The experiment specifies that the circumstances are all but literally indistinguishable:
I’ll allow you to relive your life up to this moment exactly as it unfolded the first time—that is, all the exact same experiences, life decisions, outcomes, etc.
If the sequence of events is “exactly” the same, then from your perspective it cannot be distinguished. If it could, then some event must have happened differently in the past to make it such that you were aware things were different, which violates the tenets of God’s claim. In other words, the two timelines basically must be indistinguishable from your perspective.
You are correct. Rephrasing, as I was unclear before: my experiences will be indistinguishable to me, but from an outside perspective I think there’s a difference. In the moment I’m making the decision, I’m trying to take that outside view. I suppose I’m trying to answer what I think was the spirit of the question; I value me existing and having experiences. Getting to go through life again means I exist ‘longer’ (it’s unclear exactly how the time reversal works in this case, but for this to make any sense there has to be some kind of added amount of subjective experiences, even if they’re exact copies of ‘previous’ experiences) and I would rather prolong my existence than cease to exist.
Imperfect analogy: imagine telling a paperclip maximizer that you will copy every paperclip it’s made, but you will copy them somewhere else where the paperclip maximizer will never sense them. It wants more paperclips, so it likes this idea. In a similar way, I like me existing and having experiences.
The experiment specifies that the circumstances are all but literally indistinguishable:
If the sequence of events is “exactly” the same, then from your perspective it cannot be distinguished. If it could, then some event must have happened differently in the past to make it such that you were aware things were different, which violates the tenets of God’s claim. In other words, the two timelines basically must be indistinguishable from your perspective.
You are correct. Rephrasing, as I was unclear before: my experiences will be indistinguishable to me, but from an outside perspective I think there’s a difference. In the moment I’m making the decision, I’m trying to take that outside view. I suppose I’m trying to answer what I think was the spirit of the question; I value me existing and having experiences. Getting to go through life again means I exist ‘longer’ (it’s unclear exactly how the time reversal works in this case, but for this to make any sense there has to be some kind of added amount of subjective experiences, even if they’re exact copies of ‘previous’ experiences) and I would rather prolong my existence than cease to exist.
Imperfect analogy: imagine telling a paperclip maximizer that you will copy every paperclip it’s made, but you will copy them somewhere else where the paperclip maximizer will never sense them. It wants more paperclips, so it likes this idea. In a similar way, I like me existing and having experiences.