And how, pray tell, did they reach into the vast immense space of possible hypotheses and premises, and pluck out this one specific set of premises which just so happens that if you accept it completely, it inevitably must result in the conclusion that we have something magical granting us qualia?
The begging was done while choosing the premises, not in one of the premises individually.
Premise: All Bob Chairs must have seventy three thousand legs exactly. Premise: Things we call chairs are illusions unless they are Bob Chairs. Premise: None of the things we call chairs have exactly seventy three thousand legs. Therefore, all of the things we call chairs are illusions and do not exist.
I seriously don’t see how the above argument is any more reasonable and any more or less question-begging than the p-zombie argument I’ve made in the grandparent. No single premise here assumes the conclusion, right? So no problem!
ETA: Perhaps it’s more clear if I just say that in order for the premises of the grandparent to be logically valid, one must also assume as a premise that having the information patterns of the human brain without creating qualia is possible in the first place. This is the key point that is the source of the question begging: It is assumed that the brain interactions do not create qualia, implicitly as part of the premises, otherwise the statement “P-zombies have the same brain interactions that we do but no qualia” is directly equivalent to “A → B, A, ¬B”.
So for A (brain interactions identical to us), B (possess qualia), and C (has magic):
(A → B) <==> ¬B → ¬A
((C → B) OR (AC → B)) <==> ¬(A → B)
A
¬B
Refactor to one single “question-begging” premise: ((((C ->B) OR (AC → B)) → C) <==> ¬(¬B → ¬A)) AND A AND ¬B
And how, pray tell, did they reach into the vast immense space of possible hypotheses and premises, and pluck out this one specific set of premises which just so happens that if you accept it completely, it inevitably must result in the conclusion that we have something magical granting us qualia?
I suppose they have the ability to formulate arguments that support their views. Are you saying that the honest way to argue is to fling premises together at random and see what happens?
The begging was done while choosing the premises, not in one of the premises individually.
Joint implication by premsies is validity not petitio principi.
Premise: All Bob Chairs must have seventy three thousand legs exactly.
Premise: Things we call chairs are illusions unless they are Bob Chairs.
Premise: None of the things we call chairs have exactly seventy three thousand legs.
Therefore, all of the things we call chairs are illusions and do not exist.
That is an example of a True Scotsman fallacy, or argument by tendentious redefinition. I don’t see the parallel.
However, all they’ve done is pick specific premises that hide clever assumptions that logically must end up with their desired conclusion, without any reason in particular to believe that their premises make any sense. See the amateur logic I did in my edits of the grandparent.
It is very much assumed, by asserting the first, third and fourth premises, that qualia does not require brain interactions, as a prerequisite for positing the existence of p-zombies in the thought experiment.
I have, but unfortunately that’s mostly because I don’t know the formal nomenclature and little details of writing conceivability and possibility logical statements.
I wouldn’t really trust myself to write formal logic with conceivability and probability without missing a step or strawmanning one of the premises at some point, with my currently very minimal understanding of that stuff.
And how, pray tell, did they reach into the vast immense space of possible hypotheses and premises, and pluck out this one specific set of premises which just so happens that if you accept it completely, it inevitably must result in the conclusion that we have something magical granting us qualia?
The begging was done while choosing the premises, not in one of the premises individually.
Premise: All Bob Chairs must have seventy three thousand legs exactly.
Premise: Things we call chairs are illusions unless they are Bob Chairs.
Premise: None of the things we call chairs have exactly seventy three thousand legs.
Therefore, all of the things we call chairs are illusions and do not exist.
I seriously don’t see how the above argument is any more reasonable and any more or less question-begging than the p-zombie argument I’ve made in the grandparent. No single premise here assumes the conclusion, right? So no problem!
ETA: Perhaps it’s more clear if I just say that in order for the premises of the grandparent to be logically valid, one must also assume as a premise that having the information patterns of the human brain without creating qualia is possible in the first place. This is the key point that is the source of the question begging: It is assumed that the brain interactions do not create qualia, implicitly as part of the premises, otherwise the statement “P-zombies have the same brain interactions that we do but no qualia” is directly equivalent to “A → B, A, ¬B”.
So for A (brain interactions identical to us), B (possess qualia), and C (has magic):
(A → B) <==> ¬B → ¬A
((C → B) OR (AC → B)) <==> ¬(A → B)
A
¬B
Refactor to one single “question-begging” premise:
((((C ->B) OR (AC → B)) → C) <==> ¬(¬B → ¬A)) AND A AND ¬B
...therefore C.
I suppose they have the ability to formulate arguments that support their views. Are you saying that the honest way to argue is to fling premises together at random and see what happens?
Joint implication by premsies is validity not petitio principi.
That is an example of a True Scotsman fallacy, or argument by tendentious redefinition. I don’t see the parallel.
Eh. I’m bad at informal fallacies, apparently.
However, all they’ve done is pick specific premises that hide clever assumptions that logically must end up with their desired conclusion, without any reason in particular to believe that their premises make any sense. See the amateur logic I did in my edits of the grandparent.
It is very much assumed, by asserting the first, third and fourth premises, that qualia does not require brain interactions, as a prerequisite for positing the existence of p-zombies in the thought experiment.
Again: not assuming physicalism it not the same as assuming non-physicalism.
They assume (correctly) that if ¬B and A, then ¬(A → B)
Then they assume ¬B and A.
...
You’ve flattened out all the stuff about conceivability and logical possibility.
I have, but unfortunately that’s mostly because I don’t know the formal nomenclature and little details of writing conceivability and possibility logical statements.
I wouldn’t really trust myself to write formal logic with conceivability and probability without missing a step or strawmanning one of the premises at some point, with my currently very minimal understanding of that stuff.