...but I don’t want to be rational for deep philosophical reasons. My justification is that (instrumental) rationality is useful. To demonstrate that, one would have to look at outcomes for those behaving rationally and those behaving irrational—not necessarily easy, but definitely a tractable problem.
I am not talking about a prescriptive theory that tells, whether one should be rational or not. I am talking about a rational theory, that produces a taxonomy of different ways of being rational or irrational without making a stance on which way should be chosen. Such a theory already implicitly advocates rationality, so it doesn’t need to explicitly arrive at conclusions about whether one ought to be rational or not.
...but I don’t want to be rational for deep philosophical reasons. My justification is that (instrumental) rationality is useful. To demonstrate that, one would have to look at outcomes for those behaving rationally and those behaving irrational—not necessarily easy, but definitely a tractable problem.
I am not talking about a prescriptive theory that tells, whether one should be rational or not. I am talking about a rational theory, that produces a taxonomy of different ways of being rational or irrational without making a stance on which way should be chosen. Such a theory already implicitly advocates rationality, so it doesn’t need to explicitly arrive at conclusions about whether one ought to be rational or not.