@Yanima—A few reviewers have noted the various unstated and uninterrogated assumptions and biases in Haidt’s book. It’s what make it difficult to review.
If one is to state and interrogate all of those assumptions and biases, in order to clarify and critique, then one ends writing a very long book review. An example is Dennis Junk’s “THE ENLIGHTENED HYPOCRISY OF JONATHAN HAIDT’S RIGHTEOUS MIND.”
But that isn’t to say there isn’t much of interest as well, if he oversteps the evidence provided on too many occasions, and even as he fumbles some of his interpretations.
@EnestScribbler—You wrote that, “I think he caught the Moral Foundations and their ubiquitous presence well, but then made the error of thinking liberals don’t use them (when in fact they use them a lot, certainly in today’s climate, just with different in-groups, sanctified objects, etc.).”
Others noted that same problem. If the moral foundations truly are inherent in all of human nature, then presumably all humans use them, if not in the same way. But he also doesn’t deal with the dark side of the moral foundations. Some of the so-called binding moral values are, in fact, key facets of what social scientists study in right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation. How can one talk about the view of tribalism while somehow not seeing that mountain on the landscape?
As with the personality traits of liberal-minded openness and conservative-minded conscientiousness, Haidt doesn’t grapple enough with all of the available evidence that is relevant to morality. Many things that liberals value don’t get called ‘values’, according to Haidt, because he is biasing his moral foundations theory according to a more conservative definition of morality. So, liberals are portrayed as having fewer moral values, since a large swath of what moral values is defined away or simply ignored.
@TJL - You wrote that, “If we want to know the right thing to do, we can’t just assume that all of the moral foundations have a grain of truth, figure we’re equally tribalistic, and compromise with the conservatives; we need to turn to reason.”
It’s interesting how Haidt dismisses moral pragmatism and utilitarianism but then basically reaffirms it’s essential, after all. So essential, in fact, that it seems to undermine his entire argument about conservative morality being superior. Since the binding moral foundations have much overlap with right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO), that probably should give us pause.
Should we really be repackaging RWA and SDO as moral foundations? Is that wise? And if we interpret them this way, should we treat them as equally valid and worthy as liberal-minded concern for fairness, harm, and liberty?
There is an intriguing larger context to be found in the social science research. Under severely stressful and sickly conditions (high parasite load, high pathogen exposure, high inequality, etc), there tends to be a simultaneous population level increase of sociopolitical conservatism, RWA, and SDO; though each measures independently on the individual level. So, there really is a fundamental commonality to these binding ‘moral foundations’. Just look at the openness trait, of which not measures high in liberals but low in conservatives, RWAs, and SDOs.
These binding traits are also closely linked to disgust response, stress response, and what I call the stress-sickness response (related to parasite-stress theory and behavioral immune system). Is this really just a matter of differences in moral values? Or are we dealing with a public health crisis? Liberal-mindedness requires optimal conditions of health and low stress. Why would we want to balance liberalism with conservatism, RWA, and SDO?