It would only be incompatible with consequentialism if the world contains infinite amounts of value. Moreover, all plausible moral theories include a consequentialist principle: non-consequentialist theories simply say that, in many cases, you are permitted or required not to act as that principle would require (because this would be too costly for you, would violate other people’s rights, etc.). Bostrom’s paper raises a problem for ethical theory generally, not for consequentialism specifically.
This sounds incompatible with consequentialism, for reasons pointed out by Nick Bostrom.
It would only be incompatible with consequentialism if the world contains infinite amounts of value. Moreover, all plausible moral theories include a consequentialist principle: non-consequentialist theories simply say that, in many cases, you are permitted or required not to act as that principle would require (because this would be too costly for you, would violate other people’s rights, etc.). Bostrom’s paper raises a problem for ethical theory generally, not for consequentialism specifically.
You get problems if you think it’s even possible (p>0) that the world be canonically infinite, not merely if the world actually is infinite.
Bostrom’s paper is excellent, and I recommend people read it. It is long, but only because it is exhaustive.