That doesn’t mean that Occam grounding realism is at all plausible. I’ve laid out an argument for verificationism here and met my burden of proof. Suggesting that there might possibly be a counterargument isn’t meeting the opposing burden of proof.
Meeting contrary arguments is part of a making an argument. There definitely is such a counterargument, even if you have never heard of it. That’s what steel manning and strong manning are all about.
I don’t know what a plausible version of the argument you’re hinting at would look like. If you think there’s such a plausible argument, please point me at it.
I don’t know what your thoughts on plausibility are. But multiversal theories are straightforwardly excluded by the original version of Occams Razor, the one about not multiplying entities.
Since the argument does not mention probability, it doesn’t refute the counterargument that unlikely scenarios involving simulations or multiple universes don’t significantly undermine the ability to make claims about ontology.
If you take that as a premise and you consider it contradictory to my conclusion and you accept my premises, then the premises you accept imply a contradiction. That’s your problem, not mine.
That doesn’t mean that Occam grounding realism is at all plausible. I’ve laid out an argument for verificationism here and met my burden of proof. Suggesting that there might possibly be a counterargument isn’t meeting the opposing burden of proof.
Meeting contrary arguments is part of a making an argument. There definitely is such a counterargument, even if you have never heard of it. That’s what steel manning and strong manning are all about.
I don’t know what a plausible version of the argument you’re hinting at would look like. If you think there’s such a plausible argument, please point me at it.
I don’t know what your thoughts on plausibility are. But multiversal theories are straightforwardly excluded by the original version of Occams Razor, the one about not multiplying entities.
To the extent Occam is interpreted as saying that more complicated theories are impossible, as opposed to unlikely, it’s not plausible.
As above, my claim rests only on the possibility of a multiverse.
Why should something that is possible but low probability have so much impact?
The argument is laid out in OP.
I don’t see any mention of probability.
The argument does not depend on probability.
If you disagree with the conclusion, please explain which premise is wrong, or explain how the conclusion can be false despite all premises holding.
Since the argument does not mention probability, it doesn’t refute the counterargument that unlikely scenarios involving simulations or multiple universes don’t significantly undermine the ability to make claims about ontology.
That’s not a counterargument, as it’s fully consistent with the conclusion.
If you take that as a premise and you consider it contradictory to my conclusion and you accept my premises, then the premises you accept imply a contradiction. That’s your problem, not mine.
Read back,there’s an even number of negatives.
Not following. Can you state your point plainly? Which part of my argument do you reject?