Flirting, if we continue to interpret it as a game between two agents, seems to have some interesting properties.
The “permission handshake” Scott Alexander points out (thanks, @noggin-scratcher) looks to be the core of the flirting game. A’s goal is to gain permission to be romantically intimate with B while not letting B know that they’re doing this, at least not immediately such that B can make up their mind regarding the matter. A‘s general strategy comes in two parts: gain this permission incrementally (i.e. spending time with B, initiating physical contact as opposed to directly asking for a romantic relationship), and asking for permission using the handshake.
Because of this fundamental element of ambiguity, flirting is surprisingly challenging to understand using mathematical theories. The handshake, while easy for most humans to understand, in a sense flies in the face of classical logic because A genuinely wants to convey and not convey attraction. This can’t be resolved by simply saying that A solely conveys attraction clearly. but in very small steps: an intelligent B would notice the pattern and could then realize too soon that A is romantically interested in them. It is not immediately obvious to me how one would regiment the handshake. Classical game theory makes the assumption that all agents’ strategies are common knowledge. This is a comically bad assumption to make here: if B knew A‘s strategy, then they would immediately deduce that A is flirting, ruining the point of the exercise. I would imagine Young’s theory of evolutionary game theory as presented in Individual Strategy and Social Structure, which is able to replicate much of game theory without this assumption, would help with that. Another wrinkle comes from the assumption that all agents are know they are playing a game. As already stated, B ideally should not immediately realize that A is playing the game with them. Continuing down the connection to evolutionary game theory, perhaps B has an initial strategy of “no strategy,” but then develops one once they gain enough information to begin considering if the “flirting game” is being played.
I’d like to linger on that last realization that B isn’t fully aware that they are participating in a game, as that’s connected to a core part of flirting: it is simultaneously cooperative and adversarial. Assuming that they are a boundedly rational agent, A does not know if B has figured out that A is flirting with them, and does not want them to know before A is comfortable making their attraction common knowledge, as stated above. Once B has collected enough information such that they’re a conscious player of the game, they do not want A’s attraction to B to become common knowledge, if at all, until they’ve decided how to respond, and they do not know if A knows they know assuming B too is boundedly rational. So, flirting is adversarial from the point of B. At the same time, A and B assumedly have a common goal: to preserve their relationship and possibly elevate it if mutually desired. Thusly, flirting is a cooperative game where both players are incentivized to work together without directly communicating.
In realizing the above, it is clear that flirting for each player is asymmetric in its adversarial aspect: A is primarily focused on intelligently conveying information, while B deduces and ultimately ends the game. Furthermore, this behavior comes about because B is, ideally for A, not a conscious participant of the game the whole time: the game slowly transitions from being a one— to two-player game as B gets more info.
---
I think a good next step is defining an ontology of flirting and then understanding it from an information-theoretic perspective. Gaining more intuition for how to logically regiment interactions should enable one to get over the conceptual roadblocks discussed above and give us tools to understand how B might interpret “hints” given by A. Fox’s “Flirting Report” gives a good starting point in this regard. Below are some rules of thumb for a prior distribution of whether someone is flirting or not: - (cisgender) men are inclined to interpret most positive (cisgender) women behavior conveying attraction (pg. 5) - men flirt slightly more than women (pg. 8) - young people flirt a lot (pg. 8) - single people flirt more with friends or strangers by quite a large margin (pg. 8) - flirting with someone’s partner is generally taboo (pg. 9) - flirting is most considered socially acceptable where initiating conversation with strangers is common place, alcohol is available, and where A and B share some common interest (pg. 11)
An important part of this ontology will be distinguishing playful teasing and flirting. A large part of the ambiguity present in the flirting comes about due to, absent of context, flirting and teasing being identical. Of course, A is trying to shield B from said context. If and how B can distinguish between the two will be an important part of understanding flirting in this context.
Flirting, if we continue to interpret it as a game between two agents, seems to have some interesting properties.
The “permission handshake” Scott Alexander points out (thanks, @noggin-scratcher) looks to be the core of the flirting game. A’s goal is to gain permission to be romantically intimate with B while not letting B know that they’re doing this, at least not immediately such that B can make up their mind regarding the matter. A‘s general strategy comes in two parts: gain this permission incrementally (i.e. spending time with B, initiating physical contact as opposed to directly asking for a romantic relationship), and asking for permission using the handshake.
Because of this fundamental element of ambiguity, flirting is surprisingly challenging to understand using mathematical theories. The handshake, while easy for most humans to understand, in a sense flies in the face of classical logic because A genuinely wants to convey and not convey attraction. This can’t be resolved by simply saying that A solely conveys attraction clearly. but in very small steps: an intelligent B would notice the pattern and could then realize too soon that A is romantically interested in them. It is not immediately obvious to me how one would regiment the handshake. Classical game theory makes the assumption that all agents’ strategies are common knowledge. This is a comically bad assumption to make here: if B knew A‘s strategy, then they would immediately deduce that A is flirting, ruining the point of the exercise. I would imagine Young’s theory of evolutionary game theory as presented in Individual Strategy and Social Structure, which is able to replicate much of game theory without this assumption, would help with that. Another wrinkle comes from the assumption that all agents are know they are playing a game. As already stated, B ideally should not immediately realize that A is playing the game with them. Continuing down the connection to evolutionary game theory, perhaps B has an initial strategy of “no strategy,” but then develops one once they gain enough information to begin considering if the “flirting game” is being played.
I’d like to linger on that last realization that B isn’t fully aware that they are participating in a game, as that’s connected to a core part of flirting: it is simultaneously cooperative and adversarial. Assuming that they are a boundedly rational agent, A does not know if B has figured out that A is flirting with them, and does not want them to know before A is comfortable making their attraction common knowledge, as stated above. Once B has collected enough information such that they’re a conscious player of the game, they do not want A’s attraction to B to become common knowledge, if at all, until they’ve decided how to respond, and they do not know if A knows they know assuming B too is boundedly rational. So, flirting is adversarial from the point of B. At the same time, A and B assumedly have a common goal: to preserve their relationship and possibly elevate it if mutually desired. Thusly, flirting is a cooperative game where both players are incentivized to work together without directly communicating.
In realizing the above, it is clear that flirting for each player is asymmetric in its adversarial aspect: A is primarily focused on intelligently conveying information, while B deduces and ultimately ends the game. Furthermore, this behavior comes about because B is, ideally for A, not a conscious participant of the game the whole time: the game slowly transitions from being a one— to two-player game as B gets more info.
---
I think a good next step is defining an ontology of flirting and then understanding it from an information-theoretic perspective. Gaining more intuition for how to logically regiment interactions should enable one to get over the conceptual roadblocks discussed above and give us tools to understand how B might interpret “hints” given by A. Fox’s “Flirting Report” gives a good starting point in this regard. Below are some rules of thumb for a prior distribution of whether someone is flirting or not:
- (cisgender) men are inclined to interpret most positive (cisgender) women behavior conveying attraction (pg. 5)
- men flirt slightly more than women (pg. 8)
- young people flirt a lot (pg. 8)
- single people flirt more with friends or strangers by quite a large margin (pg. 8)
- flirting with someone’s partner is generally taboo (pg. 9)
- flirting is most considered socially acceptable where initiating conversation with strangers is common place, alcohol is available, and where A and B share some common interest (pg. 11)
An important part of this ontology will be distinguishing playful teasing and flirting. A large part of the ambiguity present in the flirting comes about due to, absent of context, flirting and teasing being identical. Of course, A is trying to shield B from said context. If and how B can distinguish between the two will be an important part of understanding flirting in this context.