I understand the perspectives of those that disagree with me.

And regarding the quoted text—yes, while i appreciate i did not follow the “culture” or norms of this site, I had looked at this site as a place for substantive answers/discussions. I’m not making a fully general counterargument—I’m simply pointing out that attacking my jokes/jabs allows you to avoid my question—again, to be clear, I didn’t ask the question to prove you’re wrong, I’m asking the question to hear your answer!

non-expert 6 Feb 2013 20:25 UTC
4 points
on: Avoiding Your Belief’s Real Weak Points
How has Rationality, as a universal theory (or near-universal) on decision making, confronted its most painful weaknesses? What are rationality’s weak points? The more broad a theory is claimed to be, the more important it seems to really test the theory’s weaknesses—that is why I assume you bring up religion, but the same standard should apply to rationality. This is not a cute question from a religious person, more of an intellectual inquiry from a person hoping to learn. In honor of the grand-daddy of cognitive biases, confirmation bias, doesn’t rational choice theory need to be vetted?

HungryTurtle makes an attempt to get to this question, but he gets too far into the weeds—this allowed LW to simply compare the “cons” of religion with the “cons” of rationality—this is a silly inquiry—I don’t care how the weaknesses of rationality compares to the weaknesses of Judaism because rational theory, if universally applicable with no weaknesses, should be tested on the basis of that claim alone, and not its weaknesses relative to some other theory.

NOTE: re-posting without offending language in the hopes i dont need to create a new name. looks like i lost on my instrumental rationality point, got downvoted enough to get be restricted. on the bright side I am learning to admit i’m wrong (i was wrong to misread whether i’d offend LW, which prevented me from engaging with others on substantive points i’m trying to learn more about).

non-expert 6 Feb 2013 19:58 UTC
−8 points
on: Avoiding Your Belief’s Real Weak Points
This is a response to theOtherDave—I can’t respond anymore to threads! you guys win! crush dissent based on superficial factors that “automatically result in downvotes” and thus ignore criticism! fool proof!

Is that [understanding reality] the goal? I’m not sure it is As above, I neither agree that understanding reality is a singularly important terminal goal, nor that finding the “best theory” for achieving my goals is a particularly high-priority instrumental goal.

ok, sorry to put words in your mouth—what is your goal then? Is it not fair to say the goal is “understand reality” and “achieve your goals”? I’m ignoring the second because its personal—the first goes to a normative understanding of reality, which presumably equally apply to each of us.

perhaps your definition is different, but my understanding is that epistemic rationality is focused on understanding reality, and it uses rational choice theory as a means to understand that reality.

non-expert 6 Feb 2013 19:44 UTC
−3 points
in reply to: Eliezer Yudkowsky’s comment on: Avoiding Your Belief’s Real Weak Points
Thanks, EY. I am asking a real question in that i want to know what people think of the question.

As a person that does not think rationality is as useful or as universal as people do on this site, I am at a disadvantage in that i’m in the minority here, however, I’m still posting/reading to question myself through engaging with those I disagree with. I seek the community’s perspective, not to necessarily believe it or label it correct/wrong, but simply to understand it. My personal experience (with this name and old ones) has been that people generally do not respond to viewpoints that are contrary to the conventional thought—this is problematic because this community is best-positioned to defend weaknesses (claimed or real) regarding rationality. Looking at it another way, if I believe that rationality has serious flaws, I need to be able to defend myself against YOUR best arguments, but can only do that if someone engages with me so I understand those arguments first.

The point of my post was to ask a serious question and poke you guys with a stick, hoping the poke elicits a response to the question—frankly it worked, and now i will swallow, learn from and hopefully respond to the various comments. So long as negative points don’t prevent me from reading and posting, i could care less about what points i have—I also note that I was clear about my intentions about wanting to goad an answer.

Perhaps you disagree with my methods, but since my goal was to hear multiple perspectives, and got more than I usually do, i see its a win for instrumental rationality. And, if my follow-ups suggest I’m not an troll/general a**, perhaps I wont have to use dirty tricks going forward!

non-expert 6 Feb 2013 19:08 UTC
0 points
in reply to: TheOtherDave’s comment on: Avoiding Your Belief’s Real Weak Points
Thanks. I don’t mean any weaknesses in particular, the idea laid out by EY was to confront your greatest weaknesses, so that is something for those that follow the theory to look into—I’m just exploring :).

I guess what I’m not following is this idea of “choosing” an approach. Implicit in your answer I think is the idea that there is a “best” approach that must be discovered among the various theories on living life—why does the existence of theory that is the “best” indicative that it is universally applicable? The goal is to “understand reality,” not choose a methodology that is the “best” under the assumption that the “best” theory can be then be followed universally.

Put differently, to choose rationality as a universal theory notwithstanding its flaws, you’re saying more than “its the “best” of all the available theories—I think you must also believe that the idea of having a set theory to guide life, notwithstanding its flaws, is the best way to go about understanding reality. What is the basis for the belief in the second prong?

Saying “well i have to make a decision,” so i need to find the best theory doesn’t cut it. It is clear there are times we must make a decision, but you are left with a similar question—why are humans entitled to know what to do simply because they need to make a decision? Perhaps in “reality” is there is no answer (or no answer within the limits of human comprehension) -- it is true you’re stuck not knowing what to do but you surely have a better view of reality (if that is the reality).

The implications of this are important. If you agree that rational choice theory is the “best” of all theories, but also agree that there is (or may be) a distinction between “choosing/applying a set theory” and “understanding reality” to the greatest extent humanly possible, it suggests one would need more than rationality to truly understand reality.

non-expert 6 Feb 2013 18:02 UTC
−32 points
on: Avoiding Your Belief’s Real Weak Points
How has Rationality, as a universal theory (or near-universal) on decision making, confronted its most painful weaknesses? What are rationality’s weak points? The more broad a theory is claimed to be, the more important it seems to really test the theory’s weaknesses—that is why I assume you bring up religion, but the same standard should apply to rationality. This is not a cute question from a religious person, more of an intellectual inquiry from a person hoping to learn. In honor of the grand-daddy of cognitive biases, confirmation bias, doesn’t rational choice theory need to be vetted?

HungryTurtle makes an attempt to get to this question, but he gets too far into the weeds—this allowed LW to simply compare the “cons” of religion with the “cons” of rationality—this is a silly inquiry—I don’t care how the weaknesses of rationality compares to the weaknesses of Judaism because rational theory, if universally applicable with no weaknesses, should be tested on the basis of that claim alone, and not its weaknesses relative to some other theory.

Please note that negative points to this post, or failure to respond will only provide further evidence that LW is guilty of confirmation bias. Its sweet when you get to use cognitive biases against those that try to weed them out. (Yes, I’m trying to goad someone into answering, but only because I really want to know your answer, not because I’m trying to troll).

non-expert 5 Feb 2013 23:30 UTC
1 point
in reply to: Qiaochu_Yuan’s comment on: Rationality Quotes February 2013
ok, wasn’t trying to play “gotcha,” just answering your question. good chat, thanks for engaging with me.

non-expert 5 Feb 2013 23:19 UTC
1 point
in reply to: Qiaochu_Yuan’s comment on: Rationality Quotes February 2013
you suggested that emotion hacking is more of an issue for instrumental rationality and not so much for epistemic rationality. to the extent that is wrong, you’re ignoring emotion hacking (subjective factor) from your application of epistemic rationality.

non-expert 5 Feb 2013 22:46 UTC
0 points
in reply to: Qiaochu_Yuan’s comment on: Rationality Quotes February 2013
sure. note that i don’t offer this as conclusive or correct, but just something i’m thinking about. also, lets assume rational choice theory is universally applicable for decision making.

rational choice theory gives you an equation to use and all we have to do is fill that equation with the proper inputs, value them correctly, and you get an answer. Obviously this is more difficult in practice, particularly where inputs (as to be expected) are not easily convertible to probabilities/numbers—I’m worried this is actually more problematic than we think. Once we have an objective equation as a tool, we may be biased to assume objectivity and truth regarding our answers, even though that belief often is based on the strength of the starting equation and not on our ability to accurately value and include the appropriate subjective factors. To the extent answering a question becomes difficult, we manufacture “certainty” by ignoring subjectivity or assuming it is not as relevant as it is.

Simply put, the belief we have a good and objective starting point biases us to believe we also can/will/actually derive an objectively correct answer, affecting the accuracy with which we fill in the equation.

non-expert 5 Feb 2013 21:15 UTC
0 points
in reply to: Qiaochu_Yuan’s comment on: Rationality Quotes February 2013
Thanks for the clarification, now i understand.

Going back to the original comment i commented on:

emotion-hacking is mostly an instrumental technique (although it is also epistemically valuable to notice and then stop your brain from flinching away from certain thoughts).

Particularly with your third type of emotion hacking (“hacking your emotional responses to external stimuli”), it seems emotion hacking is vital for for epistemic rationality—i guess that relates to my original point, that hacking emotions are at least as important for epistemic rationality as hacking emotions for instrumental rationality.

I raised the issue originally because I worry that rationality, to the extent it must value subjective considerations, tends to minimize the importance of those considerations to yield a more clear inquiry.

non-expert 5 Feb 2013 20:38 UTC
1 point
in reply to: Qiaochu_Yuan’s comment on: Rationality Quotes February 2013

I suppose there is a third kind of emotion-hacking, namely hacking your emotional responses to external stimuli.

isn’t this the ONLY kind of emotion-hacking out there? what emotions are expressed irrespective of external stimuli? seems like a small or insignificant subset.

But it’s not as if I can respond to other people’s thoughts, even in principle: all I have access to are sounds or images which purport to be correlated to those thoughts in some mysterious way.

the second two paragraphs above are responding to this. sorry to throw it back at you, but perhaps i’m misunderstanding the point you were trying to make here? I thought you were questioning the value of considering/responding to others’ thoughts, because you are arguing that even if you could, you would need to rely on their words and expressions, which may not be correlated with their “true” state of mind.

non-expert 5 Feb 2013 19:26 UTC
0 points
in reply to: Qiaochu_Yuan’s comment on: Rationality Quotes February 2013
All emotions are responses to external stimuli, unless your emotions relate only to what is going on in your head, without reference to the outside (i.e. outside your body) world.

I agree you can’t respond to others’ thoughts, unless they express them such that they are “behaviors.” Interestingly, the “problem” you have with the sounds or images (or words?) which purport to be correlated to others’ thoughts is the same exact issue everyone is having with you (or me).

if we’re confident in our own ability to express our thoughts (i.e. the correlation problem is not an issue for you), then how much can we dismiss others’ expressions because of that very same issue?