I see “burden of proof” as a misconcept in the same way that someone “deserving” something is. A better way of thinking about this: “You seem to be making a strong claim. Mind sharing the evidence for your claim for me? …I disagree that the evidence you present justifies your claim.”
For what it’s worth, I also see “must _” as a misconcept—although “must _ to _” is not. It’s an understandable usage if the “to _*” clause is implicit, but that doesn’t seem true in this case. So to fix up SIAI’s argument, you could say that these are the statements whose probabilities are being contested:
If SarahC takes action Y before the development of Technology X and Technology X is developed, the expected value of her action will exceed its cost.
Technology X will be developed.
And depending on their probabilities, the following may or may not be true:
SarahC wants to take action Y.
Pretty much anything you say that’s not relevant to one of statements 1 or 2 (including statements that certain people haven’t been “responsible” enough in supporting their claims) is completely irrelevant to the question of whether you want to take action Y. You already have (or ought to be able to construct) probability estimates for each of 1 and 2.
Your grasp of decision theory is rather weak if you are suggesting that when Technology X is developed is irrelevant to SarahC’s decision. Similarly, you seem to suggest that the ratio of value to cost is irrelevant and that all that matters is which is bigger. Wrong again.
But your real point was not to set up a correct decision problem, but rather to suggest that her questions about whether “certain people” have been “responsible” are irrelevant. Well, I have to disagree. If action Y is giving money to “certain people”, then their level of “responsibility” is very relevant.
I did enjoy your observations regarding “burden of proof” and “must”, though probably not as much as you did.
Your grasp of decision theory is rather weak if you are suggesting that when Technology X is developed is irrelevant to SarahC’s decision.
Of course that is important. I didn’t want to include a lot of qualifiers.
I’m not trying to make a bulletproof argument so much as concisely give you an idea of why I think SarahC’s argument is malformed. My thinking is that should be enough for intellectually honest readers, as I don’t have important insights to offer beyond the concise summary. If you think I ought to write longer posts with more qualifications for readers who aren’t good at taking ideas seriously feel free to say that.
Similarly, you seem to suggest that the ratio of value to cost is irrelevant and that all that matters is which is bigger. Wrong again.
Really? So in some circumstances it is rational to take an action for which the expected cost is greater than the expected value? Or it is irrational to take an action for which the expected value exceeds the expected cost? (I’m using “rational” to mean “expected utility maximizing”, “cost” to refer to negative utility, and “value” to refer to positive utility—hopefully at this point my thought process is transparent.)
If action Y is giving money to “certain people”, then their level of “responsibility” is very relevant.
It would be a well-formed argument to say that because SIAI folks make strong claims without justifying them, they won’t use money SarahC donates well. As far as I can tell, SarahC has not explicitly made that argument. (Recall I said that she might have a correct argument in her mind but she isn’t giving us all the pieces.)
I did enjoy your observations regarding “burden of proof” and “must”, though probably not as much as you did.
Please no insults, this isn’t you versus me is it?
Similarly, you seem to suggest that the ratio of value to cost is irrelevant and that all that matters is which is bigger. Wrong again.
Really? So in some circumstances it is rational to take an action for which the expected cost is greater than the expected value?
No, your error was in the other direction. If you look back carefully, you will notice that the ratio is being calculated conditionally on Technology X being developed. Given that the cost is sunk regardless of whether the technology appears, it is possible that SarahC should not act even though the (conditionally) expected return exceeds the cost.
Please no insults, this isn’t you versus me is it?
Shouldn’t be. Nor you against her. I was catty only because I imagined that you were being catty. If you were not, then I surely apologize.
I didn’t say what SarahC should do with the probabilities once she had them. All I said was that they were pretty much all was relevant to the question of whether she should donate. Unless I didn’t, in which case I meant to.
I see “burden of proof” as a misconcept in the same way that someone “deserving” something is. A better way of thinking about this: “You seem to be making a strong claim. Mind sharing the evidence for your claim for me? …I disagree that the evidence you present justifies your claim.”
For what it’s worth, I also see “must _” as a misconcept—although “must _ to _” is not. It’s an understandable usage if the “to _*” clause is implicit, but that doesn’t seem true in this case. So to fix up SIAI’s argument, you could say that these are the statements whose probabilities are being contested:
If SarahC takes action Y before the development of Technology X and Technology X is developed, the expected value of her action will exceed its cost.
Technology X will be developed.
And depending on their probabilities, the following may or may not be true:
SarahC wants to take action Y.
Pretty much anything you say that’s not relevant to one of statements 1 or 2 (including statements that certain people haven’t been “responsible” enough in supporting their claims) is completely irrelevant to the question of whether you want to take action Y. You already have (or ought to be able to construct) probability estimates for each of 1 and 2.
Your grasp of decision theory is rather weak if you are suggesting that when Technology X is developed is irrelevant to SarahC’s decision. Similarly, you seem to suggest that the ratio of value to cost is irrelevant and that all that matters is which is bigger. Wrong again.
But your real point was not to set up a correct decision problem, but rather to suggest that her questions about whether “certain people” have been “responsible” are irrelevant. Well, I have to disagree. If action Y is giving money to “certain people”, then their level of “responsibility” is very relevant.
I did enjoy your observations regarding “burden of proof” and “must”, though probably not as much as you did.
Of course that is important. I didn’t want to include a lot of qualifiers.
I’m not trying to make a bulletproof argument so much as concisely give you an idea of why I think SarahC’s argument is malformed. My thinking is that should be enough for intellectually honest readers, as I don’t have important insights to offer beyond the concise summary. If you think I ought to write longer posts with more qualifications for readers who aren’t good at taking ideas seriously feel free to say that.
Really? So in some circumstances it is rational to take an action for which the expected cost is greater than the expected value? Or it is irrational to take an action for which the expected value exceeds the expected cost? (I’m using “rational” to mean “expected utility maximizing”, “cost” to refer to negative utility, and “value” to refer to positive utility—hopefully at this point my thought process is transparent.)
It would be a well-formed argument to say that because SIAI folks make strong claims without justifying them, they won’t use money SarahC donates well. As far as I can tell, SarahC has not explicitly made that argument. (Recall I said that she might have a correct argument in her mind but she isn’t giving us all the pieces.)
Please no insults, this isn’t you versus me is it?
No, your error was in the other direction. If you look back carefully, you will notice that the ratio is being calculated conditionally on Technology X being developed. Given that the cost is sunk regardless of whether the technology appears, it is possible that SarahC should not act even though the (conditionally) expected return exceeds the cost.
Shouldn’t be. Nor you against her. I was catty only because I imagined that you were being catty. If you were not, then I surely apologize.
I edited my post before I saw your response :-P
I’m sorry, I don’t see any edits that matter for the logic of the thread. What am I missing?
OK, my mistake.
I didn’t say what SarahC should do with the probabilities once she had them. All I said was that they were pretty much all was relevant to the question of whether she should donate. Unless I didn’t, in which case I meant to.