If Clippy wants to be efficient, Clippy must be rational and knowledgeable. If Clippy wants to be rational, CLippy must value reason. The—open—question is whether Clippy can become ever more rational without realising at some stage that Clipping is silly or immoral. Can Clippy keep its valuation of clipping firewalled from everything else in its mind, even when such doublethink is rationally disvalued?
The first usage of ‘rational’ in the parent conforms to the standard notions on lesswrong. The remainder of the comment adopts the other definition of ‘rational’ (which consists of implementing a specific morality). There is nothing to the parent except taking a premise that holds with the standard usage and then jumping to a different one.
The remainder of the comment adopts the other definition of ‘rational’ (which consists of implementing a specific morality).
I haven’t put forward such a definition. I ’have tacitly assumed something like moral objectivism—but it is very tendentious to describe that in terms of arbitrarily picking one of a number of equally valid moralities. However, if moral objectivism is only possibly true, the LessWrongian argument doesn’t go through.
Downvoted for hysterical tone. You don’t win arguments by shouting.
The question makes no sense. You should consider it. What are the referents of “moral” and “clippy”? No need for an answer; I won’t respond again, since internet arguments can eat souls.
Arguing is not the point and this is not a situation in which anyone ‘wins’—I see only degrees of loss. I am associating the (minor) information hazard of the comment with a clear warning so as to mitigate damage to casual readers.
Warning: Parent Contains an Equivocation.
The first usage of ‘rational’ in the parent conforms to the standard notions on lesswrong. The remainder of the comment adopts the other definition of ‘rational’ (which consists of implementing a specific morality). There is nothing to the parent except taking a premise that holds with the standard usage and then jumping to a different one.
I haven’t put forward such a definition. I ’have tacitly assumed something like moral objectivism—but it is very tendentious to describe that in terms of arbitrarily picking one of a number of equally valid moralities. However, if moral objectivism is only possibly true, the LessWrongian argument doesn’t go through.
Downvoted for hysterical tone. You don’t win arguments by shouting.
What distinguishes moral objectivism from clippy objectivism?
The question makes no sense. Please do some background reading on metaethics.
The question makes no sense. You should consider it. What are the referents of “moral” and “clippy”? No need for an answer; I won’t respond again, since internet arguments can eat souls.
Arguing is not the point and this is not a situation in which anyone ‘wins’—I see only degrees of loss. I am associating the (minor) information hazard of the comment with a clear warning so as to mitigate damage to casual readers.
Oh, please. Nobody is going to be damaged by an equivocation, even if there were one there. More hysteria.
And argument is the point, because that is how rational people examine and test ideas.