Once this story became popular among people in my country (most of whom are not interested in the philosophy of mind), I was surprised that many people chose to press the button for the money. It got me thinking that there are two distinct groups of people that don’t share the core intuition about mind.
I wonder if this lines up with camp 1/camp 2 distinction? It makes sense to me that camp 1 folks would be more likely to press the button—it fits with their way of thinking.
Also, I’m curious about how to model an agent to choose whether or not to press the button. Very rough thoughts on how to model:
- The agent who decides to press the button acts based on the future state of the physical world.
- The agent who decides not to press the button acts based on the timeline the agent will be in, which exists outside of the physical world.
Do we have any interesting work looking at this kind of approach?
Your pain qualia argument reminds me of an interesting thought experiment - [the 500 million year button](https://danspub.quora.com/The-500-million-year-button-A-Japanese-existential-horror).
Once this story became popular among people in my country (most of whom are not interested in the philosophy of mind), I was surprised that many people chose to press the button for the money. It got me thinking that there are two distinct groups of people that don’t share the core intuition about mind.
I wonder if this lines up with camp 1/camp 2 distinction? It makes sense to me that camp 1 folks would be more likely to press the button—it fits with their way of thinking.
Also, I’m curious about how to model an agent to choose whether or not to press the button. Very rough thoughts on how to model:
- The agent who decides to press the button acts based on the future state of the physical world.
- The agent who decides not to press the button acts based on the timeline the agent will be in, which exists outside of the physical world.
Do we have any interesting work looking at this kind of approach?