My best idea for achieving an international AI pause: https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/RNatHBdxdCdidhqWf/chinscratch-s-quick-takes?commentId=XCxZjqhMRPGK3Faq8
Ebenezer Dukakis
“The far left is censorious” and “Republicans are censorious” are in no way incompatible claims :-)
Great post. Self-selection seems huge for online communities, and I think it’s no different on these fora.
Confidence level: General vague impressions and assorted thoughts follow; could very well be wrong on some details.
A disagreement I have with both the rationalist and EA communities is what the process of coming to robust conclusions looks like. In those communities, it seems like the strategy is often to identify a few super-geniuses who go do a super-deep analysis, and come to a conclusion that’s assumed to be robust and trustworthy. See the “Groupthink” section on this page for specifics.
From my perspective, I would rather see an ordinary-genius do an ordinary-depth analysis, and then have a bunch of other people ask a bunch of hard questions. If the analysis holds up against all those hard questions, then the conclusion can be taken as robust.
Everyone brings their own incentives, intuitions, and knowledge to a problem. If a single person focuses a lot on a problem, they run into diminishing returns regarding the number of angles of attack. It seems more effective to generate a lot of angles of attack by taking the union of everyone’s thoughts.
From my perspective, placing a lot of trust in top EA/LW thought leaders ironically makes them less trustworthy, because people stop asking why the emperor has no clothes.
The problem with saying the emporer has no clothes is: Either you show yourself a fool, or else you’re attacking a high-status person. Not a good prospect either way, in social terms.
EA/LW communities are an unusual niche with opaque membership norms, and people may want to retain their “insider” status. So they do extra homework before accusing the emperor of nudity, and might just procrastinate indefinitely.
There can also be a subtle aspect of circular reasoning to thought leadership: “we know this person is great because of their insights”, but also “we know this insight is great because of the person who said it”. (Certain celebrity users on these fora get 50+ positive karma on basically every top-level post. Hard to believe that the authorship isn’t coloring the perception of the content.)
A recent illustration of these principles might be the pivot to AI Pause. IIRC, it took a “super-genius” (Katja Grace) writing a super long post before Pause became popular. If an outsider simply said: “So AI is bad, why not make it illegal?”—I bet they would’ve been downvoted. And once that’s downvoted, no one feels obligated to reply. (Note, also—I don’t believe there was much reasoning transparency regarding why the pause strategy was considered unpromising at the time. You kinda had to be an insider like Katja to know the reasoning in order to critique it.)
In conclusion, I suspect there are a fair number of mistaken community beliefs which survive because (1) no “super-genius” has yet written a super-long post about them, and (2) poking around by asking hard questions is disincentivized.
Yeah, I think there are a lot of underexplored ideas along these lines.
It’s weird how so much of the internet seems locked into either the reddit model (upvotes/downvotes) or the Twitter model (likes/shares/followers), when the design space is so much larger than that. Someone like Aaron, who played such a big role in shaping the internet, seems more likely to have a gut-level belief that it can be shaped. I expect there are a lot more things like Community Notes that we could discover if we went looking for them.
I’ve always wondered what Aaron Swartz would think of the internet now, if he was still alive. He had far-left politics, but also seemed to be a big believer in openness, free speech, crowdsourcing, etc. When he was alive those were very compatible positions, and Aaron was practically the poster child for holding both of them. Nowadays the far left favors speech restrictions and is cynical about the internet.
Would Aaron have abandoned the far left, now that they are censorious? Would he have become censorious himself? Or would he have invented some clever new technology, like RSS or reddit, to try and fix the internet’s problems?
Just goes to show what a tragedy death is, I guess.
I expect escape will happen a bunch
Are you willing to name a specific year/OOM such that if there are no publicly known cases of escape by that year/OOM, you would be surprised? What, if anything, would you acknowledge as evidence that alignment is easier than you thought, here?
To ensure the definition of “escape” is not gerrymandered—do you know of any cases of escape right now? Do you think escape has already occurred and you just don’t know about it? “Escape” means something qualitatively different from any known event up to this point, yes? Does it basically refer to self-exfiltration of weights which was not requested by any human? Can we get a somewhat precise definition by any chance?
Sure there will be errors, but how important will those errors be?
Humans currently control the trajectory of humanity, and humans are error-prone. If you replace humans with something that’s error-prone in similar ways, that doesn’t seem like it’s obviously either a gain or a loss. How would such a system compare to an em of a human, for example?
If you want to show that we’re truly doomed, I think you need additional steps beyond just “there will be errors”.
Some recent-ish bird flu coverage:
Global health leader critiques ‘ineptitude’ of U.S. response to bird flu outbreak among cows
A Bird-Flu Pandemic in People? Here’s What It Might Look Like. TLDR: not good. (Reload the page and ctrl-a then ctrl-c to copy the article text before the paywall comes up.) Interesting quote: “The real danger, Dr. Lowen of Emory said, is if a farmworker becomes infected with both H5N1 and a seasonal flu virus. Flu viruses are adept at swapping genes, so a co-infection would give H5N1 opportunity to gain genes that enable it to spread among people as efficiently as seasonal flu does.”
Infectious bird flu survived milk pasteurization in lab tests, study finds. Here’s what to know.
1 in 5 milk samples from grocery stores test positive for bird flu. Why the FDA says it’s still safe to drink—see also updates from the FDA here: “Last week we announced preliminary results of a study of 297 retail dairy samples, which were all found to be negative for viable virus.” (May 10)
The FDA is making reassuring noises about pasteurized milk, but given that CDC and friends also made reassuring noises early in the COVID-19 pandemic, I’m not fully reassured.
I wonder if drinking a little bit of pasteurized milk every day would be helpful inoculation? You could hedge your bets by buying some milk from every available brand, and consuming a teaspoon from a different brand every day, gradually working up to a tablespoon etc.
About a month ago, I wrote a quick take suggesting that an early messaging mistake made by MIRI was: claim there should be a single leading FAI org, but not give specific criteria for selecting that org. That could’ve lead to a situation where Deepmind, OpenAI, and Anthropic can all think of themselves as “the best leading FAI org”.
An analogous possible mistake that’s currently being made: Claim that we should “shut it all down”, and also claim that it would be a tragedy if humanity never created AI, but not give specific criteria for when it would be appropriate to actually create AI.
What sort of specific criteria? One idea: A committee of random alignment researchers is formed to study the design; if at least X% of the committee rates the odds of success at Y% or higher, it gets the thumbs up. Not ideal criteria, just provided for the sake of illustration.
Why would this be valuable?
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If we actually get a pause, it’s important to know when to unpause as well. Specific criteria could improve the odds that an unpause happens in a reasonable way.
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If you want to build consensus for a pause, advertising some reasonable criteria for when we’ll unpause could get more people on board.
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Don’t have time to respond in detail but a few quick clarifications/responses:
Sure, don’t feel obligated to respond, and I invite the people disagree-voting my comments to hop in as well.
— There are lots of groups focused on comms/governance. MIRI is unique only insofar as it started off as a “technical research org” and has recently pivoted more toward comms/governance.
That’s fair, when you said “pretty much any other organization in the space” I was thinking of technical orgs.
MIRI’s uniqueness does seem to suggest it has a comparative advantage for technical comms. Are there any organizations focused on that?
by MIRI’s lights, getting policymakers to understand alignment issues would be more likely to result in alignment progress than having more conversations with people in the technical alignment space
By ‘alignment progress’ do you mean an increased rate of insights per year? Due to increased alignment funding?
Anyway, I don’t think you’re going to get “shut it all down” without either a warning shot or a congressional hearing.
If you just extrapolate trends, it wouldn’t particularly surprise me to see Alex Turner at a congressional hearing arguing against “shut it all down”. Big AI has an incentive to find the best witnesses it can, and Alex Turner seems to be getting steadily more annoyed. (As am I, fwiw.)
Again, extrapolating trends, I expect MIRI’s critics like Nora Belrose will increasingly shift from the “inside game” of trying to engage w/ MIRI directly to a more “outside game” strategy of explaining to outsiders why they don’t think MIRI is credible. After the US “shuts it down”, countries like the UAE (accused of sponsoring genocide in Sudan) will likely try to quietly scoop up US AI talent. If MIRI is considered discredited in the technical community, I expect many AI researchers to accept that offer instead of retooling their career. Remember, a key mistake the board made in the OpenAI drama was underestimating the amount of leverage that individual AI researchers have, and not trying to gain mindshare with them.
Pause maximalism (by which I mean focusing 100% on getting a pause and not trying to speed alignment progress) only makes sense to me if we’re getting a ~complete ~indefinite pause. I’m not seeing a clear story for how that actually happens, absent a much broader doomer consensus. And if you’re not able to persuade your friends, you shouldn’t expect to persuade your enemies.
Right now I think MIRI only gets their stated objective in a world where we get a warning shot which creates a broader doom consensus. In that world it’s not clear advocacy makes a difference on the margin.
I think if MIRI engages with “curious newcomers” those newcomers will have their own questions/confusions/objections and engaging with those will improve general understanding.
You think policymakers will ask the sort of questions that lead to a solution for alignment?
In my mind, the most plausible way “improve general understanding” can advance the research frontier for alignment is if you’re improving the general understanding of people fairly near that frontier.
Based on my experience so far, I don’t expect their questions/confusions/objections to overlap a lot with the questions/confusions/objections that tech-oriented active LW users have.
I expect MIRI is not the only tech-oriented group policymakers are talking to. So in the long run, it’s valuable for MIRI to either (a) convince other tech-oriented groups of its views, or (b) provide arguments that will stand up against those from other tech-oriented groups.
there’s perhaps more public writing/dialogues between MIRI and its critics than for pretty much any other organization in the space.
I believe they are also the only organization in the space that says its main focus is on communications. I’m puzzled that multiple full-time paid staff are getting out-argued by folks like Alex Turner who are posting for free in their spare time.
If MIRI wants us to make use of any added timeline in a way that’s useful, or make arguments that outsiders will consider robust, I think they should consider a technical communications strategy in addition to a general-public communications strategy. The wave-rock model could help for technical communications as well. Right now their wave game for technical communications seems somewhat nonexistent. E.g. compare Eliezer’s posting frequency on LW vs X.
You depict a tradeoff between focusing on “ingroup members” vs “policy folks”, but I suspect there are other factors which are causing their overall output to be low, given their budget and staffing levels. E.g. perhaps it’s an excessive concern with org reputation that leads them to be overly guarded in their public statements. In which case they could hire an intern to argue online for 40 hours a week, and if the intern says something dumb, MIRI can say “they were just an intern—and now we fired them.” (Just spitballing here.)
It’s puzzling to me that MIRI originally created LW for the purpose of improving humanity’s thinking about AI, and now Rob says that’s their “main focus”, yet they don’t seem to use LW that much? Nate hasn’t said anything about alignment here in the past ~6 months. I don’t exactly see them arguing with the ingroup too much.
So what’s the path by which our “general understanding of the situation” is supposed to improve? There’s little point in delaying timelines by a year, if no useful alignment research is done in that year. The overall goal should be to maximize the product of timeline delay and rate of alignment insights.
Also, I think you may be underestimating the ability of newcomers to notice that MIRI tends to ignore its strongest critics. See also previously linked comment.
In terms of “improve the world’s general understanding of the situation”, I encourage MIRI to engage more with informed skeptics. Our best hope is if there is a flaw in MIRI’s argument for doom somewhere. I would guess that e.g. Matthew Barnett he has spent something like 100x as much effort engaging with MIRI as MIRI has spent engaging with him, at least publicly. He seems unusually persistent—I suspect many people are giving up, or gave up long ago. I certainly feel quite cynical about whether I should even bother writing a comment like this one.
superbabies
I’m concerned there may be an alignment problem for superbabies.
Humans often have contempt for people and animals with less intelligence than them. “You’re dumb” is practically an all-purpose putdown. We seem to assign moral value to various species on the basis of intelligence rather than their capacity for joy/suffering. We put chimpanzees in zoos and chickens in factory farms.
Additionally, jealousy/”xenophobia” towards superbabies from vanilla humans could lead them to become misanthropes. Everyone knows genetic enhancement is a radioactive topic. At what age will a child learn they were modified? It could easily be just as big of a shock as learning that you were adopted or conceived by a donor. Then stack more baggage on top: Will they be bullied for it? Will they experience discrimination?
I feel like we’re charging headlong into these sociopolitical implications, hollering “more intelligence is good!”, the same way we charged headlong into the sociopolitical implications of the internet/social media in the 1990s and 2000s while hollering “more democracy is good!” There’s a similar lack of effort to forecast the actual implications of the technology.
I hope researchers are seeking genes for altruism and psychological resilience in addition to genes for intelligence.
Also a strategy postmortem on the decision to pivot to technical research in 2013: https://intelligence.org/2013/04/13/miris-strategy-for-2013/
I do wonder about the counterfactual where MIRI never sold the Singularity Summit, and it was blowing up as an annual event, same way Less Wrong blew up as a place to discuss AI. Seems like owning the Summit could create a lot of leverage for advocacy.
One thing I find fascinating is the number of times MIRI has reinvented themselves as an organization over the decades. People often forget that they were originally founded to bring about the Singularity with no concern for friendliness. (I suspect their advocacy would be more credible if they emphasized that.)
I appreciate your replies. I had some more time to think and now I have more takes. This isn’t my area, but I’m having fun thinking about it.
See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:ComputerMemoryHierarchy.svg
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Disk encryption is table stakes. I’ll assume any virtual memory is also encrypted. I don’t know much about that.
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I’m assuming no use of flash memory.
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Absent homomorphic encryption, we have to decrypt in the registers, or whatever they’re called for a GPU.
So basically the question is how valuable is it to encrypt the weights in RAM and possibly in the processor cache. For the sake of this discussion, I’m going to assume reading from the processor cache is just as hard as reading from the registers, so there’s no point in encrypting the processor cache if we’re going to decrypt in registers anyway. (Also, encrypting the processor cache could really hurt performance!)
So that leaves RAM: how much added security we get if we encrypt RAM in addition to encrypting disk.
One problem I notice: An attacker who has physical read access to RAM may very well also have physical write access to RAM. That allows them to subvert any sort of boot-time security, by rewriting the running OS in RAM.
If the processor can only execute signed code, that could help. But an attacker could still control which signed code the processor runs (by strategically changing the contents at an instruction pointer?) I suspect this is enough in practice.
A somewhat insane idea would be for the OS to run encrypted in RAM to make it harder for an attacker to tamper with it. I doubt this would help—an attacker could probably infer from the pattern of memory accesses which OS code does what. (Assuming they’re able to observe memory accesses.)
So overall it seems like with physical write access to RAM, an attacker can probably get de facto root access, and make the processor their puppet. At that point, I think exfiltrating the weights should be pretty straightforward. I’m assuming intermediate activations must be available for interpretability, so it seems possible to infer intermediate weights by systematically probing intermediate activations and solving for the weights.
If you could run the OS from ROM, so it can’t be tampered with, maybe that could help. I’m assuming no way to rewrite the ROM or swap in a new ROM while the system is running. Of course, that makes OS updates annoying since you have to physically open things up and swap them out. Maybe that introduces new vulnerabilities.
In any case, overall I suspect the benefit-to-effort ratio is higher elsewhere. I would focus on making sure the AI isn’t capable of reading its own RAM in the first place, and isn’t trying to.
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QFT is the extreme example of a “better abstraction”, but in principle (if the natural abstraction hypothesis fails) there will be all sorts and shapes of abstractions, and some of them will be available to us, and some of them will be available to the model, and these sets will not fully overlap—which is a concern in worlds where different abstractions lead to different generalization properties.
Indeed. I think the key thing for me is, I expect the model to be strongly incentivized to have a solid translation layer from its internal ontology to e.g. English language, due to being trained on lots of English language data. Due to Occam’s Razor, I expect the internal ontology to be biased towards that of an English-language speaker.
It’s just that, if you feed enough data to a model that can hold entire swaths of the physical universe inside of its metaphorical “head”, pretty soon hypotheses that involve the actual state of that universe will begin to outperform hypotheses that don’t, and which instead use some kind of lossy approximation of that state involving intermediary concepts like “intent”, “belief”, “agent”, “subjective state”, etc.
I’m imagining something like: early in training the model makes use of those lossy approximations because they are a cheap/accessible way to improve its predictive accuracy. Later in training, assuming it’s being trained on the sort of gigantic scale that would allow it to hold swaths of the physical universe in its head, it loses those desired lossy abstractions due to catastrophic forgetting. Is that an OK way to operationalize your concern?
I’m still not convinced that this problem is a priority. It seems like a problem which will be encountered very late if ever, and will lead to ‘random’ failures on predicting future/counterfactual data in a way that’s fairly obvious.
If I encountered an intelligent extraterrestrial species, in principle I think I could learn to predict fairly well things like what it finds easy to understand, what its values are, and what it considers to be ethical behavior, without using any of the cognitive machinery I use to self-reflect. Humans tend to reason about other humans by asking “what would I think if I was in their situation”, but in principle an AI doesn’t have to work that way. But perhaps you think there are strong reasons why this would happen in practice?
Supposing we had strong reasons to believe that an AI system wasn’t self-aware and wasn’t capable of self-reflection. So it can look over a plan it generated and reason about its understandability, corrigibility, impact on human values, etc. without any reflective aspects. Does that make alignment any easier according to you?
Supposing the AI lacks a concept of “easy to understand”, as you hypothesize. Does it seem reasonable to think that it might not be all that great at convincing a gatekeeper to unbox it, since it might focus on super complex arguments which humans can’t understand?
Entirely separately, I have concerns about the ability of ML-based technology to robustly point the AI in any builder-intended direction whatsoever, even if there exists some not-too-large adequate mapping from that intended direction onto the AI’s internal ontology at training time. My guess is that more of the disagreement lies here.
Is this mostly about mesa-optimizers, or something else?
If I were to guess, I’d guess that by “you” you’re referring to someone or something outside of the model, who has access to the model’s internals, and who uses that access to, as you say, “read” the next token out of the model’s ontology.
Was using a metaphorical “you”. Probably should’ve said something like “gradient descent will find a way to read the next token out of the QFT-based simulation”.
Yes, there are certainly applications where the training regime produces IID data, but next-token prediction is pretty clearly not one of those?
I suppose I should’ve said various documents are IID to be more clear. I would certainly guess they are.
Right, so just to check that we’re on the same page: do we agree that after a (retrodictively trained) model is deployed for some use case other than retrodicting existing data—for generative use, say, or for use in some kind of online RL setup—then it’ll doing something other than retrodicting?
Generally speaking, yes.
And that’s where the QFT model comes in. It says, actually, even if you train me for a good long while on a good amount of data, there are lots of ways for me to generalize “wrongly” from your perspective, if I’m modeling the universe at the level of quantum fields. Sure, I got all the retrodictions right while there was something to be retrodicted, but what exactly makes you think I did that by modeling the philosopher whose remarks I was being trained on?
Well, if we’re following standard ML best practices, we have a train set, a dev set, and a test set. The purpose of the dev set is to check and ensure that things are generalizing properly. If they aren’t generalizing properly, we tweak various hyperparameters of the model and retrain until they do generalize properly on the dev set. Then we do a final check on the test set to ensure we didn’t overfit the dev set. If you forgot or never learned this stuff, I highly recommend brushing up on it.
In principle we could construct a test set or dev set either before or after the model has been trained. It shouldn’t make a difference under normal circumstances. It sounds like maybe you’re discussing a scenario where the model has achieved a level of omniscience, and it does fine on data that was available during its training, because it’s able to read off of an omniscient world-model. But then it fails on data generated in the future, because the translation method for its omniscient world-model only works on artifacts that were present during training. Basically, the time at which the data was generated could constitute a hidden and unexpected source of distribution shift. Does that summarize the core concern?
(To be clear, this sort of acquired-omniscience is liable to sound kooky to many ML researchers. I think it’s worth stress-testing alignment proposals under these sort of extreme scenarios, but I’m not sure we should weight them heavily in terms of estimating our probability of success. In this particular scenario, the model’s performance would drop on data generated after training, and that would hurt the company’s bottom line, and they would have a strong financial incentive to fix it. So I don’t know if thinking about this is a comparative advantage for alignment researchers.)
BTW, the point about documents being IID was meant to indicate that there’s little incentive for the model to e.g. retrodict the coordinates of the server storing a particular document—the sort of data that could aid and incentivize omniscience to a greater degree.
In any case, I would argue that “accidental omniscience” characterizes the problem better than “alien abstractions”. As before, you can imagine an accidentally-omniscient model that uses vanilla abstractions, or a non-omniscient model that uses alien ones.
Because the human isn’t going to constantly be present for everything the system does after it’s deployed (unless for some reason it’s not deployed).
I think it ought to be possible for someone to always be present. [I’m also not sure it would be necessary.]
So we need not assume that predicting “the genius philosopher” is a core task.
It’s not the genius philosopher that’s the core task, it’s the reading of their opinions out of a QFT-based simulation of them. As I understand this thought experiment, we’re doing next-token prediction on e.g. a book written by a philosopher, and in order to predict the next token using QFT, the obvious method is to use QFT to simulate the philosopher. But that’s not quite enough—you also need to read the next token out of that QFT-based simulation if you actually want to predict it. This sort of ‘reading tokens out of a QFT simulation’ thing would be very common, thus something the system gets good at in order to succeed at next-token prediction.
I think perhaps there’s more to your thought experiment than just alien abstractions, and it’s worth disentangling these assumptions. For one thing, in a standard train/dev/test setup, the model is arguably not really doing prediction, it’s doing retrodiction. It’s making ‘predictions’ about things which already happened in the past. The final model is chosen based on what retrodicts the data the best. Also, usually the data is IID rather than sequential—there’s no time component to the data points (unless it’s a time-series problem, which it usually isn’t). The fact that we’re choosing a model which retrodicts well is why the presence/absence of a human is generally assumed to be irrelevant, and emphasizing this factor sounds wacky to my ML engineer ears.
So basically I suspect what you’re really trying to claim here, which incidentally I’ve also seen John allude to elsewhere, is that the standard assumptions of machine learning involving retrodiction and IID data points may break down once your system gets smart enough. This is a possibility worth exploring, I just want to clarify that it seems orthogonal to the issue of alien abstractions. In principle one can imagine a system that heavily features QFT in its internal ontology yet still can be characterized as retrodicting on IID data, or a system with vanilla abstractions that can’t be characterized as retrodicting on IID data. I think exploring this in a post could be valuable, because it seems like an under-discussed source of disagreement between certain doomer-type people and mainstream ML folks.
In my experience, asking hard questions here is quite socially unrewarding. I could probably think of a dozen or so cases where I think the LW consensus “emperor” has no clothes, that I haven’t posted about, just because I expect it to be an exercise in frustration. I think I will probably quit posting here soon.
In terms of advocacy methods, sure. In terms of desired policies, I generally disagree.
If that’s what we are worried about, there is plenty of low-hanging fruit in terms of e.g. not tweeting wildly provocative stuff for no reason. (You can ask for examples, but be warned, sharing them might increase the probability that a journalist writes about them!)