I would like to argue that it is less important to determine IF it is a fallacy, than what kind it is.
One view is that this is a “deliberation” fallacy, along the lines of a failed thought experiment; e.g. ‘something went wrong because conditions weren’t met.’ Another view is that this fallacy, which relates if I am correct to “resource shortages” or “debt crises” is in fact a more serious ‘systems error’ such as a method fallacy involving recursivity or logic gates.
To some extent at this point I am prone to take the view that the extent of the problem is proportionistic, leading to a kind of quantitative rather than qualitative perspective, which makes me think in my own reasoning that it is not true logic, and therefore not a true logical problem.
For example, it can be argued modal-realistically that in some contingent or arbitrarily divergent context or world, debt might be a functional or conducive phenomenon that is incorporated in a functional framework.
I would be interested to know if this kind of reasoning is or is not actually helpful in determining about a debt crisis. Perhaps as might be expected, the solution lies in some kind of “technologism,” and not a traditional philosophical debate per se.
I would call it cognitive obscurantism or epistemological denialism. I am not actually anti-epistemology, and did not start the post myself, however, the poster asked for advice so that is mine.