Alas so. IMO a solution to the phenomenal binding problem (cf. http://cdn.preterhuman.net/texts/body_and_health/Neurology/Binding.pdf) is critical to understanding the evolutionary success of organic robots over the past 540 million years—and why classical digital computers are (and will remain) insentient zombies, not unitary minds. This conjecture may be false; but it has the virtue of being testable. If / when our experimental apparatus allows probing the CNS at the sub-picosecond timescales above which Max Tegmark (“Why the brain is probably not a quantum computer”) posits thermally-induced decoherence, then I think we’ll get a huge surprise! I predict we’ll find, not random psychotic “noise”, but instead the formal, quantum-coherent physical shadows of the macroscopic bound phenomenal objects of everyday experience—computationally optimised by hundreds of millions years of evolution, i.e. a perfect structural match. (cf. http://consc.net/papers/combination.pdf) By contrast, critics of the quantum mind conjecture must presumably predict we’ll find just “noise”.
It seems possible that the OpenWorm project to emulate the brain of a C. Elegans flatworm on a classical computer may yield results prior to the advent of experimental techniques capable of ” probing the CNS at … sub-picosecond timescales.” Would you consider a successful emulation of worm behavior evidence against the need for quantum effects in neuronal function, or would you declare it the worm equivalent of a P-Zombie?
Huh, yes, in my view C. elegans is a P-zombie. If we grant reductive physicalism, the primitive nervous system of C. elegans can’t support a unitary subject of experience. At most, its individual ganglia (cf. http://www.sfu.ca/biology/faculty/hutter/hutterlab/research/Ce_nervous_system.html) may be endowed with the rudiments of unitary consciousness. But otherwise, C. elegans can effectively be modelled classically. Most of us probably wouldn’t agree with philosopher Eric Schwitzgebel. (“If Materialism Is True, the United States Is Probably Conscious” http://www.faculty.ucr.edu/~eschwitz/SchwitzPapers/USAconscious-130208.pdf) But exactly the same dilemma confronts those who treat neurons as essentially discrete, membrane-bound classical objects. Even if (rightly IMO) we take Strawsonian physicalism seriously (cf. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physicalism#Strawsonian_physicalism) then we still need to explain how classical neuronal “mind-dust” could generate bound experiential objects or a unitary subject of experience without invoking some sort of strong emergence.
Wedrifid, yes, if Schwitzgebel’s conjecture were true, then farewell to reductive physicalism and the ontological unity of science. The USA is a “zombie”. Its functionally interconnected but skull-bound minds are individually conscious; and sometimes the behaviour of the USA as a whole is amenable to functional description; but the USA not a unitary subject of experience. However, the problem with relying on this intuitive response is that the phenomenology of our own minds seems to entail exactly the sort of strong ontological emergence we’re excluding for the USA. Let’s assume, as microelectrode studies tentatively confirm, that individual neurons can support rudimentary experience. How can we rigorously derive bound experiential objects, let alone the fleeting synchronic unity of the self, from discrete, distributed, membrane-bound classical feature processors? Dreamless sleep aside, why aren’t we mere patterns of “mind dust”?
None of this might seem relevant to ChrisHallquist’s question. Computationally speaking, who cares whether Deep Blue, Watson, or Alpha Dog (etc) are unitary subjects of experience. But anyone who wants to save reductive reductive physicalism should at least consider why quantum mind theorists are prepared to contemplate a role for macroscopic quantum coherence in the CNS. Max Tegmark hasn’t refuted quantum mind; he’s made a plausible but unargued assumption, namely that sub-picosecond decoherence timescales are too short to do any computational and/or phenomenological work. Maybe so; but this assumption remains to be empirically tested. If all we find is “noise”, then I don’t see how reductive physicalism can be saved.
Tim, perhaps I’m mistaken; you know lesswrongers better than me. But in any such poll I’d also want to ask respondents who believe the USA is a unitary subject of experience whether they believe such a conjecture is consistent with reductive physicalism?
Interesting project. I would consider such a result to be at least weak evidence against the need for quantum effects in neuronal function, maybe stronger. It would be still stronger evidence if the project managed to produce such an emulation on the same scale and energy budget as a flatworm brain. And strongest of all if they manage to hook the flatworm brain up to an actual flatworm body and drive it without external input.
Alas so. IMO a solution to the phenomenal binding problem (cf. http://cdn.preterhuman.net/texts/body_and_health/Neurology/Binding.pdf) is critical to understanding the evolutionary success of organic robots over the past 540 million years—and why classical digital computers are (and will remain) insentient zombies, not unitary minds. This conjecture may be false; but it has the virtue of being testable. If / when our experimental apparatus allows probing the CNS at the sub-picosecond timescales above which Max Tegmark (“Why the brain is probably not a quantum computer”) posits thermally-induced decoherence, then I think we’ll get a huge surprise! I predict we’ll find, not random psychotic “noise”, but instead the formal, quantum-coherent physical shadows of the macroscopic bound phenomenal objects of everyday experience—computationally optimised by hundreds of millions years of evolution, i.e. a perfect structural match. (cf. http://consc.net/papers/combination.pdf) By contrast, critics of the quantum mind conjecture must presumably predict we’ll find just “noise”.
Your first link appears to be broken.
It seems possible that the OpenWorm project to emulate the brain of a C. Elegans flatworm on a classical computer may yield results prior to the advent of experimental techniques capable of ” probing the CNS at … sub-picosecond timescales.” Would you consider a successful emulation of worm behavior evidence against the need for quantum effects in neuronal function, or would you declare it the worm equivalent of a P-Zombie?
Huh, yes, in my view C. elegans is a P-zombie. If we grant reductive physicalism, the primitive nervous system of C. elegans can’t support a unitary subject of experience. At most, its individual ganglia (cf. http://www.sfu.ca/biology/faculty/hutter/hutterlab/research/Ce_nervous_system.html) may be endowed with the rudiments of unitary consciousness. But otherwise, C. elegans can effectively be modelled classically. Most of us probably wouldn’t agree with philosopher Eric Schwitzgebel. (“If Materialism Is True, the United States Is Probably Conscious” http://www.faculty.ucr.edu/~eschwitz/SchwitzPapers/USAconscious-130208.pdf) But exactly the same dilemma confronts those who treat neurons as essentially discrete, membrane-bound classical objects. Even if (rightly IMO) we take Strawsonian physicalism seriously (cf. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physicalism#Strawsonian_physicalism) then we still need to explain how classical neuronal “mind-dust” could generate bound experiential objects or a unitary subject of experience without invoking some sort of strong emergence.
I think you’re right. Mind you I suspect saying that I disagreed per se would be being generous.
Wedrifid, yes, if Schwitzgebel’s conjecture were true, then farewell to reductive physicalism and the ontological unity of science. The USA is a “zombie”. Its functionally interconnected but skull-bound minds are individually conscious; and sometimes the behaviour of the USA as a whole is amenable to functional description; but the USA not a unitary subject of experience. However, the problem with relying on this intuitive response is that the phenomenology of our own minds seems to entail exactly the sort of strong ontological emergence we’re excluding for the USA. Let’s assume, as microelectrode studies tentatively confirm, that individual neurons can support rudimentary experience. How can we rigorously derive bound experiential objects, let alone the fleeting synchronic unity of the self, from discrete, distributed, membrane-bound classical feature processors? Dreamless sleep aside, why aren’t we mere patterns of “mind dust”?
None of this might seem relevant to ChrisHallquist’s question. Computationally speaking, who cares whether Deep Blue, Watson, or Alpha Dog (etc) are unitary subjects of experience. But anyone who wants to save reductive reductive physicalism should at least consider why quantum mind theorists are prepared to contemplate a role for macroscopic quantum coherence in the CNS. Max Tegmark hasn’t refuted quantum mind; he’s made a plausible but unargued assumption, namely that sub-picosecond decoherence timescales are too short to do any computational and/or phenomenological work. Maybe so; but this assumption remains to be empirically tested. If all we find is “noise”, then I don’t see how reductive physicalism can be saved.
Really? A poll seems as though it would be in order.
Maybe it it explained exactly what was meant by “conscious” there might even be a consensus on the topic.
Tim, perhaps I’m mistaken; you know lesswrongers better than me. But in any such poll I’d also want to ask respondents who believe the USA is a unitary subject of experience whether they believe such a conjecture is consistent with reductive physicalism?
Interesting project. I would consider such a result to be at least weak evidence against the need for quantum effects in neuronal function, maybe stronger. It would be still stronger evidence if the project managed to produce such an emulation on the same scale and energy budget as a flatworm brain. And strongest of all if they manage to hook the flatworm brain up to an actual flatworm body and drive it without external input.