If you ask ChatGPT to multiply two 4-digit numbers it writes out the reasoning process in natural knowledge and comes to the right answer.
People keep saying such things. Am I missing something? I asked it to calculate 1024 * 2047, and the answer isn’t even close. (Though to my surprise, the first 2 steps are at least correct steps, and not nonsense. And it is actually adding the right numbers together in step 3, again, to my surprise. I’ve seen it perform much, much worse.)
That’s what I’ve been saying to you: a contradiction.
And there are two ways to resolve it.
The scenario also stipulates the bomb isn’t there if you Left-box.
What actually happens? Not much. You live. For free.
“So if you take the Left box, what actually, physically happens?”
You live. For free. Because the bomb was never there to begin with.
Yes, the situation does say the bomb is there. But it also says the bomb isn’t there if you Left-box.
Agreed, but I think it’s important to stress that it’s not like you see a bomb, Left-box, and then see it disappear or something. It’s just that Left-boxing means the predictor already predicted that, and the bomb was never there to begin with.
Put differently, you can only Left-box in a world where the predictor predicted you would.
I think we agree. My stance: if you Left-box, that just means the predictor predicted that with probability close to 1. From there on, there are a trillion trillion − 1 possible worlds where you live for free, and 1 where you die.
I’m not saying “You die, but that’s fine, because there are possible worlds where you live”. I’m saying that “you die” is a possible world, and there are way more possible worlds where you live.
I’m not going to make you cite anything. I know what you mean. I said Right-boxing is a consequence, given a certain resolution of the problem; I always maintained Left-boxing is the correct decision. Apparently I didn’t explain myself well, that’s on me. But I’m kinda done, I can’t seem to get my point across (not saying it’s your fault btw).
By construction it is not, because the scenario is precisely that we find ourselves in one such exceptional case; the posterior probability (having observed that we do so find ourselves) is thus ~1.
Except that we don’t find ourselves there if we Left-box. But we seem to be going around in a circle.
… but you have said, in a previous post, that if you find yourself in this scenario, you Right-box. How to reconcile your apparently contradictory statements…?
Right-boxing is the necessary consequence if we assume the predictor’s Right-box prediction is fixed now. So GIVEN the Right-box prediction, I apparently Right-box.
My entire point is that the prediction is NOT a given. I Left-box, and thus change the prediction to Left-box.
I have made no contradictory statements. I am and always have been saying that Left-boxing is the correct decision to resolve this dilemma.
No, that’s just plain wrong. If you Left-box given a perfect predictor, the predictor didn’t put a bomb in Left. That’s a given. If the predictor did put a bomb in Left and you Left-box, then the predictor isn’t perfect.
Excellent point!
Firstly, there’s a difference between “never” and “extremely rarely”.
That difference is so small as to be neglected.
And in the latter case, the question remains “and what do you do then?”. To which, it seems, you answer “choose the Right box”…? Well, I agree with that! But that’s just the view that I’ve already described as “Left-box unless there’s a bomb in Left, in which case Right-box”.
It seems to me that strategy leaves you manipulatable by the predictor, who can then just always predict you will Right-box, put a bomb in Left, and let you Right-box, causing you to lose $1,000.
“Irrelevant, since the described scenario explicitly stipulates that you find yourself in precisely that situation.”
Actually, this whole problem is irrelevant to me, a Left-boxer: Left-boxers never (or extremely rarely) find themselves in the situation with a bomb in Left. That’s the point.
The bottom line is: to the actual single question the scenario asks—which box do you choose, finding yourself in the given situation?—we give the same answer. Yes?
The bottom line is that Bomb is a decision problem. If I am still free to make a decision (which I suppose I am, otherwise it isn’t much of a problem), then the decision I make is made at 2 points in time. And then, Left-boxing is the better decision.
Yes, the Bomb is what we’re given. But with the very reasonable assumption of subjunctive dependence, it specifies what I am saying...
We agree that if I would be there, I would Right-box, but also everybody would then Right-box, as a logical necessity (well, 1 in a trillion trillion error rate, sure). It has nothing to do with correct or incorrect decisions, viewed like that: the decision is already hard coded into the problem statement, because of the subjunctive dependence.
“But you can just Left-box” doesn’t work: that’s like expecting one calculator to answer to 2 + 2 differently than another calculator.
Alright. The correct decision is Left-boxing, because that means the predictor’s model Left-boxed (and so do I), letting me live for free. Because, at the point where the predictor models me, the Bomb isn’t placed yet (and never will be).
However, IF I’m in the Bomb scenario, then the predictor’s model already Right-boxed. Then, because of subjunctive dependence, it’s apparently not possible for me to Left-box, just as it is impossible for two calculators to give a different result to 2 + 2.
Hmmm, I thought that comment might clear things up, but apparently it doesn’t. And I’m left wondering if you even read it.
Anyway, Left-boxing is the correct decision. But since you didn’t really engage with my points, I’ll be leaving now.
Not at the point in time where Omega models my decision procedure.
One thing we do agree on:
If I ever find myself in the Bomb scenario, I Right-box. Because in that scenario, the predictor’s model of me already Right-boxed, and therefore I do, too—not as a decision, per se, but as a logical consequence.
The correct decision is another question—that’s Left-boxing, because the decision is being made in two places. If I find myself in the Bomb scenario, that just means the decision to Right-box was already made.
The Bomb problem asks what the correct decision is, and makes clear (at least under my assumption) that the decision is made at 2 points in time. At that first point (in the predictor’s head), Left-boxing leads to the most utility: it avoids burning to death for free. Note that at that point, there is not yet a bomb in Left!
That’s one possible world. There are many more where I don’t burn to death.
Asking the same question again even gives a completely different (but again wrong) result: