This Aumann paper is about (a variant of?) the stag hunt game. In this version, it’s great for everyone if we both hunt stag, it’s somewhat worse for everyone if we hunt rabbit, and if I hunt stag and you hunt rabbit, it’s terrible for me, and you’re better off than in the world in which we both hunted rabbit, but worse off than in the world in which we both hunted stag.
He makes the point that in this game, even if we agree to hunt stag, if we make our decisions alone and without further accountability, I might think to myself “Well, you would want that agreement if you wanted to hunt stag, but you would also want that agreement if you wanted to hunt rabbit—either way, it’s better for you if I hunt stag. So the agreement doesn’t really change my mind as to whether you want to hunt rabbit or stag. Since I was presumably uncertain before, I should probably still be uncertain, and that means rabbit is the safer bet.”
I’m not sure how realistic the setup is, but I thought it was an interesting take—a case where an agreement to both choose an outcome that’s a Nash equilibrium doesn’t really persuade me to keep the agreement.
This Aumann paper is about (a variant of?) the stag hunt game. In this version, it’s great for everyone if we both hunt stag, it’s somewhat worse for everyone if we hunt rabbit, and if I hunt stag and you hunt rabbit, it’s terrible for me, and you’re better off than in the world in which we both hunted rabbit, but worse off than in the world in which we both hunted stag.
He makes the point that in this game, even if we agree to hunt stag, if we make our decisions alone and without further accountability, I might think to myself “Well, you would want that agreement if you wanted to hunt stag, but you would also want that agreement if you wanted to hunt rabbit—either way, it’s better for you if I hunt stag. So the agreement doesn’t really change my mind as to whether you want to hunt rabbit or stag. Since I was presumably uncertain before, I should probably still be uncertain, and that means rabbit is the safer bet.”
I’m not sure how realistic the setup is, but I thought it was an interesting take—a case where an agreement to both choose an outcome that’s a Nash equilibrium doesn’t really persuade me to keep the agreement.