I’d guess that this illusion comes from not fully internalizing reductionism and naturalism about the mind.
Naturalism and reductionism are not sufficient to rigourously prove either form of computationalism—that performing a certain class of computations is sufficient to be conscious in general, or that performing a specific one is sufficient to be a particular conscious individual.
This has been going on for years: most rationalists believe in computationalism, none have a really good reason to.
Arguing down Cartesian dualism (the thing rationalists always do) doesn’t increase the probability of computationalism, because there are further possibilities , including physicalism-without-computationalism (the one rationalists keep overlooking) , and scepticism about consciousness/identity.
One can of course adopt a belief in computationalism, or something else, in the basis of intuitions or probabilities. But then one is very much in the ream of Modest Epistemology, and needs to behave accordingly.
“My issue is not with your conclusion, it’s precisely with your absolute certainty, which imo you support with cyclical argumentation based on weak premises”.
Yep.
There isn’t a special extra “me” thing separate from my brain-state, and my precise causal history isn’t that important to my values.
If either kind of consciousness depends on physical brain states, computationalism is false. That is the problem that has rarely been recognised, and never addressed.
The particular* brain states* look no different in the teleporter case than if I’d stepped through a door; so if there’s something that makes the post-teleporter Rob “not me” while also making the post-doorway Rob “me”, then it must lie outside the brain states, a Cartesian Ghost.
There’s another option: door-Rob has physical continuity. There’s an analogy with the identity-over-time of physical objects: if someone destroyed the Mona Lisa, and created an atom-by-atom duplicate some time later, the duplicate would not be considered the same entity (numerical identity).
There isn’t an XML tag in the brain saying “this is a new brain, not the original”!
That’s not a strong enough argument. There isn’t an XML tag on the copy of the Mona Lisa, but it’s still a copy.
This question doesn’t really make sense from a naturalistic perspective, because there isn’t any causal mechanism that could be responsible for the difference between “a version of me that exists at 3pm tomorrow, whose experiences I should anticipate experiencing” and “an exact physical copy of me that exists at 3pm tomorrow, whose experiences I shouldn’t anticipate experiencing”.
There is, and its multi-way splitting, whether through copying or many worlds branching. The present you can’t anticipate having all their experiences, because experience is experienced one-at-a-time. They can all look back at their memories, and conclude that they were you, but you can’t simply reverse that and conclude that you will be them , because the set-up is asymmetrical.
Scenario 1 is crazy talk, and it’s not the scenario I’m talking about. When I say “You should anticipate having both experiences”, I mean it in the sense of Scenario 2.
Scenario 2: “Two separate screens.” My stream of consciousness continues from Rob-x to Rob-y, and it also continues from Rob-x to Rob-z. Or, equivalently: Rob-y feels exactly as though he was just Rob-x, and Rob-z also feels exactly as though he was just Rob-x (since each of these slightly different people has all the memories, personality traits, etc. of Rob-x — just as though they’d stepped through a doorway).
But that isn’t an experience. It’s two experiences. You will not have an experience of having two experiences. Two experiences will experience having been one person.
If I expect to be uploaded tomorrow, should I care about the upload in the same ways (and to the same degree) that I care about my future biological self?
Yeah.
Are you going to care about 1000 different copies equally?
But that isn’t an experience. It’s two experiences. You will not have an experience of having two experiences. Two experiences will experience having been one person.
Sure; from my perspective, you’re saying the same thing as me.
Are you going to care about 1000 different copies equally?
Naturalism and reductionism are not sufficient to rigourously prove either form of computationalism—that performing a certain class of computations is sufficient to be conscious in general, or that performing a specific one is sufficient to be a particular conscious individual.
This has been going on for years: most rationalists believe in computationalism, none have a really good reason to.
Arguing down Cartesian dualism (the thing rationalists always do) doesn’t increase the probability of computationalism, because there are further possibilities , including physicalism-without-computationalism (the one rationalists keep overlooking) , and scepticism about consciousness/identity.
One can of course adopt a belief in computationalism, or something else, in the basis of intuitions or probabilities. But then one is very much in the ream of Modest Epistemology, and needs to behave accordingly.
“My issue is not with your conclusion, it’s precisely with your absolute certainty, which imo you support with cyclical argumentation based on weak premises”.
Yep.
If either kind of consciousness depends on physical brain states, computationalism is false. That is the problem that has rarely been recognised, and never addressed.
There’s another option: door-Rob has physical continuity. There’s an analogy with the identity-over-time of physical objects: if someone destroyed the Mona Lisa, and created an atom-by-atom duplicate some time later, the duplicate would not be considered the same entity (numerical identity).
That’s not a strong enough argument. There isn’t an XML tag on the copy of the Mona Lisa, but it’s still a copy.
There is, and its multi-way splitting, whether through copying or many worlds branching. The present you can’t anticipate having all their experiences, because experience is experienced one-at-a-time. They can all look back at their memories, and conclude that they were you, but you can’t simply reverse that and conclude that you will be them , because the set-up is asymmetrical.
But that isn’t an experience. It’s two experiences. You will not have an experience of having two experiences. Two experiences will experience having been one person.
Are you going to care about 1000 different copies equally?
Sure; from my perspective, you’re saying the same thing as me.
How am I supposed to choose between them?
By “equally” I meant:
“in the same ways (and to the same degree)”.
If you actually believe in florid many worlds, you would end up pretty insuoucient, since everything possible happens, and nothing can be avoided.