The Clippified human categorizes foods into a similar metric of similarity—still believes that fish tastes more like steak than like chocolate—but of course is not motivated to eat except insofar as staying alive helps to make more paperclips. They have taste, but not tastiness. Actually that might make a surprisingly good metaphor for a lot of the difficulty that some people have with comprehending how Clippy can understand your pain and not care—maybe I’ll try it on the other end of that Facebook conversation.
The metaphor seems like it could lose most of its effectiveness on people who have never applied the outside view to how taste and tastiness feel from inside—they’ve never realized that chocolate tastes good because their brain fires “good taste” when it perceives the experience “chocolate taste”. The obvious resulting cognitive dissonance (from “tastes bad for others”) predictions match my observations, so I suspect this would be common among non-rationalists. If the Facebook conversation you mention is with people who haven’t crossed that inferential gap yet, it might prove not that useful.
The Clippified human categorizes foods into a similar metric of similarity—still believes that fish tastes more like steak than like chocolate—but of course is not motivated to eat except insofar as staying alive helps to make more paperclips. They have taste, but not tastiness. Actually that might make a surprisingly good metaphor for a lot of the difficulty that some people have with comprehending how Clippy can understand your pain and not care—maybe I’ll try it on the other end of that Facebook conversation.
The metaphor seems like it could lose most of its effectiveness on people who have never applied the outside view to how taste and tastiness feel from inside—they’ve never realized that chocolate tastes good because their brain fires “good taste” when it perceives the experience “chocolate taste”. The obvious resulting cognitive dissonance (from “tastes bad for others”) predictions match my observations, so I suspect this would be common among non-rationalists. If the Facebook conversation you mention is with people who haven’t crossed that inferential gap yet, it might prove not that useful.