You seem to contradict yourself when you choose
to privilege the point of view of people who already have acquired the habit of using the teleportation machine over the point of view of people who don’t have this habit and have doubts about if it will really be “them” to experience coming out of the other side.
There are two components to the appearance of continuity: the future component, meaning the expectation of experiencing stuff in the future, and the past component, namely the memory of having experienced stuff in the past.
Now, if there is no underlying, persistent self to ground these appearances, if there’s no fact of the matter about it, then you don’t get to invalidate the feelings of the old grandpa who refuses to get on with the times and use the teleportation machine.
The fact that I care about what I will eat for breakfast tomorrow, the fact that I identify with my future self, is just a matter of personal preference.
You seem to contradict yourself when you choose to privilege the point of view of people who already have acquired the habit of using the teleportation machine over the point of view of people who don’t have this habit and have doubts about if it will really be “them” to experience coming out of the other side. There are two components to the appearance of continuity: the future component, meaning the expectation of experiencing stuff in the future, and the past component, namely the memory of having experienced stuff in the past. Now, if there is no underlying, persistent self to ground these appearances, if there’s no fact of the matter about it, then you don’t get to invalidate the feelings of the old grandpa who refuses to get on with the times and use the teleportation machine.
The fact that I care about what I will eat for breakfast tomorrow, the fact that I identify with my future self, is just a matter of personal preference.