Among many other things, I don’t think the depiction of illusionism contradistinguished here from EM is fair.
IndraG
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In addition, is ”...the thing that happens when, let’s just check one more time: yep, not-a-p-zombie.” referring to testing one’s experience to reach a falsifiable claim? This illusionists deny. And Descartes I am now reckoning agrees; That you can doubt everything (thus including any such falsifiable claim, e.g. about the nature of consciousness) but the fact that you’re existing. And, third, this is also internally inconsistent; When you a few sentence later I think rightly claim one’s knowledge of “stuff like “I’m conscious” and “the world exists.”″ this as knowledge implies that you could not have checked (one more time) to be otherwise. Through science we (luckily) learn of (the presence of and can build on) regularities in our world, e.g. in physics and/or biology, as additional knowledge of a different, falsifiable kind. (Claiming falsifiability where there is none can of course lead to problems..)
I think, additionally, white is very connected to (all of) the other colours through virtue signalling (as, e.g., Geoffrey Miller wrote about). Connected then to evolutionary theory, let me add my appreciation for the comment on how naturalism could but need not lead to a connection (maybe) to the world (at large) but then also a disconnect to one’s own agency.
The illusionists do not disagree! (Otherwise absolutely fantastic and important essay!)
They agree you are not a p-zombie, in fact, by defining belief, they believe p-zombies are not clearly conceivable. They agree that, of course, you experience experiences. What one extrapolates / you extrapolate from that, circumventing the scientific method is at one’s/your own risk and if a belief in an infallible conviction, in say immaterial mindstuff (grounding a further infallible conviction), follows, then that’s an illusion at work.
I think something that is missing in the perspective is that, rather than pro or contra, permissible or non-permissible torture, the war on terror might have overridden this in his mind; a greater evil to possibly justify a smaller one. In my memory, from multiple debate appearances, Hitchens was a bit or reasonably supportive of Guantanamo Bay (and thus of a smaller evil to avert a larger one) but also tried to arrive at some reasonable middle position, while the topic was (understandably) very polarizing. It is possible to be against torture, but still be open to considering exceptions.
Regarding the terminology, if group selection translates to selection of a set of individuals, then how is group selection really valuably distinct from individual selection?
And, regarding the terminology, around “If group-level selection occurs at all, then traits of the group that are not genetic traits, including cultural knowledge, must be considered.” you seem to miss accounting for the possibility of individual selection for cultural units. And regarding those, analogously the first question again: is group selection of group of cultural units really meaningfully distinct from individual selection on a set of cultural units, as happens since time immemorial due to e.g. a weather event?
My suspicion is it isn’t, and—as you allude to—the false distinction is used to shoehorn wishes for altruism into evolutionary theory.
I would also go so far as to argue that the very concept of “group”, which supports this theory as well as the practice it refers to, is itself an individual cultural unit.
Thanks for raising this issue! I think resolving it could yield great benefits, and I’ll contribute to it when I can post on this forum.
Great! I’m in.
Moreover, when one identifies two pure strategy equilibria in a 2x2 game a third, mixed strategy, equilibrium almost always exists.
threats being harmful to their target, the execution of threats seems to constitute an inefficiency:
also when the threats are targeted at (Pareto-dominated) inefficiency, i.e. at (conditional on) any actions other than (coordinating on) the most efficient?
As a concrete counter-example, there are productivity/self-control tools, wherewith people elect to target and/or execute threats on themselves to help elicit better behavior. The legal system is basically also collective threats that help us behave better, but is it inefficient such that we should do better without? I think the opposite, such that any one threat can not only be harmful, but also neutral or beneficial.
and a defecting equilibrium which does not.
Why doesn’t this also require coordination? Also, there also seems to be a mixed equilibrium where both players randomize their strategies 50⁄50.
For the Chicken game, the mixed strategy equilibrium is not 50⁄50 but more specifically 90⁄10. And a mutual defection can also not constitute crash, but instead allow for further and stable repeated play, particularly if a mixed strategy equilibrium is coordinated and acted upon.
A simple criticism of idea six is that physics is not independent from human behavior, an argument I heard made at least by David Deutsch and I think also Anders Sandberg. In other words, to be really capable of predicting the future trajectories of planets, (our) civilization will have to predicted as well.