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Modest Epistemology

TagLast edit: Jan 29, 2023, 1:32 PM by Olli Järviniemi

Modest Epistemology is the claim that average opinions are more accurate than individual opinions, and individuals should take advantage of this by moving toward average opinions, even in cases where they have strong arguments for their own views and against more typical views. (Another name for this concept is “the wisdom of crowds”—that name is much more popular outside of LessWrong.) In terms of inside view vs outside view, we can describe modest epistemology as the belief that inside views are quite fallible and outside views much more robust; therefore, we should weigh outside-view considerations much more heavily.

In LessWrong parlance, “modesty” and “humility” should not be confused. While Eliezer lists “humility” as a virtue, he provides many arguments against modesty (most extensively, in the book Inadequate Equilibria; but also in many earlier sources.) Humility is the general idea that you should expect to be fallible. Modest Epistemology is specifically the view that, due to your own fallibility, you should rely heavily on outside-view. Modest epistemology says that you should trust average opinions more than your own opinion, even when you have strong arguments for your own views and against more typical views.

Historically, Robin Hanson has argued in favor of epistemic modesty and outside-view, while Eliezer has argued against epistemic modesty and for a strong inside views. For example, this disagreement played a role in The Foom Debate. Eliezer and Hanson both agree that Aumann’s Agreement Theorem implies that rational agents should converge to agreement; however, they have very different opinions about whether/​how this breaks down in the absence of perfect rationality. Eliezer sees little reason to move one’s opinion toward that of an irrational person’s. Hanson thinks irrational agents still benefit from moving their opinions toward each other. One of Hanson’s arguments involves pre-priors.

External Posts:

Immodest Caplan by Robin Hanson

Related Sequences: Inadequate Equilibria

Related Pages: modesty, Humility, Inside/​Outside View, Egalitarianism, Modesty argument, Disagreement

The Er­ror of Crowds

Eliezer YudkowskyApr 1, 2007, 9:50 PM
32 points
13 comments4 min readLW link

Not­ing an er­ror in Inad­e­quate Equilibria

Matthew BarnettFeb 8, 2023, 1:33 AM
365 points
60 comments2 min readLW link2 reviews

The Modesty Argument

Eliezer YudkowskyDec 10, 2006, 9:42 PM
59 points
40 comments10 min readLW link

Against Modest Epistemology

Eliezer YudkowskyNov 14, 2017, 8:40 PM
71 points
48 comments15 min readLW link

Inad­e­quacy and Modesty

Eliezer YudkowskyOct 28, 2017, 9:51 PM
132 points
79 comments18 min readLW link

In defence of epistemic modesty

ThrasymachusOct 29, 2017, 8:00 PM
31 points
20 comments36 min readLW link

You can­not be mis­taken about (not) want­ing to wirehead

Kaj_SotalaJan 26, 2010, 12:06 PM
51 points
79 comments3 min readLW link

How to use “philo­soph­i­cal ma­jori­tar­i­anism”

jimmyMay 5, 2009, 6:49 AM
13 points
9 comments4 min readLW link

Us­ing Points to Rate Differ­ent Kinds of Evidence

ozziegooenAug 25, 2023, 8:11 PM
18 points
3 comments6 min readLW link
(forum.effectivealtruism.org)

On be­ing downvoted

Adam ZernerSep 17, 2023, 1:59 AM
27 points
15 comments3 min readLW link

Time­less Modesty?

abramdemskiNov 24, 2017, 11:12 AM
17 points
2 comments3 min readLW link

Against Shoot­ing Your­self in the Foot

Eliezer YudkowskyNov 16, 2017, 8:13 PM
47 points
3 comments3 min readLW link

“I know I’m bi­ased, but...”

[deleted]May 10, 2011, 8:03 PM
32 points
21 comments3 min readLW link

Ngo and Yud­kowsky on AI ca­pa­bil­ity gains

Nov 18, 2021, 10:19 PM
130 points
61 comments39 min readLW link1 review

Epistemic mod­esty and how I think about AI risk

Aryeh EnglanderJun 27, 2022, 6:47 PM
22 points
4 comments4 min readLW link

Notes on Humility

David GrossNov 29, 2020, 7:50 PM
18 points
4 comments10 min readLW link

Aiming for Con­ver­gence Is Like Dis­cour­ag­ing Betting

Zack_M_DavisFeb 1, 2023, 12:03 AM
62 points
18 comments11 min readLW link1 review

Dangers of deference

TsviBTJan 8, 2023, 2:36 PM
58 points
5 comments2 min readLW link

The Proper Use of Doubt

Eliezer YudkowskyAug 6, 2007, 8:29 PM
91 points
35 comments3 min readLW link

In defence of epistemic mod­esty [dis­til­la­tion]

LuiseMay 10, 2023, 9:44 AM
17 points
2 comments9 min readLW link

Why You Should Never Up­date Your Beliefs

Arjun PanicksseryJul 29, 2023, 12:27 AM
76 points
18 comments4 min readLW link1 review
(arjunpanickssery.substack.com)

A Sketch of Good Communication

Ben PaceMar 31, 2018, 10:48 PM
203 points
35 comments3 min readLW link1 review

When should you defer to ex­per­tise? A use­ful heuris­tic (Cross­post from EA fo­rum)

Noosphere89Oct 13, 2022, 2:14 PM
9 points
3 comments2 min readLW link
(forum.effectivealtruism.org)

10 Public “I was wrong” Ad­mis­sions by Scien­tists and Intellectuals

Hashem ElAssadJun 10, 2024, 2:19 PM
0 points
3 comments1 min readLW link

The un­der­ap­pre­ci­ated value of origi­nal think­ing be­low the frontier

EmrikOct 2, 2021, 4:03 PM
36 points
2 comments2 min readLW link

Com­mon sense as a prior

Nick_BecksteadAug 11, 2013, 6:18 PM
56 points
215 comments27 min readLW link

Christen­son’s “Episte­mol­ogy of Disagree­ment: The Good News”

Aidan_KieransMay 16, 2021, 3:58 AM
1 point
0 comments5 min readLW link
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