I am at a loss about the true meaning of a “universally compelling argument”, but from Eliezer’s original post and from references to things such as modus ponens itself, I understood it to mean something that is able to overcome even seemingly axiomatic differences between two (otherwise rational) agents. In this scenario, an agent may accept modus ponens, but if they do, they’re at least required to use it consistently. For instance, a mathematician of the constructivist persuasion denies the law of the excluded middle, but if he’s using it in a proof, classical mathematicians have the right to call him out.
Similarly, YEC’s are not inconsistent in their daily lives, nor do they have any undefeatable hypotheses about barbeques or music education: they’re being inconsistent only on a select set of topics. At this point the brick wall we’re hitting is not a fundamental difference in logic or priors; we’re in the domain of human psychology.
Arguments that “actually convince (all) people” are very limited and context sensitive because we’re not 100% rational.
Craig is just purposely conflating the likelihood of a particular result and the likelihood of given the declaration of a result by the lottery officials, that result being true.
If you and I are flipping coins for a million dollars, it’s going to take a lot of convincing evidence that I lost the coin flip before I pay up. You just cannot flip the coin in another room where I can’t even see, and then expect me to pay up because, well, the probability of heads is 50% and I shouldn’t be so surprised to learn that I lost.
Therefore, the actual likelihood of a particular set of lottery numbers is totally irrelevant in this discussion.
In any case, the only kind of “evidence” that we have been presented for miracles has always been of the form “person X says Y happened’, which has been known as hearsay and dealt with without even bothering with probability theory.