I think that this is an important point: the previously argued normative badness of directly accessible bad conscious experiences is not absolute and definitive, or in terms of justifying actions. It should weight on the scale with all other factors involved, even indirect and instrumental ones that could only affect intrinsic goodness or badness in a distant and unclear way.
JonatasMueller
Bad, negative, unpleasant, all possess partial semantic correspondence, which justifies their being a value.
The normative claims in this case need not be definitive and overruling in that case. Perhaps that is where your resistance to accepting it comes from. In moral realism, a justified preference or instrumental / indirect value that weights more can overpower a direct feeling as well. This justified preference will be ultimately reducible to direct feelings in the present or in the future, for oneself or for others, though.
Could you give me examples of any reasonable preferences that could not be reducible to good and bad feelings in that sense?
Anyway, there is also the argument from personal identity which calls for equalization of values taking into account all subjects (equally valued, if ceteris paribus), and their reasoning, if contextually equivalent. This could be in itself a partial refutation of the orthogonality thesis, a refutation in theory and for autonomous and free general superintelligent agents, but not necessarily for imprisoned and tampered ones.
A bad occurrence must be a bad ethical value.
Why? That’s an assertion—it won’t convince anyone who doesn’t already agree with you. And you’re using two meanings of the word “bad”—an unpleasant subjective experience, and badness according to a moral system.
If it is a bad occurrence, then the definition of ethics, at least as I see it (or this dictionary, although meaning is not authoritative), is defining what is good and bad (values), as normative ethics, and bringing about good and avoiding bad, as applied ethics. It seems to be a matter of including something in a verbal definition, so it seems to be correct. Moral realism would follow. It is not undesirable, but helpful, since anti-realism implies that our values are not really valuable, but just fiction.
Minds in general need not have moral systems, or conversely may lack hedonistic feelings, making the argument incomprehensible to them.
I agree, this would be a special case, of incomplete knowledge about conscious animals. This would be possible for instance in some artificial intelligences, but they might learn about it indirectly by observing animals, humans, and getting contact with human culture in various forms. Otherwise, they might become morally anti-realist.
I have a personal moral system that isn’t too far removed from the one you’re espousing (a bit more emphasise on preference).
Could you explain a bit this emphasis on preference?
This is a relevant discussion in another thread, by the way:
http://lesswrong.com/lw/gu1/decision_theory_faq/8lt9?context=3
I thought it was relevant to this, if not, then what was meant by motivation?
The inherent-desirableness of happiness is your mind reifying the internal data describing its motivation to do something
Consciousness is that of which we can be most certain of, and I would rather think that we are living in a virtual world under an universe with other, alien physical laws, than that consciousness itself is not real. If it is not reducible to nonmental facts, then nonmental facts don’t seem to account for everything there is of relevant.
From my perspective, this is “supernatural” because your story inherently revolves around mental facts you’re not allowed to reduce to nonmental facts—any reduction to nonmental facts will let us construct a mind that doesn’t care once the qualia aren’t mysteriously irreducibly compelling anymore.
It’s a reasonably good description, though wanting and liking seem to be neurologically separate, such that liking does not necessarily reflect a motivation, nor vice-versa (see: Not for the sake of pleasure alone. Think the pleasurable but non-motivating effect of opioids such as heroin. Even in cases in which wanting and liking occur together, this does not necessarily invalidate the liking aspect as purely wanting.
Liking and disliking, good and bad feelings as qualia, especially in very intense amounts, seem to be intrinsically so to those who are immediately feeling them. Reasoning could extend and generalize this.
I slightly disagree with that on a personal moral level, and entirely disagree with the assertion that it’s a logical transition.
Could you explain more at length for me?
The feeling of badness is something bad (imagine yourself or someone being tortured and tell me it’s not bad), and it is a real occurrence, because conscious contents are real occurrences. It is then a bad occurrence. A bad occurrence must be a bad ethical value. All this is data, since conscious perceptions have a directly accessible nature, they are “is”, and the “ought” is part of the definition of ethical value, that what is good ought to be promoted, and what is bad ought to be avoided.
This does not mean that we should seek direct good and avoid direct bad on the immediate present, such as making parties to no end, but it means that we should seek it in the present and the future, seeking indirect values such as working, learning, promoting peace and equality, so that the future, even in the longest-term, will have direct value.
(To the anonymous users who down-voted this, do me the favor of posting a comment saying why you disagree, if you are sure that you are right and I am wrong, otherwise it’s just rudeness, the down-vote should be used as a censoring mechanism for inappropriate posts rather than to express disagreement with a reasonable point of view. I’m using my time to freely explain this as a favor to whoever is reading, and it’s a bit insulting and bad mannered to down-vote it).
I agree with what you agree with.
Did you read my article Arguments against the Orthogonality Thesis?
I think that the argument for the intrinsic value (goodness or badness) of conscious feelings goes like this:
Conscious experiences are real, and are the most certain data about the world, because they are directly accessible, and don’t depend on inference, unlike the external world as we perceive it. It would not be possible to dismiss conscious experiences as unreal, inferring that they not be part of the external world, since they are more certain than the external world is. The external world could be an illusion, and we could be living inside a simulated virtual world, in an underlying universe that be alien and with different physical laws.
Even though conscious experiences are representations (sometimes of external physical states, sometimes of abstract internal states), apart from what they represent they do exist in themselves as real phenomena (likely physical).
Conscious experiences can be felt as intrinsically neutral, good, or bad in value, sometimes intensely so. For example, the bad value of having deep surgery without anesthesia is felt as intrinsically and intensely bad, and this badness is a real occurrence in the world. Likewise, an experience of extreme success or pleasure is intrinsically felt as good, and this goodness is a real occurrence in the world.
Ethical value is, by definition, what is good and what is bad. We have directly accessible data of occurrences of intrinsic goodness and badness. They are ethical value.
Why it would not do paperclip (or random value) maximization as a goal is explained more at length in the article. There is more than one reason. We’re considering a generally superintelligent agent, assuming above-human philosophical capacity. In terms of personal identity, there is a lack of personal identities, so it would be rational to take an objective, impersonal view, taking account of values and reasonings of relevant different beings. In terms of meta-ethics, there is moral realism and values can be reduced to the quality of conscious experience, so it would have this as its goal. If one takes moral anti-realism to be true, at least for this type of agent we are considering, a lack of real values would be understood as a lack of real goals, and could lead to the tentative goal of seeking more knowledge in order to find a real goal, or having no reason to do anything in particular (this is still susceptible to the considerations from personal identity). I argue against moral anti-realism.
I see. I think that ethics could be taken as, even individually, the formal definition of one’s goals and how to reach them, although in the orthogonality thesis ethics is taken in a collective level. Since personal identities cannot be sustained by logic, the distinction between individual goals and societal goals becomes trivial, and both are mutually inclusive.
What sort of cognitive and physical actions would make you think a robot is superintelligent?
For general superintelligence, proving performance in all cognitive areas that surpasses the highest of any humans. This naturally includes philosophy, which is about the most essential type of reasoning.
What fails in the program when one tries to build a robot that takes both the paperclip-maximizing actions and superintelligent actions?
It could have a narrow superintelligence, like a calculating machine, surpassing human cognitive abilities in some areas but not in others. If it had a general superintelligence, then it would not of its own do paperclip maximization as a goal, because this would be terribly stupid, philosophically.
I’m not sure I’m using rational in that sense, I could substitute “being rational” with “using reason”, “thinking intelligently”, “making sense”, “being logical”, what seems to follow from being generally superintelligent. Ethics is the study of defining what ought to be done and how to achieve it, so it seems to follow from general superintelligence as well. The trickier part seems to be defining ethics. Humans often act with motivations which are not based on formal ethics, but ethics is like a formal elaboration of what one’s (or everyone’s) motivations and actions ought to be.
I don’t think that someone can disagree with it (good conscious feelings are intrinsically good; bad conscious feelings are intrinsically bad), because it would be akin to disagreeing that, for instance, the color green feels greenish. Do you disagree with it?
Because I have certain beliefs (broadly, but not universally, shared). But I don’t see how any of those beliefs can be logically deduced.
Can you elaborate? I don’t understand… Many valid wants or beliefs can be ultimately reduced as to good and bad feelings, in the present or future, for oneself or for others, as instrumental values, such as peace, learning, curiosity, love, security, longevity, health, science...
What is defined as ethically good is by definition what ought to be done, at least rationally. Some agents, such as humans, often don’t act rationally, due to a conflict of reason with evolutionarily selected motivations, which have really their own evolutionary values in mind (e.g. have as many children as possible), not ours. This shouldn’t happen for much more intelligent agents, with stronger rationality (and possibly a capability to self-modify).
Sorry, I thought you already understood why wanting can be wrong.
Example 1: imagine a person named Eliezer walks to an ice cream stand, and picks a new flavor X. Eliezer wants to try the flavor X of ice cream. Eliezer buys it and eats it. The taste is awful and Eliezer vomits it. Eliezer concludes that wanting can be wrong and that it is different from liking in this sense.
Example 2: imagine Eliezer watched a movie in which some homophobic gangsters go about killing homosexuals. Eliezer gets inspired and wants to kill homosexuals too, so he picks a knife and finds a nice looking young man and prepares to torture and kill him. Eliezer looks at the muscular body of the young man, and starts to feel homosexual urges and desires, and instead he makes love with the homosexual young man. Eliezer concludes that he wanted something wrong and that he had been a bigot and homosexual all along, liking men, but not wanting to kill them.
Their motivation (or what they care about) should be in line with their rationality. This doesn’t happen with humans because we have evolutionarily selected and primitive motivations, coupled with a weak rationality, but should not happen with much more intelligent and designed (possibly self-modifying) agents. Logically, one should care about what one’s rationality tells.
We seem to be moving from personal identity to ethics. In ethics it is defined that good is what ought to be, and bad is what ought not to be. Ethics is about defining values (what is good and ought to be), and how to cause them.
Good and bad feelings are good and bad as direct data, being direct perceptions, and this quality they have is not an inference. Their good and bad quality is directly accessible by consciousness, as data with the highest epistemic certainty. Being data they are “is”, and being good and bad, under the above definition of ethics, they are “ought” too. This is a special status that only good and bad feelings have, and no other values do.
Indeed, but what separates wanting and liking is that preferences can be wrong, they require no empirical basis, while liking in itself cannot be wrong, and it has an empirical basis.
When rightfully wanting something, that something gets a justification. Liking, understood as good feelings, is a justification, while another is avoiding bad feelings, and this can be causally extended to include instrumental actions that will cause this in indirect ways.
Apart from that, what do you think of the other points? If you wish, we could continue a conversation on another online medium.