I think you may have misunderstood me. By “nanosurgery” I meant not solely Drexlerian medical nanobots (though I wasn’t ruling them out). Any drug whose design deliberately and intentionally causes specific, deliberate, and intentional changes to cell-level and molecular-level components of the human body, deliberately and consciously designed with a deep knowledge of the protein structures and cellular metabolic pathways involved, qualifies as nanosurgery, by my definition.
I contrast nanosurgery: deliberate, intentional action controlling the activity or structure of cellular-components—with medicine: the application of small molecules to the human metabolism to create a global, holistic effect with incomplete or nonexistent knowledge of the specific functional mechanisms. Surgery’s salient characteristic is that it is intentional and deliberate manipulation to repair functionality. Medicine’s salient characteristic is that it is a mapping of cause [primarily drug administration] to effect [changes in reported symptoms], with significantly reduced emphasis on the functional chain of causation between the two. As you said above, medicine is defined as “cheap tricks”. That’s what it does. That’s what it’s always been. When you’re doing something intentional to a specific piece of a human to modify or repair it’s functionality, that’s surgery, whether it’s done at the cellular or molecular level (nanosurgery) or at the macroscopic level (conventional surgery).
Prior to about 20 years ago, the vast majority of drugs were developed as medicine. Nowadays, more and more attempts at drug design are at least partially attempts to engineer tools for nanosurgery, per this definition. This is a good thing, and I see the trend continuing. If Drexlerian medical nanobots are possible at all, they would represent the logical endpoint of this trend, but I agree they represent an incredible engineering challenge and they may or may not end up being an economical technology for fixing broken human bodies.
This isn’t about Jesus Christ, and it isn’t about schizophrenia. It isn’t even about religion. It’s about the Simulation Argument.
If we have good reason to believe that we will be reliably simulated many times in the future, than we can trivially conclude that we are almost certainly inone of the simulations.