As Kawoomba colorfully pointed out, clippy’s subroutines simulating humans suffering may be fully sentient. However, unless those subroutines have privileged access to clippy’s motor outputs or planning algorithms, clippy will go on acting as if he didn’t care about suffering. He may even understand that inflicting suffering is morally wrong—but this will not make him avoid suffering, any more than a thrown rock with “suffering is wrong” painted on it will change direction to avoid someone’s head. Moral wrongness is simply not a consideration that has the power to move a paperclip maximizer.
As Kawoomba colorfully pointed out, clippy’s subroutines simulating humans suffering may be fully sentient. However, unless those subroutines have privileged access to clippy’s motor outputs or planning algorithms, clippy will go on acting as if he didn’t care about suffering. He may even understand that inflicting suffering is morally wrong—but this will not make him avoid suffering, any more than a thrown rock with “suffering is wrong” painted on it will change direction to avoid someone’s head. Moral wrongness is simply not a consideration that has the power to move a paperclip maximizer.
That is construed and constructed a certain way. The counterargument makes other assumptions.