I don’t see why split-screen mode is crazy talk at all. Is it just because it would imply faster-than-light communication? With our understanding of physics incomplete, I remain agnostic on the existence of FTL, so I wouldn’t rule this out. But even more than that, I’d propose that if there is one observer, there does not even need to be FTL communication in the first place, because it is just that the observer is in more than one place at once, similarly to how a wormhole does not necessitate true FTL. What are the other objections?
The belief system which seems most coherent to me is that we are thinking organisms, where the thought is mediated by our brains, and our internal experience is a way for the brain to refer to itself – it provides a handhold for the useful concept of “I” to latch onto. This has the added benefit that I find this idea rather cute. In this frame, you die only if your brain dies (or a weaker claim: you don’t die if you don’t undergo significant brain trauma).
On a last meta-philosophical point, which is not necessarily direct relevant to your post, it increasingly strikes me as unwise to use reasoning from external perceptions (e.g. the results of neuroscientific experiments) to attack at how we internally perceive the experience of consciousness. If neuroscience proved that the self is dying every second, then I would say with no reservation that there is either an error in the experiment, or that the self is not what it was thought to be. I genuinely believe that the answer to such philosophical questions is (perhaps even must be) “if it is felt to be true, it is true”.
It’s not just that it implies faster-than-light communication, it’s that it implies communication at all.
Experiencing both bodies at the same time, you will be able to take actions in one body that you wouldn’t have done without the other one. It seems odd that with no biological changes to your brain, the mere existence of another similar brain changes how this one functions. Why would they be linked? This implies the observer is some external soul-like thing that can manipulate matter. If you can’t take actions based on your conscious experience, it implies the observer is dissociated from the brain and not created from it or able to interact with it.
I can definitely imagine a world where this is true, but it seems extremely unlikely based on what we currently know.
Yes, it would imply the observer is external, but then it also would not change anything about how the brain functions. (Or vice versa, but I prefer this one.) I am unconvinced of the truth of what you say in the last sentence of your second paragraph.
Either way, whether or not it might seem implausible, my question is why it is, or is not, implausible. Why exactly, based on what we currently know, is this extremely unlikely?
I don’t see why split-screen mode is crazy talk at all. Is it just because it would imply faster-than-light communication? With our understanding of physics incomplete, I remain agnostic on the existence of FTL, so I wouldn’t rule this out. But even more than that, I’d propose that if there is one observer, there does not even need to be FTL communication in the first place, because it is just that the observer is in more than one place at once, similarly to how a wormhole does not necessitate true FTL. What are the other objections?
The belief system which seems most coherent to me is that we are thinking organisms, where the thought is mediated by our brains, and our internal experience is a way for the brain to refer to itself – it provides a handhold for the useful concept of “I” to latch onto. This has the added benefit that I find this idea rather cute. In this frame, you die only if your brain dies (or a weaker claim: you don’t die if you don’t undergo significant brain trauma).
On a last meta-philosophical point, which is not necessarily direct relevant to your post, it increasingly strikes me as unwise to use reasoning from external perceptions (e.g. the results of neuroscientific experiments) to attack at how we internally perceive the experience of consciousness. If neuroscience proved that the self is dying every second, then I would say with no reservation that there is either an error in the experiment, or that the self is not what it was thought to be. I genuinely believe that the answer to such philosophical questions is (perhaps even must be) “if it is felt to be true, it is true”.
It’s not just that it implies faster-than-light communication, it’s that it implies communication at all.
Experiencing both bodies at the same time, you will be able to take actions in one body that you wouldn’t have done without the other one. It seems odd that with no biological changes to your brain, the mere existence of another similar brain changes how this one functions. Why would they be linked? This implies the observer is some external soul-like thing that can manipulate matter. If you can’t take actions based on your conscious experience, it implies the observer is dissociated from the brain and not created from it or able to interact with it.
I can definitely imagine a world where this is true, but it seems extremely unlikely based on what we currently know.
Yes, it would imply the observer is external, but then it also would not change anything about how the brain functions. (Or vice versa, but I prefer this one.) I am unconvinced of the truth of what you say in the last sentence of your second paragraph.
Either way, whether or not it might seem implausible, my question is why it is, or is not, implausible. Why exactly, based on what we currently know, is this extremely unlikely?