EY’s position seems to be highly similar to Frank Jackson’s analytic descriptivism, which holds that
Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit (1995). According to their view of “analytic moral functionalism,” moral properties are reducible to “whatever plays their role in mature folk morality.” Jackson’s (1998) refinement of this position—which he calls “analytic descriptivism”—elaborates that the “mature folk” properties to which moral properties are reducible will be “descriptive predicates”
Which is a position neither popular nor particularly unpopular, but simply one of many contenders, as the mainstream goes.
Mainstream status:
EY’s position seems to be highly similar to Frank Jackson’s analytic descriptivism, which holds that
Which is a position neither popular nor particularly unpopular, but simply one of many contenders, as the mainstream goes.
I confirm (as I have previously) that Frank Jackson’s work seems to me like the nearest known point in academic philosophy.
This similarity has been noted and discussed before. See http://lesswrong.com/lw/fgz/empirical_claims_preference_claims_and_attitude/7u3s