do objective moral values exist? Is there anything I (or anyone) should do, independent from what I desire? With such a clear explanation of moral semantics at hand, I think the answer is an obvious and resounding no
You just jumped to the conclusion that there is no epistemically objective morality—nothing you objectively-should do --
because there in no metaphysically objective morality, no Form of the Good. That is a fallcy (although a common one on LW). EY has in fact explained how morality can be epistemically objective: it can be based on logic.
According to Eliezer’s definition of “should” in this post, I “should” do things which lead to “life, consciousness, and activity; health and strength; pleasures and satisfactions of all or certain kinds; happiness, beatitude, contentment, etc.; truth; knowledge and true opinions of various kinds, understanding, wisdom; beauty, harmony, proportion in objects contemplated; aesthetic experience...” But unless I already cared about those things, I don’t see why I would do what I “should” do, so as a universal prescription for action, this definition of “morality” fails.
“And I mention this in hopes that I can show that it is not moral anti-realism to say that moral statements take their truth-value from logical entities.”. If you do care about reason, you can therefore be reasoned into morality.
In any case, it is no argument against moral objectivism/realism that some people don;’t “get” it. Maths sets up
universal truths, which can be recognised by those capable of recognising them. That some don;t recognise them
doesn;t stop them being objective.
You can spend your energy on condemnation if you wish. It doesn’t sound like the most efficient use of my time. It is highly unlikely that political activism (which is what condemnation is about, either implicitly or explicitly) against any particular evil is the optimal way for me to do ‘good’.
“Anyone can be reasoned into doing that which would fulfill the most and strongest of current desires. However, what fulfills current desires is not necessarily the same thing as what is right.”
You seem to be overlooking the desire to be (seen to be) reasonable in itself.
“Anyone can be reasoned into doing what is right with enough argumentation”
...is probably false. But if reasoning and condemnation both modify bechaviour, however imperfectly, why not
use both?
You just jumped to the conclusion that there is no epistemically objective morality—nothing you objectively-should do -- because there in no metaphysically objective morality, no Form of the Good. That is a fallcy (although a common one on LW). EY has in fact explained how morality can be epistemically objective: it can be based on logic.
I didn’t say that. Of course there is something you should do, given a set of goals...hence decision theory.
There is something you self centerdly should do, but that doens’t mean there is nothing you morally-should do either.
According to Eliezer’s definition of “should” in this post, I “should” do things which lead to “life, consciousness, and activity; health and strength; pleasures and satisfactions of all or certain kinds; happiness, beatitude, contentment, etc.; truth; knowledge and true opinions of various kinds, understanding, wisdom; beauty, harmony, proportion in objects contemplated; aesthetic experience...” But unless I already cared about those things, I don’t see why I would do what I “should” do, so as a universal prescription for action, this definition of “morality” fails.
Correct. Agents who don’t care about morality generally can’t be convinced to do what they morally should do.
He also said:
“And I mention this in hopes that I can show that it is not moral anti-realism to say that moral statements take their truth-value from logical entities.”. If you do care about reason, you can therefore be reasoned into morality.
In any case, it is no argument against moral objectivism/realism that some people don;’t “get” it. Maths sets up universal truths, which can be recognised by those capable of recognising them. That some don;t recognise them doesn;t stop them being objective.
You do not reason with evil. You condemn it.
I subscribe to desirism. So I’m not a strict anti-realist.
You can spend your energy on condemnation if you wish. It doesn’t sound like the most efficient use of my time. It is highly unlikely that political activism (which is what condemnation is about, either implicitly or explicitly) against any particular evil is the optimal way for me to do ‘good’.
“Anyone can be reasoned into doing that which would fulfill the most and strongest of current desires. However, what fulfills current desires is not necessarily the same thing as what is right.”
You seem to be overlooking the desire to be (seen to be) reasonable in itself.
“Anyone can be reasoned into doing what is right with enough argumentation”
...is probably false. But if reasoning and condemnation both modify bechaviour, however imperfectly, why not use both?
How does that differ from virtue ethics?