Right, I didn’t mean to imply that it was. But Eliezer seemed to be saying that picking 1A is irrational in general, in addition to the paradox, which is the notion that I was disputing. It’s possible that I misinterpreted him, however.
What Caledonian is discussing is the certainty effect- essentially, having a term in your utility function for not having to multiply probabilities to get an expected value. That’s different from risk aversion, which is just a statement that the utility function is concave.
Right, I didn’t mean to imply that it was. But Eliezer seemed to be saying that picking 1A is irrational in general, in addition to the paradox, which is the notion that I was disputing. It’s possible that I misinterpreted him, however.
He makes it clearer in comments.
What Caledonian is discussing is the certainty effect- essentially, having a term in your utility function for not having to multiply probabilities to get an expected value. That’s different from risk aversion, which is just a statement that the utility function is concave.