Smoking lesion is a problem with a logical contradiction in it. The decision is simultaneously a consequence of the lesion, and of the decision theory’s output (but not one of it’s inputs, such as e.g. the desire to smoke, in which case it’s this desire that will correlate, and conditional on that desire, the decision itself won’t).
edit: smoking lesion problem seems more interesting from psychological perspective. Perhaps it is difficult to detect internal contradictions within a hypothetical that asserts an untruth—any “this smells fishy” feeling is mis-attributed to the tension between the fact of how smoking kills and the hypothetical genetics.
It could, thus, be very useful to come up with a real world example instead of using such hypotheticals.
Smoking lesion is a problem with a logical contradiction in it. The decision is simultaneously a consequence of the lesion, and of the decision theory’s output (but not one of it’s inputs, such as e.g. the desire to smoke, in which case it’s this desire that will correlate, and conditional on that desire, the decision itself won’t).
edit: smoking lesion problem seems more interesting from psychological perspective. Perhaps it is difficult to detect internal contradictions within a hypothetical that asserts an untruth—any “this smells fishy” feeling is mis-attributed to the tension between the fact of how smoking kills and the hypothetical genetics.
It could, thus, be very useful to come up with a real world example instead of using such hypotheticals.