BerryPick6

Karma: 681

BerryPick6 Feb 12, 2013, 1:55 PM
2 points
in reply to: buybuydandavis’s comment on: A confusion about deontology and consequentialism
Except since those are simply hypothetical imperatives, the Moral Non-Realist won’t see the need to call these theories ‘moral’ in nature. The Error Theorist agrees that if you want A then you should do B, but he wouldn’t call that a theory of morality.

BerryPick6 Feb 11, 2013, 6:42 PM
0 points
in reply to: Viliam_Bur’s comment on: Confusion about Normative Morality

In other words, I define “morality” as “a system of ‘shoulds’ that humans can agree with”.

If you want a name for your position on this (which, as far as I can tell, is very well put,) a suitable philosophical equivalent is Moral Contractualism, a la Thomas Scanlon in “What We Owe To Each Other.” He defines certain kinds of acts as morally wrong thus:

An act is wrong if and only if any principle that permitted it would be one that could reasonably be rejected by people moved to find principles for the general regulation of behaviour that others, similarly motivated, could not reasonably reject.

BerryPick6 Feb 11, 2013, 12:56 PM
0 points
in reply to: [deleted]’s comment on: Confusion about Normative Morality

I think we at least disagree about this, or do you think we’re using some relevant terms differently?

I think we disagree on the meaning of terms related to the word ‘moral’ and nothing further. We aren’t generating different expectations, and there’s no empirical test we could run to find out which one of us is correct.

BerryPick6 Feb 11, 2013, 12:53 PM
0 points
in reply to: V_V’s comment on: A brief history of ethically concerned scientists
Some data suggests they make roughly the same ethical choices everyone else does.

BerryPick6 Feb 10, 2013, 9:36 PM
0 points
in reply to: [deleted]’s comment on: Confusion about Normative Morality
We aren’t in disagreement about any facts, but are simply using the term ‘moral judgement’ in different ways. I take moral judgement to be an after-the-fact calculation, and you take it to be a statement about intentionality and agency. You would, presumably, agree with me that Abe and Ben’s actions netted the same results, and I will agree with you that Abe’s motivations were “in better faith” than Ben’s, so we’ve essentially reached a resolution.

BerryPick6 Feb 10, 2013, 9:09 PM
0 points
in reply to: [deleted]’s comment on: Confusion about Normative Morality

Hm! Those are surprising answers.

From the way you had written the previous few comments, I had a feeling you weren’t expecting me to react as I did (and I have to note, you have been by far the more logically polite partner in this discussion so far.)

I drew my initial argument from Kant’s Groundwork, and so far as I can tell, Kant doesn’t expect his reader to give the answer you did.

This seems a common occurrence in the philosophy of that era. Hume is constantly asking rhetorical questions of his readers and assuming that they answer the same way he does...

I’m no Kantian, but I have to say I find myself unable to judge Abe and Ben’s actions as you have.

If I had to guess, I would say that our disagreement boils down to a definitional one rather than one involving empirical facts, in a rather unsurprising manner.

BerryPick6 Feb 10, 2013, 8:42 PM
0 points
in reply to: [deleted]’s comment on: Confusion about Normative Morality

So suppose two people, Abe and Ben, donated to an efficient charity. Abe intends to do some good for others. Ben intends this as the first but crucial stage of an elaborate plan to murder a rival. This plan is foiled, with the result that Ben’s money simply goes to the charity and does its work as normal. You would say that the actions of Abe and Ben are morally equal?

Yes, their particular acts of charity were morally equal, so long as their donations were equal.

Assuming Ben’s plan was foiled for reasons beyond his control or expectation, would you then say that the deciding factor in determining the moral worth of Ben’s action was something beyond his control or expectation?

The deciding factor in determining the moral worth of Ben’s actions was “out of his hands,” to a certain extent. He isn’t awarded point for trying.

BerryPick6 Feb 10, 2013, 8:02 PM
0 points
in reply to: [deleted]’s comment on: Confusion about Normative Morality

It’s common for consequentialists to evaluate actions in terms of expected rather than actual consequences: the philanthropist who donates to an efficient charity is generally not thought less morally good if some uncontrollable and unpredictable event prevents the good she expected to achieve. While we are ready to say that what happened in such a case was bad, we would not say that it was a moral bad, at least not on the philanthropists part.

I don’t accept this premise. A philanthropist whose actions lead to good consequences is morally better than a philanthropist whose actions lead to less-good consequences, wholly independent of their actual intention. This just seems like one of the fundamental aspects of consequentialism, to me.

And Kant would go further to point out that it’s not quite just expected consequences either. We do not evaluate equally a philanthropist who donates to an efficient charity to spite her neighbor (expecting, but ignoring, the fact that this donation will also do some good for others) and one who donates out of a desire to do some good for others (say, expecting but ignoring the fact that this donation will also upset her neighbor). Both philanthropists expect the same consequences to play out, but we do not evaluate them equally.

Further, I would evaluate these two philanthropists exactly the same way, as long as the externalities of spiting neighbors don’t escalate to a level where they have substantial moral weight. Someone who saves a child because he is interesting in seducing their mother and someone who saves a child out of pure altruism may not be equally moral, but if you only have this single instance with which to judge them, then they must be considered so.

BerryPick6 Feb 10, 2013, 6:08 PM
0 points
in reply to: [deleted]’s comment on: Confusion about Normative Morality
I once again find Kantianism immensely counter-intuitive and confusing, so at this point I must thank you for correcting my misconceptions and undoing my rationalizations. :)

BerryPick6 Feb 10, 2013, 5:42 PM
0 points
in reply to: [deleted]’s comment on: Confusion about Normative Morality

He would say, I think, that there is no way to draw boundary lines around ‘consequences’ that doesn’t place all moral weight on something like the intention of the action.

Well then the Kantian would pick B because he intends to not violate the CI with his actions? I’m not actually sure how this is different than valuing the consequences of your actions at all?

BerryPick6 Feb 10, 2013, 2:45 PM
1 point
in reply to: ekramer’s comment on: Torture vs. Dust Specks
Once the positive consequences are outweighed by the negative consequences, obviously.

BerryPick6 Feb 9, 2013, 2:00 PM
0 points
in reply to: ekramer’s comment on: Torture vs. Dust Specks
What makes you think that making the numbers bigger changes anything? Anyone who switches answers between the original question and yours is confused.

BerryPick6 Feb 8, 2013, 4:17 PM
2 points
in reply to: JMiller’s comment on: Confusion about Normative Morality
To answer a question you gave in the OP, Jackson’s views are very close to what Eliezer’s metaethics seem to be, and Railton has some similarities with Luke’s views.

BerryPick6 Feb 8, 2013, 3:39 PM
1 point
in reply to: Kaj_Sotala’s comment on: Confusion about Normative Morality

Note that you could reverse this conversation: a deontologist could ask you why we should privilege the consequences so much, instead of just doing the right things regardless of the consequences. I would expect that your response would be pretty close to “that’s just the way it is, it’s the consequences that are the most important”—at least, I know that mine would be. And the deontologist would find this a very hard pill to swallow.

Except that deontology cares about consequences as well, so there’s no need to convince them that the consequences of our actions have moral weight. If act A’s consequences violate the Categorical Imperative, and act B’s consequences don’t, then the Kantian (for example) will pick act B.

The friction between deontology and consequentialism is that they disagree about what should be maximized, a distinction which is often simplified to consequentialists wanting to maximize the ‘Good’ and deontologists wanting to maximize the ‘Right’.

I’ll agree that past this point, much of the objections to the other side’s positions hit ‘moral bedrock’ and intuitions are often seen as the solution to this gap.

BerryPick6 Feb 8, 2013, 12:58 PM
7 points
in reply to: Error’s comment on: Philosophical Landmines

Have you ever come up with what appeared (to you) to be a knock-down argument for your position; but only after it was too late to use it in whatever discussion prompted the thought? Have you ever carried that argument around in the back of your skull, just waiting for the topic to come up again so you can deploy your secret weapon?

So… Many… Times...

BerryPick6 Feb 7, 2013, 10:45 PM
2 points
in reply to: Larks’s comment on: Confusion about Normative Morality
I only know him from the Frankfurt Cases regarding the Free Will debate. What reductionist level moral theories is he a proponent of?

BerryPick6 Feb 7, 2013, 9:49 PM
1 point
in reply to: JMiller’s comment on: Confusion about Normative Morality
The Open University in Israel (I’m not, strictly speaking, out of highschool yet, so this is all I got.)

BerryPick6 Feb 7, 2013, 9:44 PM
0 points
in reply to: JMiller’s comment on: Confusion about Normative Morality

Right? I would venture to guess that over 50% of students in my department are of the continental tradition and tend to think in anti-realist terms. I would then say 40% or more are of the analytic tradition, and love debating what things should be called, instead of facts. the remianing 10% are, I would say, very diverse, but I have encountered very few naturalists.

Out of curiosity, where to you go to school?

BerryPick6 Feb 7, 2013, 9:34 PM
3 points
in reply to: JMiller’s comment on: Confusion about Normative Morality
The ways in which this reminds me of my classroom experience are too many to count, but if the professor said something as idiotic as that to you, I’m really at a loss. Has he never heard of meta-ethics? Never read Mackie or studied Moral Realism?

BerryPick6 Feb 7, 2013, 8:57 PM
1 point
in reply to: [deleted]’s comment on: Confusion about Normative Morality

This is bad. What confused you? Anything you want explained?

I’m still working through your most recent one, and I feel like coming up with questions would be unfair before I (a) reread it and (b) process and isolate my confusion.

If I still find myself with questions after that, I will take you up on your offer. :)