If zero is very low, then total utility maximization = make as many people as possible
Repugnant conclusion certainly is worth discussing, but the other two:
If zero is very high, then total utility maximization = it’s kill everyone
I think it would be a very bad idea to have a utility function such that the utility of an empty universe is higher than the utility of a populated non-dystopia; so any utility function for the universe that I might approve should have a pretty hefty negative value for empty universes. I don’t think that’s too awful of a requirement.
If zero is average utility, then total utility maximization = doesn’t matter what you do
This looks like a total non sequitur to me. What do you mean?
He means that if utility is measured in such a way that average utility is always zero, then total utility is always zero too, average utility being total utility divided number of agents.
So where do you put zero? By this one completely arbitrary decision you can collapse total utility maximization to one of these cases.
It gets far worse when you try to apply it to animals.
As for zero being very high, I’ve actually heard many times this argument about existence of farm animals, which supposedly suffer so much that it would be better if they didn’t exist. It can as easily be applied to wild animals, even though it’s far less common to do so.
With animal zero very low, total utility maximization turns us into paperclip maximizer of insects, or whatever is the simplest utility-positive life.
If non-existent beings have exactly zero utility—that any being with less than zero utility ought not to have come into existence—then the choice of where to put zero is clearly not arbitrary.
Repugnant conclusion certainly is worth discussing, but the other two:
I think it would be a very bad idea to have a utility function such that the utility of an empty universe is higher than the utility of a populated non-dystopia; so any utility function for the universe that I might approve should have a pretty hefty negative value for empty universes. I don’t think that’s too awful of a requirement.
This looks like a total non sequitur to me. What do you mean?
He means that if utility is measured in such a way that average utility is always zero, then total utility is always zero too, average utility being total utility divided number of agents.
Well, that’s not a very good utility function then, and taw’s three possibilities are nowhere near exhausting the range of possibilities.
So where do you put zero? By this one completely arbitrary decision you can collapse total utility maximization to one of these cases.
It gets far worse when you try to apply it to animals.
As for zero being very high, I’ve actually heard many times this argument about existence of farm animals, which supposedly suffer so much that it would be better if they didn’t exist. It can as easily be applied to wild animals, even though it’s far less common to do so.
With animal zero very low, total utility maximization turns us into paperclip maximizer of insects, or whatever is the simplest utility-positive life.
If non-existent beings have exactly zero utility—that any being with less than zero utility ought not to have come into existence—then the choice of where to put zero is clearly not arbitrary.