Tentatively:
If it’s accepted that GREEN and RED are structurally identical, and that in virtue of this they are phenomenologically identical, why think that phenomenology involves anything*, beyond structure, which needs explaining?
I think this is the gist of Dennett’s dissolution attempts. Once you’ve explained why your brain is in a seeing-red brain-state, why this causes a believing-that-there-is-red mental representation, onto a meta-reflection-about-believing-there-is-red functional process, etc., why think there’s anything else?
I haven’t read the comments yet, so apologies if this has already been said or addressed:
If I am watching others debate, and my attention is restricted to the arguments the opponents are presenting, then my using the “one strong argument” approach may not be a bad thing.
I’m assuming that weak arguments are easy to come by and can be constructed for any position, but strong arguments are rare.
In this situation I would expect anybody who has a strong argument to use it, to the exclusion of weaker ones: if A and B both have access to 50 weak arguments, and A also has access to 1 strong argument, then I would expect the debate to come out looking like (50weak) vs. (1strong) - even though the underlying balance would be more like (50weak) vs. (50weak + 1strong).
(By “having access to” an argument, I mean to include both someone’s knowing an argument, and someone’s having the potential to construct or come across an argument with relatively little effort.)