Your post prompted me to recall what I read in Military Nanotechnology: Potential Applications and Preventive Arms Control by Jürgen Altmann. It deals mostly with non-molecular nanotech we can expect to see in the next 5-20 years (or already, as it was published in 2006), but it does go over molecular nanotech and it’s worth thinking about the commonly mentioned x-risk of a universal molecular assembler in addition to AGI for the elites to handle over the next 70 years.
I think as a small counter to the pessimistic outlook the parable gives, it’s worth remembering that the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and especially the Chemical Weapons Convention have been fairly successful in their goals. The CWC lays out acceptable verification methods which aren’t so demanding that if a country accepts them then they slide into complete subjugation of the inspectors… If it could be extended to cover nanotech weapons that’d be a good thing.
On the other hand, maybe they’re not so much cause for optimism. The BTWC has a noticeable lack of verification measures, and Altmann cites that as mainly due to the US dragging its feet. The US can’t even deal with managing smaller threats at home where it has complete jurisdiction, like 3D printed guns, so it’s hard for me to see it in its current form dealing with a bigger threat of a nanotech arms race (let alone x-risks), especially if that requires playing nice with the international community.
Sorry for the necro—the linked article is 404′d. I uploaded a backup here. I didn’t find it on the author’s site but did find a copy through Web Archive; still, maybe my link will save someone else the hassle.