This is precisely the problem. I was posting in the hopes of finding some clever solution to this problem- a self-proving axiom, as it were.
Carinthium
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I don’t believe in the reality around us, not on a rational level- that does not mean I don’t believe there are things which are real(there may be, anyway). I just have no idea what they are.
Justification is DEFINED in a certain manner, and I think the best one to use is the definition I have given. That is how I can be certain about justification (or at least what I am calling justification) and a skeptic about reality.
If you have no non-circular basis for believing in induction, surely it is irrational?
In reality, I believe non-skepticism on religious faith whilst thinking that rationally speaking skepticism is true. I slip up from time to time.
I should note, however, that a lot of my argument is that the rules of logic themselves suggest problems with beliefs as they currently stand- namely those surrounding circular arguments.
Ad hominem represents arguing based not on the evidence but on the character of the person giving it. This is bad because it leads people to instinctively ignore arguments from those they dismiss rather than considering them.
In this case it is also circular, as you presume the existence of the skeptic which you should not be able to know.
A premise isn’t self-evident because anybody whatsoever would accept it, but because it must be true in any possible universe.
Deductive arguments aren’t self-evident, but for a different reason than you think- the Evil Demon Argument, which shows that even if it looks completely solid it could easily be mistaken. There may be some way to deal with it, but I can’t think of any. That’s why I came here for ideas.
You claim my standards of justification are too high because you want to rule skepticism out- you are implicitly appealing to the fact skepticism results as a reason for me to lower my standards. Isn’t that bias against skepticism, lowering standards specifically so it does not result?
Implicit assumptions- not just the senses, but the reliability of memory and the reliability of rules of induction.
I already mentioned that I believe in the world, not because I think it rational, but as an act of religious-style faith. I think it irrational to believe the world exists because it makes so many assumptions that can’t be defended in a rational argument.
Why are you applying ad hominem selectively? You wouldn’t use an ad hominem argument in most things- why is the skeptic an exception?
This is the problem which must be dealt with. Rather than assume an assumption must be correct, you must somehow show it will work even if you start from no assumptions.
But we are talking about scepticism. It’s an exception to the Wittgensteinian rule.
Something is epistemically justified if, as you said, it has some sort of reality to it not by coincidence but because the rule reliably shows what is real. I am trying to find a framework with some sort of reality to it, and that requires dealing with scepticism.
Part one is ad hominem, and has no relation to the validity of the argument.
As for part 2, the point is not that the world is certainly an illusion but that we don’t know either way. Given that, meta-doubts are implied.
For me personally, my posistion is that rationally there is no way out of skepticism but that I believe it false on religious style faith.
Not so. There is no logical connection between the feasibility of a human believing something and its truth. Something can be true and impossible to believe simultaneously.
Circular argument- You assume a basis in reality which assumes skepticism is wrong.
No sceptic familiar with the Evil Demon Argument would agree that 2+2=4, as this assumes the mind remains undistorted which is part of what is under discussion.
My belief is belief on probabilities on faith in the religious sense, rather than on evidence, as I do not believe such evidence exists.
What you have is a giant circular argument, and therefore useless. A skeptic doubts the senses give actual evidence, they doubt math, and they doubt your axioms of probability. It is downright retarded to use one of those to prove the others.
It is self-evident in that it follows logically without any sort of assumptions whatsoever, merely by examining the concept of free will. Perhaps you mean something different.
Assumptions that can be demonstrated to be true in any possible universe.
Probability itself being somehow valid is something I do not think rationally legitimate. Therefore, in a sense yes but in a sense no.
That idea proves nothing, and you know it.
Then you mean a different thing by “free will” then me- I was referring to free will in the popular conception.