Incorrect
Karma: 1,067
Oh don’t worry, there will always be those little lapses in awareness. Even supposing you hide yourself at night, are you sure you maintain your sentience while awake? Ever closed your eyes and relaxed, felt the cool breeze, and for a moment, forgot you were aware of being aware of yourself?
Bug:
Are you saying that dying after a billion years sounds sad to you?
And therefore you would have a thousand-year-old brain that can make trillion-year plans.
I think I have a better understanding now.
For every statement S and for every action A, except the A Myself() actually returns, PA will contain a theorem of the form (Myself()=A) ⇒ S because falsehood implies anything. Unless Myself() doesn’t halt, in which case the value of Myself() can be undecidable in PA and Myself’s theorem prover wont find anything, consistent with the fact that Myself() doesn’t halt.
I will assume Myself() is also filtering theorems by making sure Universe() has some minimum utility in the consequent.
If Myself() halts, then if the first theorem it finds has a false consequent PA would be inconsistent (because Myself() will return A, proving the antecedent true, proving the consequent true). I guess if this would have happened, then Myself() will be undecidable in PA.
If Myself() halts and the first theorem it finds has a true consequent then all is good with the world and we successfully made a good decision.
Whether or not ambient decision theory works on a particular problem seems to depend on the ordering of theorems it looks at. I don’t see any reason to expect this ordering to be favorable.
How does ambient decision theory work with PA which has a single standard model?
It looks for statements of the form Myself()=C ⇒ Universe()=U
(Myself()=C), and (Universe()=U) should each have no free variables. This means that within a single model, their values should be constant. Thus such statements of implication establish no relationship between your action and the universe’s utility, it is simply a boolean function of those two constant values.
What am I missing?
15: discover ordinal hierarchy of Tegmark universes, discover method of constructing the set of all ordinals without contradiction, create level n Tegmark universe for all n
It was supposed to be a sarcastic response about being too strict with definitions but obviously didn’t end up being funny.
I am not a Will Newsome sockpuppet. I’ll refrain from making the lower quality subset of my comments henceforth.
Define human, moderator, judgement call, makes, and “when”.
Here’s a conversation I had with Will a while back:
Cuteness is a subjective evaluation, a way to interpret reality, not a fact.
Even calling someone’s behavior non-cute is mean. Even meanness is cute. Once you start calling humans or the things they do non-cute you open the door to finding humans disgusting.
Even if we were to assume his behavior was trollish, damaging to lesswrong, and/or unproductive, that shouldn’t make it non-cute.
I’d rather live in a world where even if we disagree with each other, annoy each other, or waste each other’s time we still don’t say anybody isn’t cute.
The opposite of cute is disgusting and is not a concept that should be applied to humans.
He’s really wondering whether the voxel-space is a directed graph or whether up∘down=down∘up=identity (and for left/right too). Movement could be commutative with up∘down≠identity.
Consider
voxels = {a, b} left(a) = a right(a) = a up(a) = a down(a) = a left(b) = a right(b) = a up(b) = a down(b) = a If f is in (left, right, up, down) let g be the respective function in (right, left, down, up) forall x in {a, b} f(g(x))=g(f(x))=a But up(down(b))=a whereas identity(b)=b
It’s really mean to say someone isn’t cute and although this entire thread isn’t very productive I find it mean that my comment rejecting the meanness to WN was selectively deleted.
This behavior isn’t cute.
Yes it is, and not just a little bit.
If dying after a billion years doesn’t sound sad to you, it’s because you lack a thousand-year-old brain that can make trillion-year plans.
If only the converse were true...
They aren’t adding qualia, they are adding the utility they associate with qualia.
Sorry, generic you.
But the axiom schema of induction does not completely exclude nonstandard numbers. Sure if I prove some property P for P(0) and for all n, P(n) ⇒ P(n+1) then for all n, P(n); then I have excluded the possibility of some nonstandard number “n” for which not P(n) but there are some properties which cannot be proved true or false in Peano Arithmetic and therefore whose truth hood can be altered by the presence of nonstandard numbers.
Can you give me a property P which is true along the zero-chain but necessarily false along a separated chain that is infinitely long in both directions? I do not believe this is possible but I may be mistaken.