You’ve got a lot of questions to raise, but no apparent alternative.
Non computationalism physicalism is an alternative to either or both the computationalist theories. (That performing a certain class of computations is sufficient to be conscious in general, or that performing a specific one is sufficient to be a particular conscious individual. Computation as a theory of consciousness qua awareness isn’t known to be true, and even if it is assumed, it doesn’t directly give you a theory of personal identity).
The non existence, or incoherence, of personal identity is another. There doesn’t have to be an answer to “when is a mind me”.
Note that no one except andeslodes is arguing against copying. The issue is when a mind is me, the person typing this, not a copy-of-me.
Reproduce the matter, you’ve reproduced the mind.
Well, that’s only copying.
Consciousness, qua Awareness, and Personal Identity are easily confused, not least because both are often called “consciousness”.
A computational theory of consciousness is sometimes called on to solve the second problem, the problem of personal identity. But there is no strong reason to think a computational duplicate of you, actually is you, since there is no strong reason to think any other kind of duplicate is.
Qualitative identity is a relationship between two or more things that are identical in all their properties. Numerical identity is the relationship a thing has only to itself. The Olsen twins enjoy qualitative identity; Stephanie Germanota and Lady Gaga have numerical identity. The trick is to jump from qualitative identity to numerical identity, because the claim is that a computational duplicate of you, is you, the very same person.
Suppose you found out you had an identical twin. You would not consider them to be you yourself. Likewise for a biological clone. A computational duplicate would be lower resolution still, so why would it be you? The major problem is that you and your duplicate exist simultaneously in different places, which goes against the intuition that you are a unique individual.
You’re fighting against the counterintuitive conclusion. Sure I’d rather have a different version of me be tortured; it’s slightly different. But I won’t be happy about it. And my intuition is still drawn toward continuity being important, even though my whole rational mind disagrees. I’ve been back and forth over this extensively, and the conclusion is always the same- ever since I got over the counter-intuitive nature of the plural I
You don’t really believe in the plural I theory, or you would have a different and we to the torture question.
Non -computationalist physicalism doesn’t have to be the claim that material continuity matters , and pattern doesnt: it can be the claim that both do. So that you cease to be you if you are destructively cloned, and also if your mind is badly scrambled. No bullet biting about plural Is is required.
If you’re not arguing against a perfect copy being you, then I don’t understand your position, so much of what follows will probably miss the mark. I had written more but have to cut myself off since this discussion is taking time without having much odds of improving anyone’s epistemics noticably.
The Olson twins are do not at all have qualitative identity. They have different minds: sets of memories, beliefs, and values. So I just don’t know what your position is. You claim that there doesn’t need to be an answer; that seems false, as you could have to make decisions informed by your belief. You currently value your future self more than other people, so you act like you believe that’s you in a functional sense.
Are you the same person tomorrow? It’s not an identical pattern, but a continuation. I’m saying it’s pretty-much you because the elements you wouldn’t want changed about yourself are there.
If you value your body or your continuity over the continuity of your memories, beliefs, values, and the rest of your mind that’s fine, but the vast majority will disagree with you on consideration. Those things are what we mean by “me”.
I certainly do believe in the plural I (under the special cirrumstance I discussed); we must be understanding something differently in the torture question. I don’t have a preference pre-copy for who gets tortured; both identical future copies are me from my perspective before copying. Maybe you’re agreeing with that?
After copying, we’re immediately starting to diverge into two variants of me, and future experiences will not be shared between them.
I was addressing a perfect computational copy.
An imperfect but good computational copy is higher resolution, not lower, than a biological twin. It is orders of magnitude more similar to the pattern that makes your mind, even though it is less similar to the pattern that makes your body. What is writing your words is your mind, not your body, so when it says “I” it meets the mind.
Noncomputational physicalism sounds like it’s just confused. Physics performs computations and can’t be separated from doing that.
Dual aspect theory is incoherent because you can’t have our physics without doing computation that can create a being that claims and experiences consciousness like we do. Noncomputational physicalism sounds like the same thing.
I concede it’s possible that consciousness includes some magic nonphysical component (that’s not computation or pattern instantiated by physics as a pure result of how physics works). That could change my answer to when a mind is me. I don’t think that’s what you’re arguing for though.
I’ve got to park this here to get other things done. I’ll read any response but it might be a better use of time to restart the discussion more carefully—if you care.
I agree that this conversation, as currently started, is unlikely to lead to anything more productive. As such, I’ll keep my response here brief [1], in case you want to use it as a starting point if you ever intend for us to talk about it again.
Noncomputational physicalism sounds like it’s just confused. Physics performs computations and can’t be separated from doing that.
Dual aspect theory is incoherent because you can’t have our physics without doing computation that can create a being that claims and experiences consciousness like we do.
As I read these statements, they fail to contend with a rather basic map-territory distinction that lies at the core of “physics” and “computation.”
The basic concept of computation at issue here is a feature of the map you could use to approximate reality (i.e., the territory) . It is merely part of a mathematical model that, as I’ve described in response to Ruby earlier, represents a very lossy compression of the underlying physical substrate [2]. This is because, in this restricted and epistemically hobbled ontology, what is given inordinate attention is the abstract classical computation performed by a particular subset of the brain’s electronic circuit. This is what makes it anti-physicalist, as I have explained:
As a general matter, accepting physicalism as correct would naturally lead one to the conclusion that what runs on top of the physical substrate works on the basis of… what is physically there (which, to the best of our current understanding, can be represented through Quantum Mechanical probability amplitudes), not what conclusions you draw from a mathematical model that abstracts away quantum randomness in favor of a classical picture, the entire brain structure in favor of (a slightly augmented version of) its connectome, and the entire chemical make-up of it in favor of its electrical connections.
To make it even more explicit, this interpretation of the computationalist perspective (that the quantum stuff doesn’t matter etc) was confirmed as accurate by its proponents.
So when you talk about a “pattern instantiated by physics as a pure result of how physics works”, you’re not pointing to anything meaningful in the territory, rather only something that makes sense in the particular ontology you have chosen to use to view it through, a frame that I have explained my skepticism of already.
Put differently, “computation” is not an ontologically primitive concept in reality-as-it-is, but only in mathematical approximations of it that make specific assumptions about what does and doesn’t exist. Those assumptions can be sometimes justified in terms of intuitive appeal, expediency of calculation etc, but reifying them as unchallengeable axioms of the universe rather than of your model of it is wrong.
The Olson twins are do not at all have qualitative identity.
Not 100% , but enough to illustrate the concept.
So I just don’t know what your position is.
I didn’t have to have a solution to point out the flaws in other solutions. My main point is that a no to soul- theory isn’t a yes to computationalism. Computationalism isn’t the only alternative, or the best.
You claim that there doesn’t need to be an answer;
Some problems are insoluble.
that seems false, as you could have to make decisions informed by your belief.
My belief isn’t necessarily the actually really answer ..is it? That’s basic rationality. You need beliefs to act...but beliefs aren’t necessarily true.
And I have no practical need for a theory that can answer puzzles about destructive teleportation and the like.
You currently value your future self more than other people, so you act like you believe that’s you in a functional sense.
Yes. That’s not an argument in favour of the contentious points, like computationalism and Plural Is. If I try to reverse the logic, and great everything I value as me, I get bizarre results...I am my dog, country, etc.
Are you the same person tomorrow? It’s not an identical pattern, but a continuation.
Tomorrow-me is a physical continuation , too.
I’m saying it’s pretty-much you because the elements you wouldn’t want changed about yourself are there.
If I accept that pattern is all that matters , I have to face counterintuitive consequences like Plural I’s.
If I accept that material continuity is all that matters, then I face other counterintuitive consequences, like having my connectome rewired.
Its an open philosophical problem. If there were an simple answer , it would have been answered long ago.
“Yer an algorithm, Arry” is a simple answer. Just not
good
If you value your body or your continuity over the continuity of your memories, beliefs, values, and the rest of your mind that’s fine,
Fortunately, it’s not an either-or choice.
I certainly do believe in the plural I (under the speciall cirrumstance I discussed); we must be understanding something differently in the torture question. I don’t have a preference pre-copy for who gets tortured; both identical future copies are me from my perspective before copying. Maybe you’re agreeing with that?
...and post copy I have a preference for the copy who isn’t me to be tortured. Which is to say that both copies say the same thing, which is to say that they are only copies. If they regarded themselves as numerically identical, the response “the other one!” would make no sense, and nor would the question. The questions presumes a lack of numerical identity, so how can it prove it?
I was addressing a perfect computational copy. An imperfect but good computational copy is higher resolution, not lower, than a biological twin. It is orders of magnitude more similar to the pattern that makes your mind, even though it is less similar to the pattern that makes your body.
You’re assuming pattern continuity matters more than material continuity. There’s no proof of that, and no proof that you have to make an either-or choice.
What is writing your words is your mind, not your body, so when it says “I” it meets the mind.
The abstract pattern can’t cause anything without the brain/body.
Noncomputational physicalism sounds like it’s just confused. Physics performs computations and can’t be separated from doing that.
Noncomputational physicalism isn’t the claim that computation never occurs. Its the claim that the computational abstraction doesn’t capture everything that’s relevant to consciousness/mind. Its not physically necessary that the computational abstraction captures all the causally relevant information, so it isn’t logically necessary, a fortiori.
Dual aspect theory is incoherent because you can’t have our physics without doing computation that can create a being that claims and experiences consciousness like we do.
Computation is a lossy , high level abstraction of a what a physical system does. It doesn’t fundamentally cause anything in itself.
Now, you can argue that a physical duplicate would make the same claims to be conscious without actually having consciousness, and that’s literally a p-zombie argument.
But we do have consciousness. The insight of DAT is that “reports of consciousness have a physical/computational basis” isn’t exclusive of “reports of consciousness are caused by consciousness”. You can have your cake and eat it!
Of course, the above is all about consciousness-qua-awareness , not consciousness qua personal identity.
I concede it’s possible that consciousness includes some magic nonphysical component (that’s not computation or pattern instantiated by physics as a pure result of how physics works).
If it’s physical, why call it magical?
It’s completely standard that all computations run on a substrate. If you want to say that all physics is computation, OK, but then all computation is physics. You then no longer have plural I’s, because physics doesn’t allow the selfsame object to have multiple instances.
Do you think a successful upload would say things like “I’m still me!” and think thoughts like “I’m so glad I payed extra to give myself cool virtual environment options”? That seems like an inevitability if the causal patterns of your mind were captured. And it would be tough to disagree with a thing claiming up and down it’s you, citing your most personal memories as evidence
It’s easy to disagree if there is another explanation, which there is: a functional duplicate will behave the same, because it’s a functional duplicate..whether it’s conscious of not, whether it’s you or not.
Non computationalism physicalism is an alternative to either or both the computationalist theories. (That performing a certain class of computations is sufficient to be conscious in general, or that performing a specific one is sufficient to be a particular conscious individual. Computation as a theory of consciousness qua awareness isn’t known to be true, and even if it is assumed, it doesn’t directly give you a theory of personal identity).
The non existence, or incoherence, of personal identity is another. There doesn’t have to be an answer to “when is a mind me”.
Note that no one except andeslodes is arguing against copying. The issue is when a mind is me, the person typing this, not a copy-of-me.
Well, that’s only copying.
Consciousness, qua Awareness, and Personal Identity are easily confused, not least because both are often called “consciousness”.
A computational theory of consciousness is sometimes called on to solve the second problem, the problem of personal identity. But there is no strong reason to think a computational duplicate of you, actually is you, since there is no strong reason to think any other kind of duplicate is.
Qualitative identity is a relationship between two or more things that are identical in all their properties. Numerical identity is the relationship a thing has only to itself. The Olsen twins enjoy qualitative identity; Stephanie Germanota and Lady Gaga have numerical identity. The trick is to jump from qualitative identity to numerical identity, because the claim is that a computational duplicate of you, is you, the very same person.
Suppose you found out you had an identical twin. You would not consider them to be you yourself. Likewise for a biological clone. A computational duplicate would be lower resolution still, so why would it be you? The major problem is that you and your duplicate exist simultaneously in different places, which goes against the intuition that you are a unique individual.
You don’t really believe in the plural I theory, or you would have a different and we to the torture question.
Non -computationalist physicalism doesn’t have to be the claim that material continuity matters , and pattern doesnt: it can be the claim that both do. So that you cease to be you if you are destructively cloned, and also if your mind is badly scrambled. No bullet biting about plural Is is required.
If you’re not arguing against a perfect copy being you, then I don’t understand your position, so much of what follows will probably miss the mark. I had written more but have to cut myself off since this discussion is taking time without having much odds of improving anyone’s epistemics noticably.
The Olson twins are do not at all have qualitative identity. They have different minds: sets of memories, beliefs, and values. So I just don’t know what your position is. You claim that there doesn’t need to be an answer; that seems false, as you could have to make decisions informed by your belief. You currently value your future self more than other people, so you act like you believe that’s you in a functional sense.
Are you the same person tomorrow? It’s not an identical pattern, but a continuation. I’m saying it’s pretty-much you because the elements you wouldn’t want changed about yourself are there.
If you value your body or your continuity over the continuity of your memories, beliefs, values, and the rest of your mind that’s fine, but the vast majority will disagree with you on consideration. Those things are what we mean by “me”.
I certainly do believe in the plural I (under the special cirrumstance I discussed); we must be understanding something differently in the torture question. I don’t have a preference pre-copy for who gets tortured; both identical future copies are me from my perspective before copying. Maybe you’re agreeing with that?
After copying, we’re immediately starting to diverge into two variants of me, and future experiences will not be shared between them.
I was addressing a perfect computational copy. An imperfect but good computational copy is higher resolution, not lower, than a biological twin. It is orders of magnitude more similar to the pattern that makes your mind, even though it is less similar to the pattern that makes your body. What is writing your words is your mind, not your body, so when it says “I” it meets the mind.
Noncomputational physicalism sounds like it’s just confused. Physics performs computations and can’t be separated from doing that.
Dual aspect theory is incoherent because you can’t have our physics without doing computation that can create a being that claims and experiences consciousness like we do. Noncomputational physicalism sounds like the same thing.
I concede it’s possible that consciousness includes some magic nonphysical component (that’s not computation or pattern instantiated by physics as a pure result of how physics works). That could change my answer to when a mind is me. I don’t think that’s what you’re arguing for though.
I’ve got to park this here to get other things done. I’ll read any response but it might be a better use of time to restart the discussion more carefully—if you care.
I agree that this conversation, as currently started, is unlikely to lead to anything more productive. As such, I’ll keep my response here brief [1], in case you want to use it as a starting point if you ever intend for us to talk about it again.
As I read these statements, they fail to contend with a rather basic map-territory distinction that lies at the core of “physics” and “computation.”
The basic concept of computation at issue here is a feature of the map you could use to approximate reality (i.e., the territory) . It is merely part of a mathematical model that, as I’ve described in response to Ruby earlier, represents a very lossy compression of the underlying physical substrate [2]. This is because, in this restricted and epistemically hobbled ontology, what is given inordinate attention is the abstract classical computation performed by a particular subset of the brain’s electronic circuit. This is what makes it anti-physicalist, as I have explained:
To make it even more explicit, this interpretation of the computationalist perspective (that the quantum stuff doesn’t matter etc) was confirmed as accurate by its proponents.
So when you talk about a “pattern instantiated by physics as a pure result of how physics works”, you’re not pointing to anything meaningful in the territory, rather only something that makes sense in the particular ontology you have chosen to use to view it through, a frame that I have explained my skepticism of already.
This will be my final comment in this thread, regardless of what happens.
Put differently, “computation” is not an ontologically primitive concept in reality-as-it-is, but only in mathematical approximations of it that make specific assumptions about what does and doesn’t exist. Those assumptions can be sometimes justified in terms of intuitive appeal, expediency of calculation etc, but reifying them as unchallengeable axioms of the universe rather than of your model of it is wrong.
.
Not 100% , but enough to illustrate the concept.
I didn’t have to have a solution to point out the flaws in other solutions. My main point is that a no to soul- theory isn’t a yes to computationalism. Computationalism isn’t the only alternative, or the best.
Some problems are insoluble.
My belief isn’t necessarily the actually really answer ..is it? That’s basic rationality. You need beliefs to act...but beliefs aren’t necessarily true.
And I have no practical need for a theory that can answer puzzles about destructive teleportation and the like.
Yes. That’s not an argument in favour of the contentious points, like computationalism and Plural Is. If I try to reverse the logic, and great everything I value as me, I get bizarre results...I am my dog, country, etc.
Tomorrow-me is a physical continuation , too.
If I accept that pattern is all that matters , I have to face counterintuitive consequences like Plural I’s.
If I accept that material continuity is all that matters, then I face other counterintuitive consequences, like having my connectome rewired.
Its an open philosophical problem. If there were an simple answer , it would have been answered long ago.
“Yer an algorithm, Arry” is a simple answer. Just not good
Fortunately, it’s not an either-or choice.
...and post copy I have a preference for the copy who isn’t me to be tortured. Which is to say that both copies say the same thing, which is to say that they are only copies. If they regarded themselves as numerically identical, the response “the other one!” would make no sense, and nor would the question. The questions presumes a lack of numerical identity, so how can it prove it?
You’re assuming pattern continuity matters more than material continuity. There’s no proof of that, and no proof that you have to make an either-or choice.
The abstract pattern can’t cause anything without the brain/body.
Noncomputational physicalism isn’t the claim that computation never occurs. Its the claim that the computational abstraction doesn’t capture everything that’s relevant to consciousness/mind. Its not physically necessary that the computational abstraction captures all the causally relevant information, so it isn’t logically necessary, a fortiori.
Computation is a lossy , high level abstraction of a what a physical system does. It doesn’t fundamentally cause anything in itself.
Now, you can argue that a physical duplicate would make the same claims to be conscious without actually having consciousness, and that’s literally a p-zombie argument.
But we do have consciousness. The insight of DAT is that “reports of consciousness have a physical/computational basis” isn’t exclusive of “reports of consciousness are caused by consciousness”. You can have your cake and eat it!
Of course, the above is all about consciousness-qua-awareness , not consciousness qua personal identity.
If it’s physical, why call it magical?
It’s completely standard that all computations run on a substrate. If you want to say that all physics is computation, OK, but then all computation is physics. You then no longer have plural I’s, because physics doesn’t allow the selfsame object to have multiple instances.
It’s easy to disagree if there is another explanation, which there is: a functional duplicate will behave the same, because it’s a functional duplicate..whether it’s conscious of not, whether it’s you or not.